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Joining the Club

The management of public
policy campaigns

The case of Colombia's
accession to the OECD (2011-2018)

Juan Carlos Cortázar Velarde

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I. Introduction

Juan Carlos Cortázar¹

Between 2011 and 2018, the Colombian Government supported a prolonged campaign to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Some Latin American countries – Mexico and Chile – had already successfully traversed this path, while other aspirants had faced difficulties in completing. The campaign required a great transversal effort, involving almost all sectors of the Colombian Executive Branch and even entities of other branches of Government and agencies that enjoy constitutional autonomy. The purpose of this effort, to receive the formal invitation to become a member of the organization, required a thorough technical effort to demonstrate that the country complied satisfactorily with the values, policies, standards, and recommendations of the OECD in 23 areas of public policy.

¹ Peruvian (LIMA, 1964). Complete doctorate studies in Management (London School of Economics and Political Science), Magister in Management and Public Policy (University of Chile) and Bachelor of Sociology (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú). Professor of the Department of Social Sciences and the School of Government of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru. Part-time teacher in the Magister in Management and Public Policy at the University of Chile and at the Continental University (Peru).

The purpose of this study is to understand how the Colombian Government was able to design and manage such an extensive campaign without losing its way or succumbing to the gradual decline of the effort. The investigation therefore points to the fundamental question that any public manager would ask when faced with an experience that, despite adversities and time, achieves its purpose: *how did it work*, which then leads, at an analytical level, to the question: *why did it work*? Both questions generally arise from public managers' interest in learning from the experience of others, i.e., to extract knowledge applicable in the unique context – necessarily different from that of the experience observed – in which they perform their work.

Taking into account the aforementioned perspective, typical in the field of public management, an *instrumental case study* is chosen here. In this work, this equates to a case study that goes beyond the inherent interest in the uniqueness of the historical process under study (Colombia's campaign to join the OECD), and places emphasis on understanding its functioning from more general conceptual concerns (the functioning of policy interventions which, as will be argued below, can be understood with reference to the conceptual type called *public policy campaign*). Case studies are a methodology recurrently used in the field of Social Sciences (YIN, 1994), as well as in the field of management and public policies. This study is part of the line of research promoted by Barzelay (2007, 2019), which seeks to generate knowledge in the field of public management through a specific type of case study (which the author has recently called design-focused case studies). Although this study is indebted to that perspective and takes up many of Barzelay's old and recent propositions, it is not a rigid or direct application of his most recent synthesis (2019), being perhaps closer to the 2007 synthesis. As for the methodology followed for the explanation of the study design and the production and management of information, it largely responds to the guidelines previously proposed by Barzelay and Cortázar (2004).

In what follows, section II presents the evidence of the case in the form of a narrative, which is based on semi-structured interviews with nine actors directly involved in the campaign, as well as secondary² material. The evidence responds exclusively to the perspective of Colombian actors. The perspective of OECD actors was not considered in the research design. Section III presents the conceptual framework used to frame the case, which models the experience under study as a *process* and, more specifically, as a *public policy campaign*. Section IV contains the analysis of the evidence, and seeks to understand the events of the campaign from the aforementioned processual perspective. To this end, we follow Barzelay's (2007, 2019) proposal to study the events because of the interaction between the characteristics of the design and execution of the experience under study and the contextual factors in which it unfolded. Finally, section V offers a set of possible lessons learned from the experience studied, knowledge that could be useful in contexts other than that of the experience under study.³

² With reference to the relevance of this methodological decision, see: Barzelay and Cortázar, 2004.

³ This section moves away from the usual tendency to present "lessons" or "good practices" that claim to be valid in different contexts and opportunities and is oriented rather to suggest lines of reflection that readers can follow when facing their tasks as public managers involved in public policy campaigns.

The study was conducted at the request of Brazil's National School of Public Administration (ENAP). We are grateful for the dialogue, interest, and follow-up provided by Diana Coutinho and Guilherme Mansur from ENAP, as well as the dialogue and support of Juliana Torres from Colombia's Department of Public Administration. We are also grateful for the guidance and very timely discussions with Professor Michael Barzelay of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Finally, we would like to thank the nine interviewees who agreed to share their experiences as part of the campaign under study.

II. The process of Colombia accession to the OECD (2011-2018)

1. Knocking on the door: the first steps

On January 24, 2011, President Juan Manuel Santos attended the Council of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris and formally requested its 33 members to initiate the necessary process for Colombia's entry into the organization. In justifying his request, the President stated that Colombia wanted to be part of the OECD because he saw in it "the club of good practices" for Government and public policy. Regarding his country, Santos also said that his intention was to adopt the "threshold that the OECD has for the entry of countries to this club" as a standard or reference for the South American⁴ country's development policy. In the immediate term, the goal was clear: the Colombian Government had to demonstrate to the member countries, through the process established by the OECD, that it complied satisfactorily with all the technical standards that guided the organization.

During the electoral process that led him to the Presidency in June 2010, Santos had included Colombia's entry into organizations such as NATO and the OECD among his proposals. As President-elect, during a tour of Europe in July of the same year, the governments of Germany and France supported the idea of Colombia's accession to the OECD. During that same tour, Santos held talks with the OECD⁵ General Secretariat.

⁴ The Spectator, November 24, 2011.

⁵ Portfolio, July 7, 2010.

As a result of these talks, and as a preliminary approach to formally requesting accession, the Colombian government initiated technical talks with ten OECD technical committees on highly sensitive issues for member countries, such as public integrity, financial management, and regulatory policies, among others.

Back in Bogota after the visit to the OECD Council in early 2011, it was necessary to hold someone accountable for what would soon become the accession process. Analogous to the way in which the president decided to face one of the main issues of his Government agenda, the peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Santos chose to hold directly and personally responsible one of the High Councils that were part of his immediate setting in the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the Republic (Presidency, in the following). This Department was responsible for the cross-cutting coordination of the actions of the Government, of the ministries and agencies that formed it, and included the High Councils, designated according to the presidential agenda to address specific issues. Catalina Crane was, since the beginning of the Government in 2010, in charge of the High Council for Competitiveness and Public-Private Management, and it was her that the President, returning from Paris, made responsible for the “OECD process.”

Catalina Crane, an economist with degrees in Colombia and the United States, already had extensive work experience in both the public and private sectors. Her relationship with President Santos dates back at least to 1994, when she joined the Good Government Foundation that Santos had recently created. She also accompanied him in his unsuccessful first attempt to run for the Presidency in 1997. In 2000, she was appointed Vice Minister when Santos took over as Finance Minister in the administration of President Pastrana. As part of her responsibilities, Crane organized the discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that were necessary for the IMF's support of the Colombian economic process.

Crane's assignment was part of the set of responsibilities that she assumed as High Counselor. In time, Crane needed to form a Working Group, because the process required increased effort in keeping the work of various Ministries and Agencies with the ten OECD committees

referred to above aligned and coordinated. However, from the start and until 2013, this instance consisted exclusively of the incorporation of an Access Coordinator, who worked under Crane's orders. The creation of the Working Group was formalized by means of a Decree and a Presidential Directive, instruments necessary both for the Government to make the agreed payments to the OECD to finance the accession⁶ process, and for the ministries involved to include in their annual budgets funds to finance travel, conferences, and studies related to accession. However, no specific budget lines were created, nor were any new accession related positions created for Crane or the Coordinator, who were formally designated as advisors to the Presidency.

Crane and the Coordinator immediately began pursuing three lines of action. The first concerned discussions with ten technical committees, some of which had already been in contact since 2010. As part of this line of action, Colombia asked the OECD to conduct a set of studies, consisting of an assessment of the state of Colombian public policies in the areas corresponding to those committees⁷. To promote technical dialogue around these ten studies, the ministries that would necessarily be involved were identified, and a technical team was organized in each area, usually under the leadership of a vice-minister. The deputy ministers in charge functioned as "liaisons" with the Coordinator and Crane.

As a second line of work, and as part of a strategy aimed at showing "goodwill" in terms of aligning with the organization's standards, the Government decided to formally adhere to a relevant set of OECD legal instruments. Therefore, between 2011 and 2013, the Government of Colombia signed the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the Agreement on Exchange of Information on

⁶ The *Roadmap* established that, from the date of its approval, Colombia undertook to cover all expenses related to the accession process, including the cost of the organization's technical staff working time, missions, meetings, documentation, coordination and management, communications and miscellaneous expenses.

⁷ Reviews were published in the following areas: public governance, regulatory reform, territorial development policy, and environmental sustainability policies.

Tax Matters and the Anti-Bribery Convention. Along the same lines, Colombia became a member of the OECD Development Centre, the organization's think tank for dialogue between member countries and non-member developing countries. Finally, a course of action consisted of developing a consistent political and diplomatic approach to gain the support of OECD member Governments for Colombia's intention to join the organization.

2) Establishing an initial position: *the Initial Memorandum*

Approximately two years after President Santos expressed his interest to the OECD concerning Colombia's accession, in May 2013, the OECD Council decided to formally open negotiations with the country⁸. The OECD General Secretariat was to establish the terms, conditions and process for accession. The *Roadmap for the Accession of Colombia to the OECD Convention*⁹, approved in September 2013 – without the Colombian Government being able to negotiate its content – sets out in detail the requirements and characteristics of the process. The core of the *Roadmap* was to specify the scope and content of a broad set of in-depth technical reviews to be conducted by the organization's 23 technical committees. These committees covered almost every public policy area a country might have, considering economic, environmental, social, financial, governmental, scientific, and technological issues. These studies would provide the Council with a formal opinion on two aspects: i) Colombia's intention and ability to implement OECD policy instruments, and ii) an assessment of Colombia's public policies and practices against the best policies and practices adopted by the OECD in each technical area.

⁸ In the same resolution, the Council authorized similar negotiations with Costa Rica, Latvia, and Lithuania. As of the formal entry date of Colombia (2020), Latvia and Lithuania (2018) had completed the process and obtained access.

⁹ [https://one.OECD.org/document/C\(2013\)110/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.OECD.org/document/C(2013)110/FINAL/en/pdf)

Therefore, while the first aspect had a relatively concrete reference point (around 250 decisions, recommendations, declarations, and international agreements, i.e., formal documents), the second alluded to a set of standards, recommendations and technical proposals, the degree of concreteness of which varied according to the policy area in question. In areas such as Chemistry and Statistics, for example, the policy standards with which the country had to comply were clearly established. In other areas, such as Public Governance, Education, or Labor and Employment, the precision of the standards was more diffuse, often referring to values and criteria rather than specific indicators.

The starting point of the technical discussion process was the presentation by the Colombian Government of an *Initial Memorandum*. This document had to clearly state the country's position in relation to each of the 250 instruments referred to in the previous paragraph, also indicating how Colombian legislation, policies, and practices were coherently aligned with those instruments. Regarding the position with respect to the instruments, the *Roadmap* established that the possible alternatives were: acceptance, acceptance with a clear timeframe for implementation, acceptance subject to reservations or observations, rejection.

The document clearly stated that Colombia was expected to use the last two options very exceptionally, warning also that resorting to them would affect the Council's final decision on whether the country should join the organization.

In the Chair's office, Crane and the Working Group had to work quickly to prepare and deliver the *Initial Memorandum*, since this was the key that would open the door to direct technical negotiations between the Government and the staff of the OECD committees. It also needed to be done in such a way that the formal invitation from the OECD to join the organization would occur within President Santos' term of office (which ended in 2014). Such an invitation, however, would only take place after the 23 Committees had expressed to the Council a formal positive opinion regarding the country's alignment with the required instruments and standards.

The responsibilities of Catalina Crane and the Access Coordinator at that time included continuing to promote technical discussions with the 10 committees with which contact had been maintained since 2010, to which was now added the preparation of the *Initial Memorandum*. Therefore, they had to decide which of the seventeen ministries were responsible for establishing the country's position on each of the 250 instruments, ensuring that it corresponded to one of the two "acceptance" options indicated in the *Roadmap*; ensuring that the position adopted was written down and justified in a way that was acceptable to the OECD; and finally, establishing who would review all the responses so that they were in line with the purpose of joining the organization.

Considering the policy areas of the instruments, Crane and the Coordinator identified the ministries and agencies that needed to give their opinion on the instruments, and to promote and follow up on their work, the decision was made to scale up the way of working that had been followed with 10 OECD committees since 2010: organize technical teams (necessarily with greater transversality than before) and designate a vice-minister or official as leader and, at the same time, as "liaison" of each team with the Presidency. The practice of holding monthly meetings – or more frequently if necessary – between these liaisons with Crane and the Access Coordinator was also initiated. These meetings were almost always held at the President's office. During these meetings, doubts were clarified, the progress of each technical team was monitored, and instructions were "downloaded" from the Presidency to the ministerial teams.

Regarding the preparation and drafting of the country's position with respect to each OECD instrument, a major difficulty was to ensure that the participants in the teams had a clear notion of what was required for the *Initial Memorandum*. As indicated in the *Roadmap*, each OECD instrument had to be analyzed to determine how the Colombian institutional framework, legislation, and regulatory frameworks met or did not meet the requirements. If the assessment indicated that the country was still far from complying with the provisions of the instrument, the *Initial Memorandum* needed to propose a work plan and a period to achieve compliance through legislation, policy design, or reforms. The justification had to be as succinct and direct as possible. Expressed in the colloquial way of the

country, Crane considered that the main thing was “abuse” – to mark aligned things and identify which were not within the OECD instruments. However, and except for the actors who had already participated in the technical conversations with the OECD since 2010, this type of exercise did not come naturally to many of the actors involved in the task, for whom the normal tendency was to elaborate extensive dissertations on the progress made by their ministries, showing all the achievements obtained in each policy area.

This tendency had to be controlled by the Presidency, and it was then necessary for Crane and the Access Coordinator to edit and narrow the scope. This work also involved ensuring the alignment of the responses to each instrument with the strategic orientation of the overall effort, i.e., convincing the OECD staff of the country’s willingness to adequately navigate the accession process. This implied avoiding possible contradictions between arguments used to establish a position for different instruments, as well as exaggerations regarding the degree of alignment of Colombian policies with the OECD instruments. Consequently, it was necessary for the Presidency’s editing work to place emphasis on gauging the coherence and accuracy with which the ministerial teams argued in favor of the existing degree of compliance. Although this work of decentralized argumentation and centralized editing or verification was demanding, during the preparation of the *Initial Memorandum* there were no major conflicts among the ministerial teams or between them and the Presidency.

One factor undoubtedly facilitated cross-cutting cooperation and acceptance by ministers and officials of the strong and visible centralizing role of Crane and the Access Coordinator, namely, everyone was aware that the campaign to accede to the OECD was a matter “of the President’s heart.” In fact, President Santos himself, during Council of Ministers meetings, insisted on knowing the extent of the campaign’s progress. This led to an unexpected effect: the ministers were looking for ways to show an effective link between their agendas and the OECD campaign, since this offered them the possibility of introducing sectoral initiatives or measures into the presidential agenda. Therefore, the Presidential team also had to limit the use of the argument “this is an issue for the OECD” which, many times, served only as a framework or steppingstone for an initiative, Decree or ministerial measure to obtain presidential attention.

In March 2014, seven months after the *Roadmap* was approved, the Government of Colombia formally presented the *Initial Memorandum* in Paris. Catalina Crane traveled for the presentation and, as of that milestone, left her post in Bogota to lead the accession process from Paris. Since Colombia did not yet have a diplomatic delegation to the OECD, Crane moved to the offices provided by the Chilean Mission to that Organization¹⁰. In the Presidency, María Lorena Gutiérrez, an industrial engineer and finance specialist educated in the United States, who served as High Counselor for Good Governance, replaced Crane in leading the OECD accession process. The accession campaign was thus in the hands of the two officials, one based in the Presidency and therefore able to control the work of the ministries and national teams, and the other based in Paris, where Crane could maintain close relations with the representatives of the OECD member countries and the organization's directors.

3. Convincing members: the technical assessments

In May 2014, the Government of Colombia was able to initiate the next step, together with the OECD technical staff. This consisted of the *technical reviews* that, as established in the *Roadmap*, were to be performed in the policy area corresponding to 23 committees of the Organization (Box 1 shows the 23 thematic areas).¹¹ Once Colombia had the formal approval of the committees, the OECD Secretariat General would prepare a general report and a recommendation to the OECD Council, which would decide whether to accept Colombia as a member of the Organization.

¹⁰ Chile was the Latin American country that most recently joined the organization, in 2010.

¹¹ Each Technical Committee had a seat for those member countries that, given their interest in the area, so decided. On the other hand, the Committees had a staff of technical experts in the policy area in question.

The step to be taken now posed a set of important challenges. The first concerned the scope of the effort undertaken up to that point. While the Colombian Government had, on its own initiative, begun technical discussions and requested several studies from the OECD in 2012 in 10 of the policy areas in question, the thematic scope was now doubled, as they would have to negotiate in parallel with the technical staff of the 23 committees of the Organization.

Box 1

The technical committees of the OECD

Investments
Bribery in international business transactions
Corporate governance
Financial markets
Insurance and private pensions
Competitiveness
Tax matters
Environmental policies
Chemicals
Public governance
Regulatory policy
Territorial development policies
Statistics
Economic and development assessment
Educational policy
Employment, work and social affairs
Health
Commerce
Farming
Fishing
Scientific and technological policy
Information, computing and communications policy
Consumer policy

A second challenge was posed by the negotiation deadlines. The *Roadmap* did not make any requirements in this regard, stating that the duration of the negotiations depended exclusively on the Government's ability to provide the required information to each Committee. It did state clearly, however, that the General Secretariat would not prepare the final report and recommendations to the OECD Council until all 23 committees had formally expressed their favorable opinion on Colombia's policies and practices. More precisely, it stated that the opinions of the committees were to be forwarded to the Secretariat "*as a single package.*" This provision prevented taking advantage of the fact that in some areas it would be easier and quicker to reach a final agreement (the 10 areas in which Colombia had already been working with the OECD, for example), since in practice the final deadline would be decided by the last committee to give its approval. And while the OECD had no definite deadline for concluding the accession process, on the Colombian side there was obvious pressure, related to President Santos' term in office. The president had won re-election in June 2014, for a term that would run until 2018. And while the re-election campaign had not had a direct effect on the *Initial Memorandum* process, it was clear that such a visible item on the president's agenda had to be brought to a successful conclusion before his administration finally ended in 2018. A delay would mean that access to the OECD could not count as a success of his administration or, in the worst case, that the process would not be continued by the next administration, rendering useless the entire effort.

The third challenge was the nature of the argumentative effort that needed to be made. The *Initial Memorandum* had required Colombian officials to affirm, in writing and in a convincing manner, that the country's laws and regulations complied with the purposes and contents of the 250 OECD policy instruments. Now, instead, it was necessary to address the second dimension of assessment that the *Roadmap* established, i.e., the review of Colombia's policies and practices versus the best policies and practices recommended by the Organization. This implied that the negotiation had to take place in the broader, more detailed and complex terrain of the OECD's standards, recommendations and technical proposals, whose degree of concreteness and delimitation varied according to the policy area in question. As if that were not enough, the Government also had

to demonstrate that the country's policies and practices respected (or advocated) the basic principles that guided the Organization's policies and practices and which, for each policy area, were set out in the Annex to the *Roadmap* (Box 2 includes a small sample of the basic principles, showing that they ranged from those that could be precise and easily verified to those that consisted of the enunciation of public policy values that were complex to interpret and difficult to follow). In addition, during the negotiations, government officials and OECD technicians were to agree on a *Roadmap* for the country to achieve compliance with any of the normative instruments left pending in the *Initial Memorandum*. Similarly, *Roadmaps* needed to be established that would allow -prior to approval by the relevant committee- Colombia to comply with policy and practice standards that, in the judgment of the OECD technical staff, the country was not yet in compliance with.

Thus, the Colombian Government's advocacy needed to be deployed on different fronts. First, it had to demonstrate compliance with the issuance of regulatory measures that had been committed to in the *Initial Memorandum*, demonstrate compliance with OECD policy and practice standards, commit to and demonstrate compliance with those measures that had been agreed on to cover possible gaps with those standards. Finally, the effort needed to convince technical experts and committee members that Colombian policies complied with policy principles that could be very precise or, on the contrary, quite diffuse.

Together, the three challenges created a complex scenario, in which for the entire process to fail, all that was needed was for a single member country of a single committee to not agree to give a favorable opinion on any Colombian standard, policy, or practice.

Box 2

Basic principles of OECD policy

Eliminate international double taxation on income and capital by complying with the substantive conditions underlying the OECD model tax convention (Tax Affairs Committee).

Combat harmful tax practices in accordance with the 1998 OECD Recommendation and Related Reports (Tax Affairs Committee).

Promote the use of economic instruments to improve the allocation and efficient use of resources and better reflect the social costs of resource use, waste and pollution (Environmental Policy Committee).

Ensure the quality and relevance of environmental information and its availability to the public (Environmental Policy Committee).

Transparency and accountability to promote and facilitate accountability for Government action and inclusive stakeholder participation in policy design and implementation (Public Governance Committee).

The use of performance indicators and data on public governance, including performance data for eventual inclusion in the governance database published every two years in Government at a Glance.

Structural policy configurations in product, labor and financial markets consistent with promoting improved economic performance (Economic and Development Assessment Committee).

Guarantee the quality and effectiveness of education and training programs and improve the quality of learning outcomes (Education Policy Committee).

3.1) A network of targeted campaigns

As noted, the new phase involved a significant broadening of the thematic scope of negotiations with OECD committees. In those areas where there were no major gaps in compliance with OECD instruments or difficulties in demonstrating correspondence with their policies and practices, it was sufficient to insist on the concepts expressed in the *Initial Memorandum* and to participate in one or perhaps two meetings of the corresponding Committee in Paris, at which the Committee's positive opinion was obtained. This was the case, for example, of the Education, Health, and Pension Committees. But there were other committees where, for various reasons, negotiations could not be so straightforward and expeditious. In the case of the Environment Committee, for example, complexity stemmed from the fact that 30% of the OECD instruments that served as a reference for negotiations were concentrated in this area. The Public Governance Committee, for its part, included simultaneous negotiations on eight policy areas, which were quite heterogeneous in content (Box 3). In the Employment and Trade Committees, as will be seen below, issues arose that went beyond the scope of technical negotiations, involving social actors from Colombia and some member countries and therefore requiring political negotiations between Governments.

This heterogeneity, as well as the need for technical work of greater scope and depth than that developed for the *Initial Memorandum*, resulted in the involvement of a larger number of actors (technical officials of the ministries, ministers and vice-ministers, Foreign Ministry officials, ambassadors, and representatives of civil society) who, in addition, could participate in a range of thematic areas. Therefore, for example, the Ministry of the Environment participated in three areas (Chemicals, Waste, Environmental Policy), coordinating the preparation and support of the Colombian position with at least four other ministries (Trade, Housing, Agriculture, and Finance). In the case of the Public Governance Committee, given the number of issues it had to consider, other parties participated substantively, including the National Planning Department, the Administrative Department of Civil Service, the Transparency Secretariat of the Presidency and the Ministry

of Technology and Information. The National Archive of the Nation, the National Department of Statistics and the Ministry of Justice were also involved in more specific aspects and at more limited moments.

Box 3
Public Governance Committee: policy areas

- Government structure
- Transparency and accountability
- Integrity in the public sector
- Budget performance
- Human resource management in the public sector
- Use of ICT and electronic Government
- Multi-level governance
- Performance indicators and data in Government

Therefore, considering the heterogeneity of the matter, the number of actors involved in the negotiations and the different challenges (technical and/or political) to be faced, the negotiation with each of the 23 OECD committees became a specific campaign within the larger accession process campaign.

To promote this sort of “network of campaigns,” the Chair and the Access Working Group decided to insist on the coordination and follow-up system that had enabled them to prepare the *Initial Memorandum*. This meant, on the one hand, confirming or identifying the entities and individuals who would participate in the negotiations with each committee. The entities (Ministries, Departments, Secretariats, etc.) were selected by comparing their roles and responsibilities with the contents and policy principles that the *Roadmap Annex* indicated for each committee. Among them, one entity was chosen to play the role of coordinating the Colombian counterpart. In terms of individuals, technical delegates (responsible for collecting, providing and interpreting information, answering questionnaires and doubts, as well as for sustained dialogue with OECD technicians) and high-level delegates (usually ministers or vice-ministers) were identified. All of them were chosen according to the regular and formal responsibilities

that corresponded to their jobs. Some officials had a partial commitment and others an exclusive commitment to the negotiations, but in no case were new technical or managerial positions created or designated for the OECD¹² negotiations. Furthermore, resources were not allocated to supplement the salaries of the officials involved in the process.

On the other hand, and despite the fact that the broadening of the scope and volume of the negotiations might have suggested otherwise, it was decided to maintain a very small core leadership of the campaign. Although, as noted above, the leadership role was split (or shared) between the High Advisor on Good Governance of the Presidency (in charge of María Lorena Gutiérrez) and the Representative Office to the OECD in Paris (in charge of Catalina Crane). In both cases, the team had very few members (at one point a maximum of 3 in Bogota and 3 or 4 in Paris, in addition to Gutierrez and Crane). This split responded to the need to adequately manage two distinctive fronts of the campaign. Thus, the Presidency's team maintained the coordination role with all the Colombian technical team liaisons (those designated as responsible), participated in all the meetings that these teams held with the OECD counterparts, and reviewed the successive versions of the responses to the questionnaires, decrees, norms, and other documents that were necessary for the progress of the negotiations. The Access Coordinator frequently attended the Council of Ministers to report on the progress of the accession process and on pending and future milestones, using a *scorecard* format. As a result, President Santos was kept informed of the progress and, simultaneously, could exert pressure on any ministry responsible for delays or backlogs

The Paris team explored what the representatives of the member countries thought about the accession process and Colombia's compliance. This made it possible to anticipate possible blockages and stumbling blocks in the negotiations, therefore providing feedback to the Bogotá team. Crane maintained close contact with the Bogotá team and the Foreign Ministry, and had direct access to President Santos. As mentioned below, when important deadlines expired without reaching agreement

¹² In the case of the Ministry of the Environment, our informant estimates that the technicians with part-time dedication to negotiations required 20 to 30% of their working time to do so.

with any of the member countries, or when there were demands from other Governments that could not be met through exclusively technical negotiations, it was necessary to exert diplomatic and political pressure on the representatives, ministers or even heads of state of the countries in question. For this responsibility, the formation of a task force was an extremely useful measure. It was composed of the President himself, the Foreign Minister, those responsible for the accession process both at the Presidency and in Paris, and the Minister of Finance.

3.2) The dynamics of negotiations

Technical negotiations began with the management of each Committee sending questionnaires that the Colombian counterpart had to answer. The objective was always aimed at demonstrating Colombia's compliance with the required standards and principles or, specifying the compliance issues that were necessary to address. The questionnaires were based on the experience of OECD technicians negotiating previous accession processes, and the degree of standardization and precision varied according to the committee in question. Based on a first response to said questionnaires – answers that were reviewed by the Presidency's central team – the OECD technical staff wrote a preliminary version of the *background* report that they had to present to the Committee at the end of the process. This version served as a baseline or starting point, and it stated: i) the status of the situation in Colombia's corresponding policy area(s) with respect to the standards and principles of the Organization, ii) a set of recommendations intended to close the gaps in cases where said standards or principles were not complied with, and iii) a work plan corresponding to said recommendations.

The Colombian counterpart had to provide the necessary information and evidence of compliance with the plan's milestones, which was done through virtual meetings with OECD technicians or through missions in which the latter visited Bogota. In cases with less complicated negotiations – because Colombia had already shown full compliance or was very close to it in the *Initial Memorandum*, or because the policy areas were more

objective and focused – a round of responses was sufficient, followed by the background report being presented to the corresponding Committee in Paris to obtain formal approval. In the cases of longer or more complicated negotiations, several rounds of questions and answers were necessary, in addition to various missions (up to 2 or 3 missions annually per Committee). In these cases, the rounds of meetings aimed to continually refine what was included in the background report. This task included both parties “*checking*” the items that were already completed thanks to the actions taken by the Colombian Government (usually by the establishment of norms, regulations, and guidelines along with indicators for future monitoring). Given that the OECD committees met only biannually or annually in Paris, the process explicitly aimed to establish an agenda of items that, in the period between Committee meetings, were expected to provide evidence of compliance. The pressure that these biannual or annual deadlines exerted on Colombian technicians was important. If the Government could not present evidence of compliance for any item or area previously agreed upon, or if its arguments were not convincing to the member countries, the item in question remained pending until the next meeting in six months or a year. Given that the accession process, as pointed out, could not advance to the next stage until all 23 committees gave their formal and final agreement, a delay in the approval of any item planned for a certain meeting in Paris, entailed a general delay of six months or a year for the entire accession process. Naturally, no one – neither technicians nor ministers – wanted to bear that responsibility before the president.

One way to avoid possible delays consisted of a highly detailed preparation of Colombian participation in the OECD committee meetings in Paris. As indicated, all negotiations had to pass, at least once, through said meetings, to obtain approval of the partial advances that were demonstrated or, in the best-case scenario, received final approval. These meetings were usually attended by the delegate whose ministry led the negotiation in question, accompanied by the representative in Paris (Catalina Crane) and, if necessary, someone from the sectoral technical team. The presence of the ministers, not being essential since the counterparts of the member countries did not always have this status (they were usually technicians

who focused on the details of the rules and policies under discussion), was a way of showing the Colombian Government's commitment at the highest possible political level. The meetings required prior preparation, in which the ministry in charge prepared a draft of the statement that the minister would make before the committee. Both teams, within the Presidency and in Paris, reviewed the draft and made improvements. Already in Paris, after the minister was informed of the OECD countries' positions and of possible concerns of member countries, a final version of the declaration was prepared as well as a script of the possible questions that members would ask, in addition to the correct answers. Before the meeting, the minister practiced reading and addressing both the statement and possible responses.

In some cases, especially those in which – as seen below – the negotiations resulted in political confrontation, the OECD technicians would request meetings with third parties, i.e., members of civil society organizations (NGOs, academia) or representatives of trade associations (employers, unions). Sometimes they organized the meetings themselves, based on similar organizations operating in member countries (as indicated below in the case of workers' unions). In other situations they left it up to the government to identify and convene such actors. The meetings could be behind closed doors or with the presence of government counterparts, as decided by the OECD mission.

The OECD also encouraged the government to seek assistance from other member governments on issues that the latter showed progress that would help Colombia close a compliance gap. This was the case in the negotiations on open data. The OECD recommended that Colombia learn first-hand about the experiences developed in the United Kingdom, Chile, and Mexico. For example, Colombia was internationally very well evaluated in terms of the availability of open data, but the indicators showed highly limited effective use of such data by citizens. The practices developed in Mexico in terms of technological developments, portals, and events to promote the use of data were emulated in Colombia, thus closing the gap identified with the OECD.

There were situations where the effort to close gaps led the country to adopt novel and far-reaching measures. Therefore, in the case of open data, although the Government had a clear open data strategy, this was not yet a legal obligation. Given the need to comply with this standard (legal mandate that would force the opening of government data), the Ministry of Technology and Information decided to take advantage of the opportunity. This led to Congress initiating talks on the Transparency Law project, and therefore, with the help of a senator, an article was included that required the mandatory nature of open data. In the case of public procurement (an area included in the scope of the Public Governance Committee), the negotiations led the Government to develop an entirely new regulatory system and to establish the National Agency for Public Procurement. In the field of public employment, the negotiations served as an impetus to initiatives that the Administrative Department of the Public Function had been promoting previously or in parallel, even being included in the Government's¹³ Development Plans. Another example of how the Access process was able to support and rely on Colombia's policy processes, was in the area of transparency. Therefore, because of the work performed with the Public Governance Committee, the Directorate for Participation, Transparency and Citizen Service was created in 2016 in the Presidency. Norms related to public integrity and the improvement of relationships between citizens and the State were also approved.

¹³ This included initiatives such as the Strategic Public Employment Plan 2015-2025, the SIGEP (Information and Employment Management System), and improvements in collective bargaining.




Considering the entire campaign, the Colombian State adopted a total of 51 public policy measures. This was achieved through laws, resolutions, decrees, and documents from the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (Box 4)¹⁴. The regulations provided and the entities created allowed for 100% compliance with OECD recommendations and standards, while also having a lasting effect on Colombian policies beyond achieving access itself. It is possible that without the additional push that the campaign to join the Agency provided, many of these initiatives would not have come to fruition or, perhaps, would not have even occurred.

Box 4
Policy measures taken during the accession
process to the OECD

- Anti-bribery and regulation and supervision laws for financial conglomerates.
- Transparent election and permanence in office of the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce.
- Framework agreement for mutual assistance in tax matters to avoid tax evasion.
- Laws to promote competition and productivity, copyright, regulatory improvement and agricultural census.
- Environmental regulations.
- Promotion of formality in labor relations, protection of trade unionists and strengthening of the Labor Ministry.
- Improvements in the corporate governance of commercial companies.
- Transparency mechanisms in public purchases.
- Adoption of the Declaration on foreign investment.

¹⁴ TORO, JOSÉ A. (2019). The OECD, a challenge for the insertion of Colombia in transnational economic law. In: Chamber of Commerce of Medellín for Antioquia. Reflections on the impacts for the country's merchants and entrepreneurs after Colombia's entry into the OECD.

Through successive rounds of questions and answers, missions, and elaboration of evidence of compliance on the Colombian side, each of the background reports was progressively refined with OECD technicians. President Santos consistently exercised a centralized control of contents and negotiation venues. He prepared a scorecard-like table to manage the wide range of items in negotiation, the recommendations to complete, and the commitments acquired. The adoption of traffic light-type tools, both at the level of the central equipment and of the technical equipment by area, facilitated the follow-up of negotiations (Box 5). These tools, both private and well-known, allowed the President’s team to address a vast set of negotiations and pending issues, taking into account that the process did not extend and the places did not extend.

Box 5 Public Governance Committee: monitoring tool	
Traffic light	Meaning
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are budgetary, regulatory or jurisprudential restrictions for this type of actions.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actions in process or in implementation. • Have financial resources. • They have support, either in the National Development Plan or in the entity's action plan. • When it comes to an external consultancy, it has already been hired.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action that has already been completed. • Decision that has already been taken and is in implementation.

There was, however, no communications policy to accompany either the overall process or the specific negotiations. The campaign lacked communicational elements that would give it an identity, such as a slogan, a logo, or colors that would represent it to the public. Although reports and certain forums, events, and announcements were made when some

important approval was achieved (for example, when one of the Committees gave its final approval), in the media the issue emerged mainly in light of important events (such as the OECD Secretary General's visit to Bogota in October 2013) or conflicts over the ongoing negotiations that resulted in actions of pressure or force, as was the case of the disagreements with truck drivers and workers' unions that will be described below. Given this lack of a communications policy, the general image that ended up being implanted, at least in a significant part of the public opinion, was that the government wanted Colombia to join "the club of rich countries".

3.3) Offering convincing evidence

The *Initial Memorandum* was clearly the starting point for the 23 technical evaluations. Considering its purpose – to express and support agreement or disagreement with the 250 normative instruments of the Organization – the Presidency team and the thematic technical teams achieved a significant degree of conciseness and objectivity in the document. In that case, the requirement consisted of expressing a position (in the vast majority of cases of acceptance or partial acceptance), offering a fundamentally legal argumentation of the position held, making express reference to national regulations (Constitution, laws, decrees, regulations), and, though to a lesser extent, to the implementation of policies. The language used was thus direct and markedly descriptive, incorporating – when deemed necessary – adjectives to reinforce that national norms and policies were "clear", "predictable", "transparent", "accountable" or "competent"; to cite a few examples. Gaps that were recognized between the OECD instruments and the reality in Colombia – related to shortcomings in the standards or weak or unfinished implementation – were usually presented in a positive way, insisting that the country was already working to overcome them. Where possible, the Presidency team pressured the technical teams to specify compliance deadlines. Another resource used was to mention that the standards and policies were based on or inspired by good practices in member countries of the Organization.

Although the technical assessments were a continuation of the effort to prepare the *Initial Memorandum*, there were some important differences. The first was that the starting point was no longer a unilateral manifestation of acceptance by the Colombian Government, but rather long and detailed questionnaires. The technical teams therefore had to answer questions of a very different scope (relative, for example, to the institutional structure of the three branches of the State or, at the other extreme, to the number of public unions created in recent years). This was done by considering, on the one hand that the information provided hit the target of what the OECD technical staff wanted to know and, on the other hand, that the interpretation made of said information demonstrated compliance with the standards and adherence to the principles of the Organization's policy. Accompanying the information with descriptions and assessments (made as comments within the responses), to promote that the counterpart's interpretations were closer to the desired purpose.

A second difference consisted in the fact that while in the *Initial Memorandum* the argumentation was basically legal (presentation, description, and assessment of legal norms), during the assessments it was essential to also provide data that proved the effective validity of national norms and regulations, as well as the extension and effective application of policy practices consistent with those of the OECD. The responses to the questionnaires sought to offer quantitative data (usually presented through tables) and qualitative data (presented through examples that were briefly related). But gathering such information posed a major logistical problem, given that the negotiations covered almost all of the State's areas of action and, therefore, involved numerous ministries and public agencies. Added to this was the fact that information was not always available or even existent. For example, the data on public employment, which was necessary for the negotiation on public governance, had to be built almost from scratch by the Department of Public Function since Colombia did not have complete information or historical series. There were areas, as in the case of transparency, where information was used that had been processed for other regional or international bodies. Therefore, the team in charge of this issue collected and used information generated by civil society organizations or data prepared for instances such as the follow-up

mechanism to the agreements of the OAS Convention against corruption, of which Colombia was a signatory. In more fortunate situations, it was possible to take advantage of data that flowed regularly from the monitoring tools of the State's management. This was the case with the Integrated Planning and Management Model, created in 2012, which collected information annually on the State's performance in areas such as ICTs, transparency, or acquisitions through a single reporting model.

Finally, a third difference between the technical assessments and the preparation of the *Initial Memorandum* was that while for the latter a unilateral manifestation on the part of the Government was sufficient, but for the technical assessments, the process consisted of rounds of successive conversations and meetings with the OECD technicians, during which the answers to the questions in the questionnaires were progressively refined. Therefore, both the data and its interpretation were continuously "massaged", in a constant coming and going of questions and answers, until compliance was achieved by the OECD technical team.

As previously mentioned, the Presidency's central team was constantly attentive to this process of generating and refining the responses to the questionnaires. Therefore, a member of said team was present whenever conversations or meetings with the OECD technicians were held in one of the 23 thematic areas. They reviewed the preparation of responses reached by Colombian technicians, as well as successive changes or extensions that were made to them because of the counterpart's concerns or requirements. This control exercise sought answers that were as precise and concise as possible (taking up the exercise already performed during the preparation of the *Initial Memorandum*), and responses that consistently pointed to the campaign's purpose: demonstrating how Colombia satisfied (or would soon meet) the standards and principles of the Organization.

4. Avoiding disaster

By 2017, most Committees had already agreed to give their formal approval to Colombia's accession to the Organization. Only three committees had yet to reach this decision, and it depended on them – given how the process was structured in the *Roadmap* – whether the entire effort was successful. Those committees were the Employment and Labor Affairs Committee, the Foreign Trade Committee, and the Public Governance Committee.

While Catalina Crane was still in charge of the office in Paris, in the Presidency, María Lorena Gutiérrez had left, in 2015, direct leadership of the accession process. In that year, Carolina Soto, who until then served as Vice Minister of Finance, took charge of the High Council for Competitiveness and Public-Private Management. Among her responsibilities was pushing for the completion of the access negotiations. As the months passed, the pressure of the final term to achieve their objective was increasingly being felt. President Santos' administration would end in August 2018, and without the possibility of re-election. Before this date, it was essential that the formal invitation for Colombia to access the Organization was obtained from the OECD Council, which depended on the explicit and unanimous agreement of each of the 23 committees. Therefore, in 2017, the negotiation with the three mentioned committees became markedly critical.

4.1) Two fronts in the negotiation on labor policies

In November 2015, a few months after Carolina Soto assumed leadership of the process on the Presidential side, the Government attended the meeting of the Employment and Labor Affairs Committee in Paris. The intention of the Government, after the dialogue actions with the unions and countries that had been performed, was to close the negotiations. However, in one of the few explicit setbacks that the process had in Paris, the Committee did not give its approval to what was negotiated, postponing the discussion until April 2016.

Negotiations in the area of labor were not easy. From the beginning, the Colombian public employee unions had opposed access to the OECD. They contacted similar organizations in member countries to intervene with their Governments so that the demands on Colombia regarding labor issue 27 were give more emphasis aligned with their vision. Tense discussions surfaced between a vision focused on the protection of labor rights of effectively and formally employed workers, on the one hand, and perspective that emphasized the expansion of labor opportunities to all workers, formally or informally employed or unemployed. Countries such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden presented objections and demands in the Committee that led to a lengthy negotiation. As part of the strategy to make the process viable, the Presidency team promoted periodic meetings with the Ministry of Labor and the unions. Visits were also made to countries such as Germany and Austria, which included trade union leaders. During these visits, host country Governments tried to mediate dissenting positions, but privately acknowledged that there was not much they could do about the insistence of the powerful unions in their countries.

The Government had been trying to align itself with OECD policies, which insisted on formalizing and, at the same time, expanding job opportunities, maintaining stability between the protectionist stance of the unions and part of the technical team of Ministry of Labor. But a change in the head of said ministry led to further delays¹⁵. The new minister, an economist and lawyer with extensive experience in political action and who was previously appointed Mayor in charge of Bogotá by President Santos, had a position closer to that of the unions and the countries that in the committee had not yet given their okay to Colombia. It was her responsibility to participate in the April 2016 meeting, during which she made two commitments that went in a different direction than what the Presidency, with the support of the Ministry of Finance, had previously negotiated.

¹⁵ This change was part of a renewal of President Santos' cabinet, aimed at preparing the Government for a post-conflict scenario after the peace talks held with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

The first commitment alluded to outsourcing. This was an issue that had been raised by the United States and, later, by Canada. Outsourcing consisted of the legal possibility for Colombian companies to hire workers through a third party, under different conditions than their regular employees, therefore reducing hiring costs. The United States argued that Colombia had already breached a labor agreement that it had signed with the US in the framework of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, by not definitively eliminating outsourcing, which they considered an unfair competition practice. It argued that if Colombia had not complied with that agreement, it would not do so within the OECD framework either. The Government maintained that said agreement did not imply the prohibition of this practice, and in a long and detailed negotiation effort, it drew up a Decree that regulated outsourcing without eliminating it. The rule established that outsourcing would be allowed to the extent that it would not establish a relationship of effective subordination of the outsourced worker with the company, and established a series of inadequate outsourcing indicators that needed to be considered. However, after the Committee meeting in April 2016, the new labor minister repealed the Decree, and issued a resolution that in fact prohibited all types of outsourcing. It was not possible for either the Presidency team or the Paris office to redirect the opinion that the minister expressed in the Committee, and in this way – as indicated by an informant – they had in the labor area “a whole year of comings and goings.” The access negotiating team was therefore caught between the coinciding positions of some OECD countries and that of the Ministry of Labor.

The second compromise alluded to a suggestion from Germany that Colombia could adopt the German model of unions by industry . While the new minister was highly in favor of this idea, both the Presidency and the Ministry of Finance refused to do so, insisting on the usual model of unionization by company. This issue and the previous one, in which there was not much possibility of reaching a consensus between the Presidency and the Ministry of Labor despite the meetings held even with President Santos, was resolved only when the Minister resigned from her position to become a presidential pre-candidate in 2017. The new minister-designate returned to the positions of the Presidency, regarding both the regulation of outsourcing and the maintenance of unionization only at the level of each company.

However, when the negotiations seemed to be back on track, some countries insisted on an issue that had also merited the Committee's attention. The problem, in their view, was the scant protection offered by the government to social leaders, especially trade union leaders, who had been suffering for many years from assassinations and threats by armed groups in the country¹⁶. The issue had also been part of the pact the country signed with the United States to make the Free Trade Agreement viable, and the government argued that it had taken important measures and that, at that time, it was providing police protection for 1,300 trade unionists. The discussion, however, since it alluded to the capacity of the Colombian judicial system to effectively prosecute and punish those guilty of murdering or threatening trade unionists, went beyond the thematic mandate of the Employment Committee, squarely impacting the negotiations taking place in the Public Governance Committee.

4.2) The surprising irruption of judicial deficiencies

With the Public Governance Committee, characterized by its great diversity of topics, the negotiations had proceeded as expected. Issues such as transparency and accountability, or administrative capacities at the sub-national level, had received attention and work, but without becoming serious problems. The problem of lack of security and consequent impunity in crimes against trade unionists, led unexpectedly to attention being paid to the area of justice, which was somewhat secondary in the negotiations in this area¹⁷. This took the negotiators by surprise. The Government, which although it had included the Ministry of Justice among the entities involved to report on the separation of powers and the structure of the State, did not consider it one of the key actors in the negotiation. To the

¹⁶ A BBC note in May 2013 indicated that 3,000 Colombian trade unionists had been assassinated since 1977. So far this year, four union leaders had already been assassinated, while the previous year the figure had risen to twenty.

¹⁷ Indeed, justice was only mentioned in one of the eight policy principles in Public Governance included in the *Roadmap*. Therefore, in the principle that refers to the general structure of the State, the need for effective justice institutions is mentioned generically.

technical staff of the OECD, who only very recently – in the case of Chile’s accession to the Organization – had given some attention to the issue and, therefore, lacked the set of questionnaires and indicators that they did have for other thematic areas.

Based on the problem of crimes against trade unionists, the countries that intervened in the matter – Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the United States –, also advanced on other aspects of the management of justice, such as the effective access of the citizens to justice and the local models of justice that Colombia had been implementing. As in the case of the Employment Committee, several civil society organizations in those countries, linked to the promotion of human rights, exerted pressure on their Governments to demand responses from the Colombian Government.

The Colombian Government should have paid immediate and important attention to the issue. A special working group was quickly organized in which the Presidency, the Ministries of Labor, Interior and Justice participated, as well as the Office of the Prosecutor, and – unlike what had happened in other areas of negotiations – the technical manager for the issues of justice (and not only the ministerial authority) attended meetings in Paris up to six times. To strengthen the Colombian position, the country’s Vice Prosecutor also accompanied the Government delegation on some occasions.

In response to the questions, the Government maintained that the rates of violence and impunity related to trade unionists were lower than in previous years, and that the Office of the Prosecutor had made important improvements in the prosecution of crimes. An important constitutional reform to the justice system, which had been discussed for a long time and which would have been a very good sign of the country’s commitment to improving access to justice, ended up being rejected by Congress. Given the situation, it was decided to provide greater prominence to another initiative also in progress, the development of a ten-year Justice Plan, which was immediately included in the National Development Plan.

The negotiation was slow and thorny. It required not only a lot of technical work with the OECD counterparts, but also intense diplomatic and political negotiation – even at the presidential level – with the Governments of the countries that raised the issue. A formal problem consisted in the fact that the previous country of the region admitted to the Organization, Chile, had not shown significant compliance after accessing a set of measures committed in justice. This strengthened the position of those countries that refused or hesitated to offer Colombia the same way out, that is, to establish compliance commitments after the granting of access. However, given that constitutional reform was no longer possible and that a large part of the measures to be adopted depended on other branches of the State – Congress and the Judiciary – the negotiation was aimed at establishing compliance indicators in as much detail as possible in three specific areas: access to justice, the implementation of local justice plans and, finally, the continuity in the application of the Survey of unsatisfied legal needs. In this regard, Colombia pledged a demonstration of progress during the two years following access to the Organization.

4.3) Hard commercial interests

Between July and August 2016, the Colombian Government had to face one of the longest and most severe transport stoppages that the country had ever experienced. The trucker strike, as it was called, lasted a total of forty-six days, blocked important roads of land communication, affecting agricultural producers and generating shortages in the cities. The conflict sparked heavy clashes between protesters and the police, resulting in injuries and even one death. At the origin of the conflict was a wide range of complaints regarding the working conditions of transporters, but also a highly visible point that derived directly from the negotiations with the OECD's Committee on Foreign Trade.

For some time, Colombia had legislation on land transportation that established a “one-to-one” policy regarding the renewal of the truck fleet. According to the policy, a new cargo truck could only be incorporated into the country's effective fleet if, correspondingly, an existing one was eliminated. This process was called “scrapping” (turning into scrap).

Transporters and businessmen in the sector defended this policy, pointing out that in this way an oversupply of trucks was avoided and that this also benefited the environment. However, in the framework of negotiations with the OECD, several countries (Germany, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States) argued that this policy constituted an entry barrier for trucks produced by their industries, establishing arbitrary barriers to competition. Although the Ministry of Transport had no interest in starting a conflict front with the powerful transport unions, and preferred to focus on its own sectoral agenda, the pressure generated by the need to move forward in negotiations with the OECD ultimately led to the preparation of a draft Decree that definitively eliminated “scrapping.” The publication of the draft of the Decree (following a practice of prior consultation that the Government had adopted at the suggestion of the OECD) ignited the spark that, in short, led to the trucking strike.

The government was caught between the need to resolve the conflict and growing pressure to conclude the OECD accession process that had begun five years earlier. The “scrapping”, however, signified a breaking point for negotiations with important OECD member countries, and the government was initially reluctant to give in on this point with the transporters. The prolongation of the conflict and its consequences in terms of shortages and higher prices, however, forced the government to make its position more flexible, until it decided not to issue the Decree that had been planned, committing itself to maintain the renewal of the fleet by means of the “one-to-one” system. This, of course, meant an important impasse in the negotiations with the Foreign Trade Committee, and technical, diplomatic, and political conversations were necessary with the countries that questioned the “one-for-one” policy in order to reach an intermediate solution by September 2016. This solution consisted of issuing a new decree regulating various aspects of “scrapping”, creating a fund to help truck drivers and, most importantly for the negotiations, committing to definitively deactivate the “one-to-one” policy in December 2018. Although a promise of post-accession compliance was not to the liking of the countries involved, the Committee finally accepted such a solution. This, as was to be expected, led to unrest and protests by businessmen and carriers, although the same kind of stoppage that had occurred months earlier.

An issue that was negotiated within the framework of the same Committee, in parallel to the “scrapping”, was the taxation of foreign and domestic liquors. The difference, which was interpreted by the countries of the Committee as a barrier to competition, was due to the fact that the production of spirits and wines was in the hands of the country’s Departments (sub-national governments), which were taxed differently from the private¹⁸ sector. The negotiations, headed on the Colombian side by the Ministry of Finance, led to a proposal to include in the National Development Plan the approval of a new Liquor Law, which would correct the tax inequality in question. However, at first, members of congress resisted the article referring to such Law, since it was feared that it would affect the income of their electoral jurisdictions. Finally, the idea was approved and in December 2016 the new Law was enacted.

During 2017, the Colombian Government estimated that, once the two issues that had focused attention and delayed the negotiation effort during the previous year had already been overcome, the long-awaited approval of the Committee would finally be obtained. Surprisingly, and at the beginning of 2018, the United States expressed its concern about matters related to the protection of intellectual property in general and the protection of patents related to the pharmaceutical sector in particular (Switzerland accompanied the concern in this last point). The claim came from provisions that Colombia would not have complied with in the framework of the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries, in matters of copyright. Regarding pharmaceutical companies, the concerns also referred to the drug price control system that the country maintained.

These claims, which could prolong the negotiations already well beyond the reasonable period to obtain access under the mandate of President Santos, implied significant problems for the Government. On the one hand, committees such as Health, which had already closed negotiations some time ago, could be forced to reopen talks. On the other hand, the consideration from the Trade Committee of issues that spilled over into

¹⁸ The Departments could receive income from the production of distillates in two mutually exclusive ways: by charging a tax rate for consumption or by exercising, through contracts with third parties, the monopoly of their production (for which they received a percentage of participation).

other policy areas (as had just happened with labor and transportation issues), threatened the balances achieved within the ministerial cabinet. Therefore, ministers who were clearly focused on their sectoral agendas and considered the OECD process as something that had already been settled, found themselves drawn back into the negotiating arena. Presidential intervention was necessary, both with the ministers and with the Governments that planted the claims, to overcome the impasse. On the pharmaceutical front, the Government pushed to maintain the price control system, but agreed to have as a reference a basket of international reference prices, as well as to create a body to regulate public purchases of new drugs. Regarding the copyright, the Government, already strongly pressured by deadlines, succeeded in obtaining amendments to the copyright Law, dating from 1982, to be approved, directly responding to the Committee's questions.

5. Epilogue: the doors are opening

In May 2018, after successfully completing the 23 technical assessments, Colombia finally obtained the formal invitation from the OECD Council to join the Organization. Seven years had passed since President Santos had requested the said Council to initiate the accession process, and five since formal negotiations with the country began. The president went to Paris to sign the Admission Agreement. On that occasion, the Secretary General of the Organization expressed his pleasure in welcoming Colombia to the Organization, highlighting the role of President Santos and celebrating “that the process has been able to be completed during his mandate”. The last legal steps, the ratification by Congress and the deposit of the Access Instrument in the OECD, were already performed by Santos' successor in office, President Iván Duque, in 2020.

III. A framework for understanding the experience: campaigns and processes

Studying a specific experience, such as that of Colombia's accession to the OECD, can serve several purposes. The first and most obvious is to analyze the process that that experience followed, aiming for an understanding of its uniqueness. This would therefore come to be an intrinsic approach to the experience under study, considering it valuable given, for example, its exceptionality. Another purpose, although not opposed to the previous one, that complements and broadens its views, is to study unique historical experiences in order to ask questions and provide answers that serve to understand this particular case and other experiences that, by some criterion, are related to each other. It is therefore an *instrumental* approach to the experience under study (STAKE, 1995). The study of a singular experience for instrumental purposes necessarily requires an understanding of that experience itself. The purpose, however, makes important differences when asking questions, generating evidence, and sketching answers (BARZELAY & CORTÁZAR, 2004).

The instrumental approach is clearly oriented to promote learning, understanding some experiences to generate learning that facilitate the development of others. Therefore, the purpose of studying the practices put into effect in a management or public policy experience may be to understand such practices so that, through the necessary adaptation, they can be *extrapolated* to contexts other than the original one (BARDACH, 2004). Or, going one step further, this type of study can also aim to understand the functioning of those processes that constitute the experience under analysis, modeling them in such a way that they constitute precedents or useful references for other design and management experiences, as well as to reconsider and expand professional knowledge in public management (BARZELAY, 2019).

In what follows, the path followed by Colombia to access the OECD, as described in the previous section, will be analyzed from an instrumental perspective. In line with the previous paragraph, we will try to identify and conceptualize, as much as possible, the characteristics, practices, and instruments that were involved in this experience and facilitated its operation, as a contribution to knowledge and also to the design and management of public policy interventions.

1. Access to the OECD as a persuasion campaign

The effort made by the Colombian Government to get the country admitted to the OECD can be modeled by the concept of a public policy campaign, suggested by Barzelay (2020 and 2021). Therefore, and unlike other types of public interventions (such as programs or projects), campaigns are collective efforts that proceed in an evolutionary way, progressively involving components of different character during a specific period, to achieve certain purposes, within the framework of a window of time. Three characteristics are particularly relevant for this type of intervention: i) an evolutionary dynamic, that is, its course towards the achievement of policy results through a sequence of stages, each of a different nature or character (WEISS & TSCHIRHART, 1994; SHARP, 2011); ii) the necessary scaffolding between said stages, so that each one builds on the achievements of the previous ones, while maintaining a certain identity of its own and is oriented towards the achievement of specific purposes that contribute to the greater or final (JONES & SIMONS, 2017); and iii) a non-permanent nature, in that the campaign is designed to exist for a certain period, and does not intend to perpetuate itself beyond the achievement of the final purpose. Considering these three characteristics, it is reasonable to conceptually model Colombia's accession to the OECD as a public policy campaign.

The purpose of the campaign launched by the Colombian Government in 2011 was for the country to be admitted as a full member of the OECD. In this sense, the campaign did not have the purpose, for example, to develop a set of deliverables or to elaborate a political decision of the Government¹⁹. The campaign was aimed at getting other actors – grouped in the OECD – to jointly make a decision (one relative to the admission of Colombia as a full member of the organization). Therefore, this campaign can be characterized as a *persuasion campaign* (JONES & SIMONS, 2017), assuming that persuasion is a type of communication and interaction designed precisely to influence the judgments and actions of others. Any public policy process necessarily includes persuasion as a fundamental element (MAJONE, 1997), but it is important to emphasize that, in the case of the campaign under study, influencing the judgment and decisions of other actors (managers of the OECD, the member countries, the representatives of the countries and the technical staff of each Committee), overcoming their possible resistance, constituted the very essence of the intervention. More precisely and following Jones and Simons (2017), it is here assumed that the campaign consisted of a coercive persuasion effort. This does not suggest that the Colombian Government had any effective capacity to coerce or compel the decisions of the actors that constituted its audience, but rather that the specific type of persuasion used was that specifically oriented to the persuaded being moved to accept the position or the proposals of the person who persuades.

A relevant aspect to take into account is the way in which the campaign was cognitively *framed* by its promoters. From the first contacts of President Santos with the OECD, the metaphor used (apparently spontaneously or very poorly elaborated) was that of “entering the club of good practices.” Although the image may be usual and seem neutral, it is not, and it is

¹⁹ An example of the first type of campaign is the Brazil in Action initiative, implemented by the Government of Fernando Enrique Cardoso to perform public infrastructure works at the federal level (BARZELAY & SHVETS, 2006). An example of the second is the set of actions that led the Government of President Kennedy to react to the threat of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 (ALLISON & ZELIKOW, 1999).

important to note that the idea of entering a *club* symbolically alludes to elements of prestige (therefore it requires a formal application process by the person entering, as well as by review and acceptance by the other members), identity (whoever enters therefore becomes a partner of the other members) and distinction (with respect to those who are not members). Although it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the pre-decisional process that led the President and his government to make the decision to run for the OECD, it is important to take this into account to the extent that elements such as prestige, identity, and distinction influenced the dynamics of the campaign in some way, as will be argued below. On the other hand, it was a metaphor oriented towards the political, economic, and technocratic elites, but not so much aimed at the citizenry in general, or, at least, it had an impact on the dynamics of the campaign, as will be argued below or, in any case, it had little effect on the latter. In fact, the campaign did not include any explicit and large-scale effort to develop a communication campaign that would provide it with any symbolic identity before public opinion. In the extreme, sectors opposed to the Government turned the meaning of the metaphor (although without relevant impact), pointing out that the campaign wanted “a poor country to join the club of the rich.”

2. The OECD access campaign seen as a process

Policy campaigns, such as the one we study here, can be conceptually modeled and analyzed as processes, that is, as a sequence of actions and decisions that take place in each time and context (PETTIGREW, 1997)²⁰. Considered in its most basic elements, every process implies an input element (input) and an output element or result (output). Actions and decisions occur between both points that, since they are considered in direct interaction with their initial conditions and the specific context


²⁰ The procedural approach assumed supports the option to elaborate the evidence of the case in the form of a narrative (story), as has been done in the previous section of this study. In this regard, see: BARZELAY AND CORTÁZAR, 2004.

(scenario) in which they occurred, we will model as *events*²¹. These events generated situations or states that constituted intermediate results, milestones that in turn served as initial conditions for another set of events, therefore chaining events and results until the result or situation sought by the campaign was achieved. This chaining directly refers to the evolutionary nature (sequencing of stages) that, as has been pointed out, characterizes political campaigns. Graphic 1 shows the OECD access campaign as a process.

The starting point that triggered the campaign occurred in January 2011, when President Santos requested in Paris the start of a process for his country's access to the OECD. The result or situation that said campaign sought consisted, as has already been argued, in the country being admitted as a full member, which was specified through the formal invitation to be part of the organization that the OECD Council extended to Colombia, and Colombia's formal acceptance of said invitation (by signing an agreement and depositing said instrument with the OECD General Secretariat after its parliamentary approval, in 2020).

²¹ In this regard, Barzelay (2021) maintains: "The concept of activities modeled as events can be put into play whenever empirical reality is viewed in a procedural way. It can be applied to small chunks of empirical reality, such as a single meeting between just two people, just as it can be applied to larger chunks, such as repetitive long-duration cycles of activity, as in the case of budgeting, or large-scale phenomena, made up of stages, like campaigns". (own translation).

Graphic 1
The case of Colombia's accession to the OECD: a procedural overview



Between these two points, three milestones took place (intermediate results or situations) that, by closing or opening the different stages of the campaign, made possible –from a formal perspective, as will be seen later – its progress: the approval of the *Roadmap*, the presentation of the *Initial Memorandum*, and the obtaining of favorable formal opinions from the 23 technical committees of the OECD. Between each of these formal milestones, the broad set of activities that make up the process under study occurred and which, as noted, are modeled here as events. This study is limited (as shown by the shaded area in Graphic 1) to the analysis of the events associated with these intermediate results (E1, E2, E3 and E4), about which evidence was already presented in the case narrative (section I). Therefore, other events that correspond to the pre-decisional moment of the campaign (which led President Santos and the Government to request access to the OECD) or to the final formal steps after the invitation are left aside, since these should be analyzed with an adequate look at public policy processes, rather than with the public management approach that is used here.

IV. Why did the campaign work?

An experience like the one this study considers is undoubtedly attractive because it achieved what was its ultimate purpose: that Colombia was accepted as a full member of the OECD. That is, because it worked successfully. Since many public policy campaigns, announced with high visibility by Governments and vigorously supported by the highest authorities, often end up failing (be it because they give way to problems such as loss of momentum, dispersion of effort, or diversion regarding the intended purpose), anyone who approaches the Colombian campaign to access the OECD will wonder how success was possible. And this approach is probably motivated by the interest in learning from said experience and then “applying” what allowed the design and management of other political campaigns to be successful. This interest, which corresponds to the challenge of extrapolation of designs, practices, and means (BARDACH, 2004) referred to above, clearly coincides with the instrumental perspective of this study. Now, as Barzelay (2007) points out, extrapolation requires two steps. The first, causally understand why and how the process or practice under study worked in its original context. To do this, Barzelay proposes to study the interaction between the actions, the characteristics of the process design, and the contextual²² factors. The second step consists of applying the causal knowledge that results from the previous analysis, seeking to adapt the process or practice of interest to the conditions singular of the destination context.

²² In his analysis proposal, Barzelay (2007, 2019) adds to the identification of the social mechanisms that act when triggered by some of the other elements indicated and explain the dynamics of their interaction. The notion of mechanisms basically comes from Herdström (2005), who defines them as "a constellation of entities and activities that are linked together in such a way that they regularly produce a particular type of result." A sample of the type of analysis suggested is found in Barzelay (2006).

This section focuses on the first of the referred steps. In this way, the manner in which the action of individuals and entities, the resources and management practices, the characteristics of the process design, and the contextual factors in which the process was developed, interacted in such a way that they led the campaign to success, and will be analyzed for this purpose. This analysis aims, in short, to answer the question that guides this study: how it was possible for the Colombian Government to successfully conduct and manage a campaign of high technical complexity and which, in addition, encompassed a broad set of sectoral policies.

In what follows, in order to understand the process, we will present our argument using five relevant lines of analysis. These are:

- The design of the process: formalized and at the same time adaptive.
- Stage control: managing a network of campaigns.
- The articulation between political impulse and technical expertise.
- Managing deadlines and blame.
- Political bargaining to face crises.

1. A campaign that was both armored and adaptive

The approval of the *Roadmap* by the OECD, without any participation or interference by the Colombian Government in its preparation, is a relevant element to understand the subsequent progress of the process. As shown in Table 1, the *Roadmap* established in a very detailed way the basic characteristics of the process, both in terms of its stages and deliverables, as well as in relation to the content of said deliverables (*Initial Memorandum* and in-depth reviews), and procedures that would govern actions (technical

reviews and formal approval by the 23 committees)²³. The Government, to advance towards its purpose, had to accept these characteristics without the possibility of discussing them. It is important to note that, considering the large number of actors involved, both on the part of the OECD (committees, authorities, member countries) and the Government (Presidency, ministerial cabinet, ministerial authorities and experts), the fact that the basic design of the campaign constituted a given and non-negotiable fact, facilitated the early launch of the campaign²⁴. This kind of shielding of the fundamental characteristics of the design was based on the authority structure of a multinational entity over which no Governmental actor the Colombian politician had power. It should be noted that this type of shielding is a device that, although made more flexible in recent decades, is recurrent in the relations of developing countries with multilateral organizations, even occurring that certain Government actors (from countries receiving loans or assistance technique) turn to it to prevent or settle dissidents within Governments or with third parties.

²³ The *Roadmap* is an instrument that standardizes (MINTZBERG, 1993) the processes of access to the OECD, focusing basically on the standardization of procedures (discussion areas, collection methods, forms of approval) and results (contents of the *Initial Memorandum* or approval reports of each of the 23 committees). Therefore, little or no difference is observed between the version of the *Roadmap* applied to Colombia in 2013 and the versions applied previously (CHILE, 2007) or a couple of years later (LITHUANIA & COSTA RICA, 2015).

²⁴ It is reasonable to assume that the development, negotiation and approval of the characteristics of the process that the *Roadmap* established in fact, would have been a long and complex process. An example of how the design processes of public interventions involve complex negotiations between those involved, based on interests, experiences and often divergent formations, is the Brazil in Action campaign (BARZELAY & SHVETS, 2006), or the reform initiative of the Peruvian civil service in 2008 (CORTÁZAR, 2014).

Table 1
Process scenario of events 1 and 2

Events	Actions	Design features	Contextual factors
E1. Designing and testing the structure, means and way of working of the campaign.	<p>Assignment of management role to C. Crane</p> <p>Formalization of the working group (Decree and Directive)</p> <p>Request for Reviews and formation of technical teams as counterparts of 10 OECD committees</p> <p>"Goodwill" actions</p> <p>First scaling up of the network of technical teams to prepare the <i>Initial Memorandum</i>.</p>	<p>Clearly distinguishable stages with pre-established deliverables</p> <p>Initial Memorandum Content</p> <p>Formation of technical teams.</p> <p>Selection of team members according to formal responsibility and technical expertise.</p>	<p>OECD authority structure: Secretariat, Council 250 OECD instruments</p> <p>Structure of the Administrative Department</p> <p>Administrative Department of the Presidency: Councils</p> <p>Presidential term of office.</p>
E2. Managing rounds of technical reviews.	<p>Second scaling up of the network of technical teams to deal with technical reviews.</p>	<p>Rounds of technical reviews: procedure and contents.</p> <p>Mechanisms for the collection of OECD information</p> <p>Formal approval by each OECD Committee in parallel</p> <p>Need to have the approval of the approval of all 23 OECD Committees OECD "as a single package" for the OECD Secretariat to make recommendation to the Council.</p>	<p>Structure of the 23 Committees</p> <p>OECD: members + technical</p> <p>Set of values, standards, policies and practices recommended by the OECD.</p>

Faced with the *Roadmap*, the Government could only have an *adaptive* reaction. This reaction was based on some design decisions made by the Government previously, such as the appointment of Catalina Crane in the leadership role of the campaign and the establishment of technical teams to interact with some of the OECD Committees²⁵. Crane's appointment puts in evidence the decision to promote the campaign not so much from a regular administrative entity of the State, but from a light and flexible structure, dedicated to coordination within the State and closely articulated to the political decisions of the Government, such as the case of the Ministries (this aspect will be referred to later). The selection of someone with Crane's academic and technical background made it possible to take advantage of the professional and cultural similarities between her (or her successors, of similar profile) and the technical staff and the OECD authorities. As Jones and Simons (2017) indicate, the *interpersonal similarity* between persuaders and persuaded increases the credibility of the former, since it generates in their audience a perception of technical (or political) expertise and integrity that predisposes them to the acceptance of their arguments. This, which is important in any type of public intervention, is of relevance in a campaign specifically oriented to persuasion, as is the case of the campaign studied here.

The manner and criteria used to select the members of the technical teams that would be the national counterparts of the ten OECD Committees with which contact was initiated will be analyzed in greater detail in the following two sections. Suffice it to note here that the criteria for the selection (recognition) of members, i.e., formal responsibility (understood as jurisdictional or mandated scope relating to a given policy area) and technical expertise (in the policy area in question), also refer to the *interpersonal similarity* highlighted by Jones and Simons [year].

²⁵ It should not be forgotten that, as shown in graphic 1, the E1 event began to take place before the approval of the *Roadmap*, triggered by the request for access made by President Santos to the OECD in January 2011.

Based on these previous decisions, the Government sought to adapt to the parameters established in the *Roadmap*. To do this, it resorted to scaling the network of technical teams referred to in the previous paragraph. A first escalation allowed to control and to manage the tasks of preparing the *Initial Memorandum*. The second escalation, of a greater magnitude than the previous one, served to face the technical reviews, a stage of the campaign with much greater coverage (in terms of the number of actors involved), complexity and uncertainty (regarding its results) than the one that had led to the *Initial Memorandum*. Through both escalations, the Government's reaction was organized reflecting characteristics of the OECD's political and technical management structure and mechanisms (delimitation and content of policy areas, differentiation of spheres of political and technical action, type of evidence to consider).

The reaction of the Government to the characteristics of the process established in the *Roadmap*, was therefore markedly *adaptive* and *oriented towards its audience*, both attributes that are central to coercive persuasion campaigns, to which we have already referred. In this type of persuasive effort, action and speech are not oriented so much to “be right” on a topic, but to consider the uniqueness of the audiences and their specific situations as the setting on which to deploy proposals and arguments (JONES & SIMONS, 2017). In short, it could be said that in coercive persuasion the focus of attention is not the topic under discussion, but the situation and characteristics of the actors to be persuaded. And indeed, already in the first design decisions that the Colombian Government made in reaction to the *Roadmap* (reflecting, for example, the technical structure and way of working of the OECD), it is observed that the campaign was not oriented towards “being right” regarding the policy content (discussion of values or standards, for example) or the possible achievements of the country, but rather to present evidence and arguments that harmonize with the criteria, standards, and situations that characterized the audience.

Finally, it should be noted that the campaign had to be deployed considering two important restrictions. The first consisted of the “all or nothing” dynamic that the *Roadmap* imposed by establishing that the OECD General Secretariat would only make a recommendation to the Council when it had, before it, the formal approval (and by consensus of the members) of all and each of the 23 committees “as a single package.” In this way, it was enough for a country, in one of the many committees, to refuse to give its formal approval to a specific aspect under discussion, for Colombia to leave empty-handed. This restriction arising from design was exacerbated by another, contextual in nature, such as the term imposed by the duration of the administration of President Santos (June 2014). Both restrictions led to significant vulnerabilities in the campaign, which will be discussed later.

2. The management of a network of campaigns

From the beginning, the effort to join the OECD enjoyed an important boost: the explicit and direct will of the President of the Republic himself. His early and prominent inclusion on the Government agenda should certainly be seen as a significant strength. However, even with this impulse, the deployment and success of the campaign required an indispensable resource that the president himself and the Administrative Department of the Presidency only controlled indirectly: technical expertise in the numerous policy areas that the OECD required to be examined. Said expertise resided in the professional segments of the ministerial bureaucracies, controlled by the chain of middle managers, trusted and vice ministers who reported to the Council of Ministers’ members.

In presidential systems, as is the case in Colombia, although the ministers are politically subject to the direct trust of the president and, from a formal perspective, basically play a role of assisting him, in practice they have influence and a margin of decisive action in the design of policies, in their legislative negotiation and in their implementation. All of this is due, precisely, to the access they have to the indispensable technical expertise through the chain of command to which reference has been made (MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2010). The presidential initiative to join the OECD, given the emphasis that the design of the process established in the *Roadmap* placed on very detailed technical negotiations, was obliged to draw heavily on the technical knowledge accumulated in the ministries. Even though the operating system set up by the central team in the Presidency sought to articulate directly with the technical experts (a point to which we will refer later), therefore reducing the possible executive role that the members of the Council could have had in the campaign, the ministers they were essential for at least two important issues: i) having access to the technicians respecting the regulations of the public administration (those relating to the allocation of the experts' working time, for example, or the budgeting and execution of the necessary financial expenditure for campaign actions, since these came from ministerial budgets); and ii) to show sufficient formal political authority before the OECD when supporting the country's positions at the Committee meetings in Paris. The latter was necessary because the representatives of the member countries on the Committees (not the technical staff) were usually at ministerial or vice-ministerial level.

Table 2
Process scenario of events 2 and 3

Events	Actions	Design features	Contextual factors
E2. Managing the rounds of technical reviews	<p>Second network scaling of technical teams to deal with technical reviews</p> <p>Technical team meetings</p> <p>technical team meetings: evidence and arguments</p> <p>Monthly meetings between PRES/technical team leaders</p> <p>Progress reports to Council of Ministers of Ministers</p> <p>Meetings with Committees OECD in Paris</p> <p>OECD meetings with third parties LOC stakeholders</p> <p>Adoption of policy measures in line with OECD</p> <p>OECD recommendations.</p>	<p>Rounds of technical reviews: procedure, contents and OECD's tools</p> <p>Government technical teams as a counterpart ("mirror") of the 23 OECD teams</p> <p>Technical teams formed technical peers</p> <p>Selection of team members according to formal responsibility and technical expertise</p> <p>Direct supervision of teams by PRES.</p> <p>Mechanisms: scorecard traffic lights, liaison meetings</p> <p>Deployment of the central command: PRES and Paris.</p>	<p>Structure of the 23 Committees OECD: members + technical technical</p> <p>Structure and dynamics of Ministers</p> <p>Term of the second presidential term (2018)</p> <p>Calendar of meetings of the OECD Committees</p> <p>Technical status of the OECD.</p>
E3. Controlling the narrative	<p>PRES participation in meetings between meetings between LOC and OECD</p> <p>Editorial processing</p> <p>Preparation of presentations to the Committees (Paris)</p> <p>Use or activation of information data collection systems</p> <p>Production and "massaging" of evidence.</p>	<p>Editorial control of content centralized in PRES</p> <p>Focus on the "target": values, policies, standards and OECD practices</p> <p>Data collection mechanisms.</p>	<p>Set of values, standards, policies, and practices recommended by the OECD.</p>

Throughout the campaign, the participation of technical experts was channeled through inter-ministerial work teams. During the E1 event, while the OECD approved the *Roadmap*, teams of technicians were formed to collaborate in the preparation of the 10 reviews that the Government had requested in specific areas. At E2, once the *Roadmap* was approved and to prepare the *Initial Memorandum*, the Presidency decided to scale up said preliminary device. Later, at the time of starting the longest stage of the campaign, that is, the technical assessments, a second scaling of the device was decided. But, beyond the increase in the number of teams, what was really important was that both the thematic structure of the set of teams and the internal structure of each of them needed to now reflect the corresponding one in the OECD. Therefore, a characteristic that the design of the campaign that was accentuated as it went from one stage to another (see Table 2), was to be modeled as a “mirror” of the technical structure of the OECD²⁶, a situation that corresponds to the adaptivity of the campaign indicated above.

Given that the thematic structure of the OECD did not fit in with that of the Colombian Executive Branch, the second escalation implied, firstly, that the technical teams were markedly inter-ministerial (more so than in the previous stages), to be able to cover all the technical areas that each OECD Committee would consider in its examination²⁷. Secondly, the situation also required that the same ministry (vice-ministry or Directorate, even) had to participate, through its technicians, in more than one of the campaign’s Committees. Both implications contributed to hinder the possibility of a direct control of the Committees by the ministers, which consequently left more room for the centralizing role of the Presidency²⁸ team. On the other hand, the situation created, considering both the internal heterogeneity of each team and that existing among the teams, as well as the strong

²⁶ During the previous stage, in E1, said “mirror” effect was not essential, since the focus of the effort was on the 250 OECD instruments, which the Presidency team could distribute at will among the teams it wanted to establish.

²⁷ The most notable case in this regard was that of the Public Governance Committee (see Box 3).

²⁸ It is not being argued that the ministers have effectively sought to have a control role of the Campaign Committees, since there is no evidence of it. The argument pointed out that said ministerial control, as a possibility of designing the campaign, was hampered by the situation indicated.

dependence of the campaign on the role of the ministerial technical experts, generated important vulnerabilities to the process. In particular, it exposed the campaign to the double risk of strategic opportunism and dispersion of effort, since the experts (or their superiors, even the ministers) could use their relative technical autonomy to push their specific agendas (ministerial, professional, and even personal), therefore weakening the focus that the campaign needed to maintain on achieving the immediate purpose (approval by the 23 Committees).

The vulnerabilities mentioned will be analyzed later. Taking them into account now is important for analyzing the design of the operating system of the campaign that should have been carried out from the Presidency. In any effort to promote collaboration among actors (entities) with different mandates, jurisdictions, hierarchies and interests, the design and management of the campaign's operational system is a decisive step (BARDACH, 1998). In the case of the campaign, given the high technical specialization of the participants in the evaluations, the operational challenge was to effectively integrate the various inputs (avoiding conflicts and dissent on the Colombian side), keeping the focus of all negotiations and activities on achieving acceptance by the Committees. Given the pressure of the deadline (now set by the second term of President Santos, which ended in 2018; see Table 2), preventing as much as possible the risk of dispersion of effort mentioned above was a priority.

The operational system put in place by the Chair's team was intended to ensure collaboration among the technical experts and, at the same time, avoid dispersion of their efforts. This system, which, as mentioned above, began to be set up intuitively as early as the E1 event, consisted of two essential components: i) a set of "working groups" as a *lateral liaison* device to integrate the contributions of experts (technical peers) from different ministries into each team, and ii) a *vertical supervision* device from the Presidency, which promoted the appropriate pace in the execution of the negotiations and, at the same time, controlled the negotiation scenario and the narrative offered in them (see Table 2).

The interministerial teams of technicians correspond to the type of lateral liaison that Mintzberg (1993) calls *working groups*, i.e., a defined set of technicians convened to perform a given task (negotiating with the OECD counterpart, in this case, and achieving the necessary approval) and to disband after its completion. An important characteristic of this type of mechanism is that the meeting is the main vehicle for facilitating the adaptive adjustment of the positions and contributions of the members. In the case of the OECD accession campaign teams, successive rounds of meetings (between national experts and especially with OECD experts during their missions to Colombia) were the main action (see Table 2). There were, however, other secondary activities, including the collection, sorting, or standardization of the information needed to develop the Government's arguments, as well as the task of putting those arguments in writing. Since each team functioned through meetings of peers (the vice ministers or other officials delegated as "coordinators" were liaisons with the Presidency, and did not have a hierarchical role in the teams' decision-making), this arrangement integrated inputs and positions through a mechanism that resembles, to some degree, what Mintzberg calls *mutual adjustment*.²⁹

The need for an adaptive or mutual adjustment, given the absence of a clear and formal hierarchical structure within each team, was also a result of the criteria by which the members of each team were selected and recognized. McAdam et al. (2001) conceptualize certification as the social mechanism by which external authorities validate the actors, their actions, and their claims or arguments. In the case of the OECD campaign teams, the members of each team were therefore validated (certified) by the Presidency (and even by their peers) based on: i) their technical authority, i.e., the policy area in which they worked and which corresponded to one of the areas considered in one of the OECD Committees, and ii) the degree of technical competence or expertise they possessed, to the extent that

²⁹ The notion of mutual adjustment or adaptation developed by Mintzberg explicitly refers to the coordination of work through informal communication. The work teams of the OECD access campaign could not be characterized as completely informal, as they were based on formal criteria such as authority and technical competence, but they did not have the degree of formality that Mintzberg attributes to a standing committee. The teams were at an intermediate point of formalization.

professionals were sought who could negotiate on equal terms with the members of the OECD technical staff. Given that the experts came from ministries that had the same hierarchical level within the State structure and that, in addition, each had direct authority over the corresponding policy area, it was not possible to place one ministry hierarchically above the others (this would undoubtedly have generated competition). As has been pointed out, the designation of certain officials (usually deputy ministers) as “coordinators” of the teams responded more to the need for a vertical link with the Presidency than to a role of authority or supervision over their peers³⁰. Therefore, the option for a low degree of hierarchical formalization of the teams and the use of mutual adjustment as the predominant mechanism for coordination within them were two marked characteristics of the mechanism put in place. As will be seen below, these characteristics favored the exercise of the specific type of persuasion (oriented to the target audience) that the campaign required.

However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the certification criteria used, and the characteristics of the teams mentioned above, created conditions for the technicians (individually and as teams) to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy within the campaign. This could be detrimental to the success of the campaign, as it opened the possibility for opportunism, dispersion, and slowing down of the effort. The second part of the operative system was aimed precisely at counteracting these risks, through a system of close supervision of the pace of progress of the work of the teams from the central team in the Presidency. The central characteristics of this supervision were verticality (supervision based on the explicit use of the formal hierarchy of the Presidency) and the concentration of control on the performance (results) of the teams (MINTZBERG, 1993; ECHEBARRÍA, 1988). The Presidency team therefore developed a set of means of monitoring and controlling the production of the technical teams (direct participation in meetings and missions, reports to the Council of Ministers through a scorecard, monthly meetings with team liaisons: see Table 2). The main concern was to maintain an adequate pace for reaching agreements with the technical teams and the OECD committees, making the most of the latter's meeting schedule.

³⁰ In fact, the role of these coordinators corresponds, rather, to the type of liaison device that Mintzberg conceptualizes as “liaison posts,” since it lacks formal authority but has some degree of informal influence or power.

In terms of Robert Simons (1995), this supervision mechanism brought into play, in the first place, a *diagnostic control*, focused on monitoring critical variables of the teams' performance (holding meetings, meeting deadlines, reaching agreements). Secondly, however, the supervision was explicitly aimed at avoiding dispersion throughout the negotiations, i.e., that Government technicians would devote time and effort to generating evidence or elaborating arguments that, although they might show important achievements or progress in Government policies, were not directly and strictly aimed at gaining the acceptance of the corresponding OECD Committee. Therefore, a *limiting control* was exercised over the actions of the technical teams, which, to be effective, required some form of surveillance of the evidence and arguments that the Government technicians offered to their OECD counterparts to achieve their approval. The means used for this was the editorial, intermediate and final control of the responses and texts resulting from the work of the technical teams, as well as the pacing of the presentations that the ministers had to make to the committees in Paris (see Table 2). This control was exercised in a sustained and continuous manner by the central team of the Presidency and the Paris office. Although this team, given its limited structure, could not make substantive judgments on the content of arguments relating to very diverse and specialized policy areas, it did manage to perform its central task: to ensure that any response or text sent to an OECD Committee responded exclusively and directly to a technical requirement of the Organization and, as will be pointed out later, demonstrated compliance with the Organization's values and standards.

Considering now the two pieces of the operational system -lateral adaptation and vertical supervision-, it is necessary to go beyond the organizational functions of the system (the control of the production and performance of the national teams), to consider how the system responded to the eminently persuasive nature of the campaign and its purpose. Therefore, from the perspective of persuasion processes, the system had to promote the elaboration of a *narrative* that would persuade the audience (technicians and members of the OECD committees) that Colombia deserved to be incorporated into the Organization. At this level, the operational system fulfilled three important functions: i) to focus all

efforts on the audience, avoiding anything that might be far from the possible key points of interest of the audience; ii) to align the argumentative production of the technical teams in a common narrative that showed a clear acceptance and compliance with the technical requirements of the OECD; and for the two previous points to be possible; iii) to control the production scenario of this narrative (actors, roles, what is shown and what is hidden).

Regarding the former, the campaign as a whole and each one of the “small campaigns” that each technical team had to promote through the negotiations, show the characteristics that, according to Jones and Simons (2017), correspond to coercive³¹ persuasion. The main one consisted in the orientation towards the recipient or audience³². Following this orientation, the technical teams had to explore and understand the characteristics, positions, and interests of their counterparts (which was possible thanks to the successive rounds of meetings during the OECD missions to Bogotá), which could vary depending on the committee and the country concerned³³. They also focused their argumentation entirely on the values, policies, standards, and preferred practices of the OECD. Although this focus was clearly established in the *Roadmap*, making it effective required both a conscious effort to limit themselves to arguing only and exclusively based on what the OECD required and nothing else³⁴, and a centralized editorial control work in the Chair. At a different level, that of the central command of the campaign, we can also observe the centrality of audience orientation in the decision to split the command into two, incorporating

³¹ The most clearly visible in the case of the OECD access campaign are: orientation to the receiver, sensitivity to situations, use of similarities between the persuader and the persuaded, appeal to acceptable premises or shared with the audience.

³² The authors contrast this approach with that of topic-oriented persuasion.

³³ It is possible that, as Bardach (1998) points out, the similarity of professional characteristics between national technicians and those of the OECD (experts in a specific area of public policy, and most likely with similar practices, trajectories and studies), has been a factor that favored collaboration thanks to a common identity. In any case, it is a characteristic that favors the success of coercive persuasion (JONES & SIMONS, 2017).

³⁴ This required the sacrifice of putting aside all efforts to show progress, positions or proposals that, being the preferred ideas or alternatives of national technicians (pet solutions, in terms of KINGDON, 1995), did not strictly correspond to some value, policy, OECD standard or practice.

an office in Paris whose task was to explore more closely the positions and interests of the member countries, generating links that would facilitate influence on them.

The second function consisted in achieving what Hilgartner (2000) calls a univocal narrative. This univocity does not refer to the technical and substantive content of the arguments offered (that would have been impossible, besides being useless), but to the homogeneity that all the arguments of the different teams had to have in terms of showing clear acceptance and compliance (effective or in progress) with the values, policies, standards, and practices recommended by the OECD, avoiding entering issues or discussions that exceeded that framework. Consequently, this narrative can be understood as the aggregate set of evidence and arguments that showed, on the part of Colombia, acceptance of and compliance (effective or progressive) with the technical requirements of the Organization³⁵.

It was the task of each technical team to ensure that their arguments met the usual requirements of persuasion in public policy: reliability of the data, relevance of the information, clarity of the argument and reasonableness of the conclusions (MAJONE, 1997). This task required, in an important way, the collection, generation or “massaging” of a large amount of data that were not always available. Naturally, such argumentation had to be convincing to the audience, i.e., acceptable. In this regard, and considering the rhetorical elements that explain acceptance according to Hood and Jackson (1997), it can be observed that in the campaign narrative there were three facilitating elements. The first refers to the criterion of symmetry, applicable in this case to the degree to which the evidence and argumentation offered matched as closely as possible the values, standards, and terminology (language) of the OECD in each policy area³⁶. A second element consisted of selectivity in the choice of evidence and arguments, making visible that which showed clear acceptance and compliance with

³⁵ On the articulation between information, evidence and argumentation, see the classic text by Giandomenico Majone (1997).

³⁶ It is interesting to note that, as noted, the organizational aspects of the Colombian campaign also met an analogous criterion of symmetry, as far as they reflected the technical structure of the OECD.

OECD requirements and minimizing that which could be understood as contradicting them³⁷. Finally, the third refers to the elimination of doubt, which, according to the authors, is achieved by resorting mainly to urgency in decision making. In the case of the campaign under study, although it is true that time was running mainly against the national negotiators, it is also true that already in 2018 the urgency to concretize access before an imminent new Government could cast doubt on its necessity, also exerted pressure on countries that, after all, were also obtaining benefits (commercial, above all) through the inclusion of Colombia.

However, in order for the focusing and alignment of the teams' argumentation effort to be possible, the second piece of the operating system – the vertical control – had to fulfill the function that Hilgartner (2000) calls stage control. The author, assuming an analogy with dramaturgy, argues that one means by which scientific entities manage to offer a convincing (persuasive) expert judgment is through a set of techniques that control what is shown to the public (on stage) and what is kept hidden (behind the scenes) to achieve the desired effect on the audience. It is this game of revelation and concealment that generates the persuasive effect of a univocal narrative. Therefore, in the Colombian campaign, the selection (certification) of the members of the technical teams, the supervision of their performance in meetings and missions, the editorial control of their production and, finally, the planning of the presentations in Paris, by the central team in charge of the campaign, sought to align the effort to make visible that evidence and argumentation that showed that Colombia accepted and complied with the values and standards of the OECD, while at the same time (and this will be seen clearly later, when analyzing the way in which the final crises were faced in 2017 and 2018) it concealed, within the Government, possible discrepancies and disagreements.

³⁷ As will be seen later, the discrepancies that arose within the Government in the specific area of Employment and labor matters, precisely led to a break with this criterion.

In short, the operational system put in place for the campaign to achieve its strategic purpose made it possible both to obtain the contribution of technical experts who, based on their knowledge and bureaucratic position, enjoyed relative autonomy vis-à-vis the political authorities (Presidency), and to prevent their efforts from deviating from the immediate purpose (acceptance by the committees) or slowing down beyond the political deadlines that made the purpose possible. To this end, this system combined two devices of a different nature, namely, on the one hand, lateral and adaptive collaboration between the technical members (and their entities of origin) and, on the other hand, vertical control exercised centrally from the Presidency. Therefore, the campaign's effort to maintain the strategic direction of the whole, and to do so in a timely manner, made use of procedures that appealed to both peer-to-peer mutuality and hierarchical oversight (HOOD et al., 2004). The combination of these two heterogeneous pieces – mutuality, adaptation and low formality versus verticality, supervision, and greater formalization – allowed the campaign to achieve the necessary flexibility to adapt to the diversity of positions and interests of the technicians and OECD members, while maintaining a strategic orientation entirely focused on the achievement of the acceptances. It should be emphasized that an alternative design, based for example on an extreme centralization of all campaign actions, would have made it difficult to adapt to the diverse audiences that constituted the OECD committees. Conversely, relying entirely on adaptive and flexible negotiation processes without central control would have led to divergent narratives and the expiration of existing political deadlines.

The operating system described and analyzed here can be represented as a specific “network of campaigns”, 23 singular campaigns that progressed within the framework of the vertical control that the Presidency exercised to keep them within the general strategic orientation and the planned³⁸ deadlines.

³⁸ Sharp (2011) points out that it is usual for the joint operation that constitutes a campaign to be disaggregated into specific actions by certain actors, therefore taking the form of smaller or smaller-scale operations.

3. The articulation between political momentum and technical expertise

The functioning of the operational system of the campaign, as analyzed in the previous section, presupposed a basic articulation that made possible the exchange between political and technical actors, i.e., a specific form of linkage between the interests and purposes of the political authorities (the President and his immediate environment) and those of the technical experts. In the absence of such articulation, a break between these actors would have caused the shipwreck of the campaign (due to lack of political momentum, lack of capacity for technical negotiation, or for both reasons at the same time).

Hood and Lodge (2006) study this articulation of interests based on two conceptual models: the links between politicians and civil servants (bureaucrats) that can be understood as agency relationships (principal agent) and those that can be understood as “trusteeship” relationships (trusteeship). The latter refer to situations in which civil servants develop interests from an area of relative autonomy, in which they exercise a degree of discretion that cannot be completely subjected to the direction or control of elected politicians. Therefore, the permanence and remuneration of civil servants does not depend entirely and directly on the political interests of their constituents (elected authorities and their delegates), since their role is based on technical competencies that, ideally, should not be subject to the instrumental interests of politicians. Unlike an agent-principal logic, the loyalty of technicians is directed to an entity (national interest, fundamental rights, consistency of state policies, technical requirements) that transcends the Government of the day and its agenda³⁹.

³⁹ It is in this sense that the authors conceptualize this link as “fiduciary”, to the extent that public servants represent, defend or preserve a superior interest that transcends those of the current rulers.

The configuration of the Colombian public sector – like that of most Latin American countries – does not fully correspond to that of a meritocratic and professional bureaucracy, with an important degree of technical capacity and autonomy from elected Governments, characteristics that are what Hood and Lodge have in mind. However, part of the Colombian bureaucracy shows greater elements of administrative job security, as well as selection based on technical and merit criteria, than other countries in the region (ECHEBARRÍA & CORTAZAR, 2007; ZUVANIC et al., 2010). In any case, the OECD access campaign shows – with the limitations inherent to the Colombian bureaucratic configuration – two of the characteristics that Hood and Lodge highlight in a “fiduciary” type articulation. The first, that servants are selected based on their exceptional skills and technical expertise. As noted, this was the case for the national teams of the campaign: given that they had to negotiate with the staff of an entity of recognized prestige and technical capacity such as the OECD, the Government had to bring to the table experts whose experience and formal accreditations matched those of the OECD technicians.

The second characteristic refers to the fact that the exchange between politicians and technicians consists of the latter putting their skills at the service of the former’s political purposes, in exchange for status and the exercise of certain discretionary power. In the case of the campaign, as we have seen, the Presidency had to respect a sphere of lateral collaboration between the technicians of the different ministries, without establishing a formal internal hierarchy in each team (only a coordination and liaison mechanism), and intervening in the negotiations *ex post*, that is, by editing the responses or statements resulting from the work of the teams. Although vertical control was important on this last point, it cannot be denied that both the limited size of the central team at the Presidency, and the impossibility of having all the technical competencies necessary to control in depth the substantive content of detailed negotiations in 23 policy areas, led in practice to granting a space of relative autonomy to the technicians.

As for the status as a gain obtained by technicians in this type of exchange, although the fieldwork performed does not provide systematic evidence on this, it is reasonable to consider that being part of negotiations with the OECD may have meant for many national technicians an opportunity for career advancement, given the visibility and technical status of the OECD. In addition to learning and information exchange (made possible, for example, through access to experiences and technicians from OECD member countries through missions and conferences), it is very likely that personal links between technicians and access to professional networks have been important gains for national experts. Finally, and although the evidence collected is far from systematic in this regard (this was not one of the purposes of the study), it is noted that after the end of the campaign, some Colombian technicians gained access to positions in international institutions and even in the OECD itself. It is most likely that this type of movement responds to professional trajectories that began before and were independent of the campaign itself, but it is also possible that participation in the campaign (being part of its success) was an element that contributed to enriching their professional value in the international labor market.

On the other hand, although the model of articulation between politicians and bureaucrats that Hood and Lodge call “agency” is not the most appropriate for understanding the relationship between the technicians and the president and his entourage, it is the most appropriate for shedding light on the articulations within that entourage. The presidential decision to assign the direction and control of the campaign to a High Commissioner, who was part of the staff of the Presidency, and not to a Government agency or authority (as it could have been assigned to the Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs, for example), was a decision with important consequences for the campaign. On the one hand, it was easier for the members of the Council of Ministers to accept that the campaign would be led by someone who was not strictly a peer (Catalina Crane and her successors belonged to the Department that performed the institutional coordination, had no vertical sectoral authority and no formal ministerial rank), therefore avoiding competition contests. By contrast, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that the campaign was led by a Commissioner

allowed the President a “long rein”⁴⁰ delegation, in which the President lost neither authorship nor ultimate control of the campaign, without the need to compromise on its details. Opting to cede the direction of the campaign to a member of the Council, in addition to the problems of competence already mentioned, would have meant a delegation of even greater distance and autonomy to the one chosen, where in addition the mediation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the chosen ministry would hinder presidential control.

The link between the High Commissioners who succeeded each other in the direction of the campaign and the President shows the characteristics that the aforementioned authors identify as constituting a principal-agent type link “by delegation” (*delegated agency bargains*), that is, one where, although the link is close, the one who receives the delegation maintains some formal space for independent activity. Therefore, it is the principal who establishes the terms of the delegation (being able to modify them or dispense with the agent at will), granting the agent a space of discretion in exchange for responsibility and direct enforceability for the results within that area of discretion. This form of articulation between elected politicians and public servants has been widespread since the 1990s, especially in the areas of fiscal policy (from which both Santos and Crane came). The Commissioners in charge of the campaign, both at the beginning and after this direction was split into two articulated headquarters (the Presidency and the Paris office), obtained because of this type of agreement a great discretion to design, direct, and control the campaign progress, maintaining the direct access that, as High Commissioners, they had to the very center of the executive power in the Government and, in addition, being able to partially claim authorship for the achievements of the campaign. All this in exchange for full responsibility for the progress and results of a campaign, being directly liable for any delays and failures that might occur. It should be noted that this was a risky assignment, considering that important contextual elements of the campaign were completely beyond their control (the political deadlines of the Government

⁴⁰ Due to his role, it was not possible to think of an option where the president exercised a delegation of the “short rein” type, that is, one where he was directly involved in decision-making and control of the campaign.

and the OECD meeting schedule, the political and commercial interests of member countries, the interests of national unions and guilds), as well as important intrinsic elements of the campaign (the part of the design pre-established by the OECD, the content of the OECD's policies and standards, and the content of the OECD's policies and standards), as well as important elements intrinsic to the campaign (the part of the design pre-established by the OECD, the content of the Organization's policies and standards, the degree of hardness of the technical staff's demands), while they could only exercise partial control over other factors (the capabilities and negotiating role of ministerial technicians, the agendas of ministers on issues included in the OECD negotiations).

Therefore, from the perspective of the relations between civil servants (ministerial or not) and elected politicians, the campaign was based on a double loop of articulations that allowed the exchange of benefits such as managerial or technical discretion (the former for the Commissioners and the latter for the experts of the ministries) and status (access to professional networks or networks of decision-makers at the international level), in exchange for assuming responsibility and being subject to demand for the result of the campaign as a whole (getting the OECD Council to invite Colombia to join the Organization) or for the specific results of the 23 campaigns that made up the operation as a whole (getting the formal approval of one of the OECD committees). This double loop allowed the president's political drive to be transformed into managerial capacity, as well as the latter to guide and (partially) control the technical negotiations that constituted the node of the accession process. Granting a certain degree of discretion and status in exchange for responsibility for results was the logic that sustained the campaign's operating system, making it function successfully as a sort of "transmission belt" through which presidential political intent was transformed, at the other end of the campaign, into technical persuasion capacity in specific and complex policy areas. In this way, the campaign overcame one of the usual vulnerabilities that this type of interventions, strongly linked to the presidential impulse, have: the languishing or extinction of the political momentum because of its lack of effective impact on the performance of the actors involved. effective impact on the performance of the actors involved.

4. Guilt management to avoid delays

The presidential political momentum, which the operational system propagated by serving as its “transmission belt”, was undoubtedly key for the campaign to succeed in mobilizing actors and resources, that is, for the activities structured in the campaign design to take place (both what was pre-designed by the OECD in the *Roadmap* and what was designed by the Presidential team). However, it is hardly feasible to explain the campaign progress and its positive trajectory towards the achievement of its goals based, mainly, on the existence and transmission of presidential will and interest. This is even more difficult because it is a campaign that, considering at least the events under study, unfolded during approximately eight years of activity.

A contextual element, such as the existence of rigid periods, combined with another intrinsic to the design and management of the campaign, such as the “management of guilt” among the actors involved, allows us to understand – together with the evident presidential impulse – why such an extended campaign did not falter and achieved its purpose in time.

Regarding deadlines, Tables 1 and 2 show the two sources of time pressure that affected the campaign: the final deadline of the two Santos administrations and the schedule of OECD Committee meetings. Although the *Roadmap* did not establish any deadline for the progress of the process, leaving it in the hands of the Colombian Government, in practice the routine of semi-annual or annual meetings of the committees that were to formally approve each of the agreements reached by the Colombian and OECD technical experts imposed a strong pressure on the technical teams and the ministries. The accumulation of delays that prevented the Government from obtaining the OECD Council invitation before the end of the presidential term in 2018 was one of the main vulnerabilities that threatened the campaign.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1998) point out that the delay in policy implementation (and this applies to the case of interventions such as campaigns) is a function of three factors: (i) the number of “decision

points” (decisions in which the actors involved must make a choice that significantly affects the course of implementation), (ii) the number of participants, and (iii) the intensity and direction of their preferences (whether the actors have a positive or resistant position with respect to the policy being implemented, and whether that position is staged with much or little intensity, depending on how important the progress of the policy in question is for each actor). In the case of the OECD access campaign, it is clear that the number of participants (even considering each small sectoral campaign) was high. Given the established parameter that the final invitation could not proceed until all 23 OECD committees had formally approved all the technical aspects under discussion, it can be assumed that any unresolved discrepancy between the technicians on both sides and, above all, the refusal of a single country to approve a particular point in any committee was enough to delay or even paralyze the whole process. Therefore, the number of “decision points” can also be considered to be considerable.

Regarding the intensity and direction of participants’ preferences, the authors provide Table 3, which typifies the possible types of implementation delay. In most policy areas, the technical teams achieved formal approval by the OECD Committees between 2014 and 2016. It can be assumed that in these cases what the table considers minimal or minor delay occurred, since there was no explicit opposition to the agreement by OECD staff or country representatives, and the Colombian experts sought to show the country’s prompt compliance with the recommendations made by the Organization. While it is plausible to assume that on the OECD side the intensity of the preferences would not be high, for the Colombian side of the campaign there was a high intensity (and positive direction) coming from the need to comply with the presidential purpose.

Table 3
Types of delay for agreement during implementation
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1998)

	High Intensity	Low Intensity
Positive direction	(1) Minimum delay, without negotiation.	(2) Minor delay, without negotiation.
Negative direction	(3) Maximum delay, negotiation regarding essential points.	(4) Moderate delay, negotiation with respect to peripheral points.

Undoubtedly, the “maximum delay”, in terms of the table, corresponds to the greatest fear of the Presidency team in charge of the campaign, given that, combined with the rigidity of President Santos’ government’s deadline, it jeopardized the ultimate purpose of the campaign as a whole. Call for attention, nevertheless, that only in three areas (labor matters, human rights, and foreign trade) the negotiations would continue beyond 2016, and that only in one of them (foreign trade) the negotiations would be late in closing until there was not much remaining in Santos’ final term. If aware that these delays obeyed the position of some member countries more than the action of the Colombian representatives (except for the negotiation on labor outsourcing, where there will be a reference), does not mean that during the first few years of the campaign there were no more relevant delays registered because of some national⁴¹ actor.

⁴¹ Indeed, despite the insistence on this issue, the interviewees during the fieldwork do not recall significant delays beyond those that occurred in the negotiations with the three mentioned committees.

In our opinion, the prediction of the risk of delay triggered in the campaign a usual mechanism in the public world: management of blame. In fact, to avoid diverting others from the risk of being blamed for causing some damage or loss, is a concern that greatly contributes to shaping the organization and functioning of executive Governments, as well as a consuming activity time and guidance in the practice and performance of organizations and civil servants (BARDACH, 1979; HOOD, 2011). The challenge, from the perspective of those who direct and control an intervention (in this case, the campaign), consists precisely in maintaining in force the possibility that those responsible for the damage or loss can be identified and exposed (blamed), as a medium to discipline performance. In the campaign under study, as has been mentioned, the form of articulation established between the Presidency and the technical experts attributed to these a degree of discretion in the negotiations, to change the achievement of the approval of the corresponding OECD Committee. However, it was difficult to assign responsibilities in case the approvals were delayed any longer than expected, given that the operating system includes teams of technical partners from various ministries, lateral cooperation, and scarce hierarchical formalization of the authority, a type of organizational arrangement that seems to be fertile ground for the practices of evasion and deviation from blame (HOOD, 2011). It is only surmised that, in the case of negotiations on which the terms and acceptance depended on actors over which we had no control (the negotiators and representatives of the OECD member countries), it was very easy for Colombian negotiators to find a way to evade their responsibility and justify delays by signaling on the other side of the table (using what Hood calls “presentation strategies”).

In such a situation, in which it was difficult to counteract possible liability avoidance practices within the technical teams, the means used by the Presidency’s team to manage blame was one that pointed higher, towards members of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, a scorecard system was implemented that was frequently shown in the Council meetings with the president, to report on the progress of the negotiations. Although said purpose was formally stated, it is clear that said resource functioned as a dissuasive means that threatened the possibility of assigning the ministers blame for possible delays, and doing so directly in the eyes of the president

(and the peers). It is true that each negotiating team involved technicians from various ministries, however the appointment of a vice minister as coordinator or liaison of the team, despite not constituting a formal hierarchical line of authority, allowed a certain valid degree of attribution of responsibilities to the Board⁴² members. The non-occurrence of a chain of serious delays seems to indicate that this resource, despite its great simplicity and its inability to permeate the entire operation downward, was effective in preventing the accumulation of delays.

It should be noted that the Presidency team also kept a detailed scorecard of the goals and deadlines that each team had to achieve (in terms of information satisfactorily sent and measures taken based on OECD recommendations), but there is no evidence that said instrument was explicitly and extensively used as a deterrent resource linked to the management of blame. Apparently, it basically served for the Presidency to control the performance of the teams, as well as for the control of the actions by the teams themselves. In any case, given that the main mechanism of “blame management” (the ministerial-level scorecard) was exclusively focused on the higher hierarchical levels of the campaign, it is not possible to explain the absence of a significant number of serious delays (those that put the campaign at risk) without taking into account the vigor of the vertical supervision (diagnostic control) exercised by the Presidency on the teams, an aspect to which reference has already been made.

⁴² This mechanism counteracted what Hood (2011) calls “agency strategies” to evade blame, which are those that are based on the distribution of responsibility, competition and authority between entities and actors to dilute blame or divert it to others.

5. Political bargaining for dealing with crises

If between 2014 and 2016 the technical negotiations progressed without major complications, it was in 2017 when suddenly, without much capacity to see them coming from the Presidency, that important obstacles emerged regarding six different issues that postponed the formal approval of three committees: Employment and labor issues (labor outsourcing, unionization by industries, crimes against union members), Public Governance (access to justice) and Foreign Trade (“scrapping” of trucks, taxes on liquors, intellectual property and pharmaceutical patents). As Table 4 shows, the pressure of a key contextual factor, such as the proximity of the date on which President Santos was to leave power, was articulated with others such as the power of unions both in Colombia and in some member countries, the commercial interests of member countries (mainly the United States), the defense of certain important policy values for those countries (effectiveness of justice, human rights) and ministerial rotation (in the case of the Ministry of Labor). The concurrence of these factors contributed to materializing one of the biggest risks of the campaign: that the invitation from the OECD to be part of the Organization would not come to pass during the mandate of President Santos. The design parameter established in the *Roadmap*, referring to the fact that the approval of the 23 Committees should arrive “as a single package” to the OECD Secretariat, blocked any solution that was not to satisfy, in some way, the requirements of the countries that they had not yet given their approval in any of the committees in question.

Table 4
Process scenario of event 4 (coping with crises)

Actions	Design features	Contextual factors
<p>Meetings with OECD Committees in Paris</p> <p>OECD meetings with third party stakeholders COL (trade unions)</p> <p>Creation of special working group for judicial issues (PRES, Labor, Interior, Justice and Prosecutor's Office)</p> <p>Trade negotiations by the Treasury</p> <p>Diplomatic action with OECD governments</p> <p>Presidential interventions with OECD country governments</p> <p>Technical visits to OECD countries</p> <p>Adoption of policy measures to respond to OECD country positions</p> <p>Meetings PRES, Treasury with Minister of Labor to align discrepancies.</p>	<p>Need to have the approval of the 23 OECD committees "as a single package" in order for the OECD Secretariat to make a recommendation to the Council Direct supervision of the teams by PRES.</p> <p>Split of the central command: PRES and Paris.</p>	<p>Internal Composition of the Employment, Foreign Trade and Public Governance Committees</p> <p>Term of the second presidential term (2018)</p> <p>Calendar of Committee meetings OECD</p> <p>Influence of trade unions on governments of OECD countries</p> <p>Business interests OECD countries</p> <p>Important policy values for OECD country governments</p> <p>Free Trade Agreement USA-COL</p> <p>Protest capacity of the union truck drivers COL</p> <p>Crimes against trade unionists COL</p> <p>Ministerial rotation</p> <p>Political process: municipal elections in Bogota.</p>

The solutions that were finally arrived at consisted of the Government approving with extreme urgency legal changes (which required resorting to Congress), new plans and indicators or, to the limit of what is possible, future compliance commitments, that is, after access.

These solutions were the result of intense bargaining between the Government and the authorities of the countries involved, an action during which the OECD technicians and authorities kept a relative distance. Although direct contact with the Governments of the member countries was an action planned and used punctually by the campaign managers, the intense and urgent final *bargaining* was not a situation anticipated by the Colombian Government, which was literally surprised by the run of disputed subjects being already very near the final political term.

The haggling involved going beyond the actors and characteristics of the campaign design (both on the *Roadmap* side and what the Government did), so that the technical negotiation (which was at the heart of the ongoing assessments) it was overwhelmed by the strictly political negotiation of commercial interests, local power quotas, or value options of the actors involved. The result of this type of interaction, as Allison and Zelikow (1999) point out, is not a set of carefully planned and agreed solutions, but an agglomeration or *collage* of relatively hasty and independent decisions that respond to the actions of individual actors (in the case of the campaign, actors such as ministers, experts, diplomats, and even the president) that are linked through conflict and compromise, amidst a significant degree of uncertainty and confusion⁴³.

Among the characteristics of *political bargaining* that Allison and Zelikow identify, there are four that are relevant to understanding the final trajectory of the campaign under study. The first is the limited time available to make decisions, which leads, during the continuous marches and countermarches typical of bargaining, to decisions usually hasty, destined to satisfy some of the parties in conflict. In the case of the campaign, the Colombian Government had to act “against the ropes”, that is, severely limited by the proximity of the end of the Santos administration. It is not an exaggeration to point out that some actors (Governments, unions, transporters union) took advantage of this factor to achieve decisions and

⁴³ The analytical model referred to is what the authors call “Governmental politics.” The authors use the term bargain to conceptualize the type of interaction between the actors involved, a term that can be translated as negotiation or bargaining. The second term will be used to avoid confusion with the ongoing technical negotiation process, but above all because it better represents the dynamics of the final interactions between the Governments involved in the discussions.

concessions on the part of the Colombian Government (especially in the commercial sphere: taxes on liquors, intellectual property, pharmaceutical patents) that, in another context and moment, perhaps they would not have been possible, or would have had different contents.

A second characteristic refers to the face of the problem, that is, to the way the actors represent themselves and present to the other parties the essential content of what is under discussion. Therefore, in the case of discussions on intellectual property and labor outsourcing, the United States Government presented the situation as a breach of the bilateral commitments acquired by Colombia in the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries (which it anticipated would be prolonged after accession to the OECD). In the case of crimes against trade union leaders, which went beyond the greater issue of access to justice (therefore going beyond the limits of the Employment Committee to the Public Governance Committee), the European Governments that focused on the issue presented it as possible violations to human rights. By labeling the disputed issues in terms of bilateral trade or ultimate values, haggling fell outside the scope of the technical assessments required by the *Roadmap*. The main indication of this was that, in general, the technical teams of the OECD stayed relatively on the sidelines of these disputes.

Third, the aforementioned authors mention that the impact that the actions of the actors have on the result of *bargaining* depends fundamentally on the costs associated with haggling (an aspect that ELSTER, 1989 also insists on) and on elements of power such as position hierarchical, control of resources or expertise in the matter. In this regard, all the actors who took the opportunity to put pressure on the Colombian Government at the last minute, saw their positions strengthened by two central characteristics of the design included in the *Roadmap*: i) that the approvals of the OECD committees could only be considered by the General Secretariat “as a single package”, and ii) that the formal approval by each Committee could only be the result of a unanimous vote of all its members. Therefore, both design features turned out to be important haggling resources in the hands of these actors. Additionally, this leads us to consider the important role that threats and their credibility have in the dynamics of bargaining (ELSTER, 1989). Therefore, while the possibility that a Government linked

to the issues in dispute would vote negatively was assumed as a credible threat by the Colombian Government, the possibility, for example, of a second strike by transporters over the issue of transportation was not so credible “scrapping”. Consequently, the measures offered by the Government in the case of trucks prioritized meeting the demands of the Governments, sacrificing in the medium term the interests defended by the national union of transporters.

Finally, a fourth characteristic mentioned by Allison and Zelikow, which is also present in the case of the campaign, is that haggling occurs within a regular channel of decision between the actors, therefore including rules of the game already known to the parties. (It is not, therefore, an informal or “under the table” negotiation that responds only to individual interests). In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the campaign the final *political bargaining* involved replacing the channel formally established in the *Roadmap* (technical assessments), for other channels of formal interaction but they were not an explicit part of the campaign design, such as were diplomatic channels and high-level political connections (relationship between heads of Government).

In summary, although the crisis of the technical negotiations in the three aforementioned committees surprised the Colombian Government and put the achievement of the campaign’s purpose at serious risk, the situation was dealt with successfully thanks to a *political bargaining* process that worked due to the availability of alternative channels to negotiate, the ability of technical experts to elaborate and re-elaborate technical measures that would satisfy their audience (mainly other Governments), and an adequate assessment of the credibility of the threats (internal and external) involved in the bargaining. However, among all the situations that required bargaining, there was one that opened the greatest possible risks to the success of the campaign: the discussion on outsourcing. This debate, mainly with the United States Government, triggered – like all the other issues raised – the risk of a delay beyond the end of President Santos’ term. But, additionally, the intervention of a new Minister of Labor who openly disagreed with the positions assumed by the Presidency in the negotiations with the OECD, triggered the risk of deviation of the effort in relation to its immediate purpose (the approval of the 23 committees) and

the substantive one (the invitation to access the Organization). Indeed, the ability of the minister to advance a labor policy agenda closer to the defense of labor rights as the union organizations understood them, was reinforced by her position in the campaign, since it allowed her to delay the necessary approvals and, in the end, sacrificing the entire process in favor of that agenda. Although perhaps the latter was not considered a credible threat (given the president's link with the campaign), the former was, and it was for this reason that after unsuccessful attempts to bring positions closer together, the Presidency and the Treasury took some distance from the problem, preparing apparently to have to accept a political decision that, although it was indispensable for the campaign, would have important consequences in the national labor market for a long time. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the action of the minister, who explicitly disagreed with the position taken by the Colombian Government during a meeting of the Employment Committee in Paris, strengthened the negotiating capacity of foreign Governments and unions by showing cracks in the national position. Showing internal cracks broke the *single narrative* principle of the campaign and, at the same time, weakened the stage control devices established by the Presidency, to which reference has already been made. It represented something like a direct shot to the waterline of the campaign at a time when, even worse, there was extremely little time to react and look for alternatives. Fortunately for the campaign, the minister left office to run for mayor of the capital city, and the new minister agreed to the agreements and position prior to her campaign, which made it possible to agree with the other Governments intermediate⁴⁴ solutions. It should be noted, beyond the fortuitous event that solved the impasse, the campaign had no possibility of solving the problem except by accepting labor policy decisions that, most likely, neither other Government actors, nor the president himself nor the business unions, would have been willing to accept. This was, therefore, the moment when the campaign came closest to failing.

⁴⁴ The informants interviewed consider that the departure of the Minister from the Labor portfolio was not a decision linked to the entrapment of the campaign for access to the OECD, but rather responded to the demands and interests of the Colombian political process, specifically, the municipal voting campaign. This was, therefore (and as Table 4 indicates) a contextual factor that impacted on the final trajectory of the campaign.

V. Learning from the case: a campaign that overcame its vulnerabilities

As has been pointed out from the beginning of these pages, the study of a unique experience, as is the case of the Colombian campaign for access to the OECD, makes sense as a contribution to the field of public management if it is possible to identify lessons learned that are useful when designing and managing other public policy campaigns in different contexts. This, of course, is not limited to negotiating campaigns with multilateral organizations). Learning must, therefore, serve to “extrapolate” (BARDACH, 2004) public management artifacts (systems, processes or forms of intervention) from their original context to that of destination, through a “second-hand” learning process (BARZELAY, 2007). From the perspective of a public manager and in the case under study, it is expected that this learning will focus on understanding as clearly as possible why the Colombian campaign for access to the OECD worked successfully, since such understanding can contribute to obtaining an analogous success (or at least approaching it) in other interventions.

Any public policy intervention has a successful record of accomplishment if it manages to circumvent those situations that would lead to collapse, that is, to not achieve its main purpose. These situations (events) are risky because they activate the vulnerabilities of an intervention, that is, factors (contextual elements and characteristics of the intervention itself) that, if activated, generate problems that put the achievement of the intended purpose at risk.

Perhaps the most useful way to learn from the experience of others (second-hand), is to understand how the experience or management device under study managed to prevent, neutralize, or – where appropriate – confront their vulnerabilities. This is because long lists of “good practices” fail to penetrate the dynamics of the effort to face setbacks, and rather tend to freeze (objectify) a set of practices, means, or decisions as “lessons” that can be applied beyond the specificities of each recipient context⁴⁵.

In the previous section, reference has been made, at various times, to how the design and management of the Colombian campaign responded to the need to address its vulnerabilities. Table 5 presents in a systematic way the vulnerabilities of the campaign, the problems that they could trigger, the measures by which the campaign sought to prevent, neutralize or confront them, as well as the possible learning elements that arise from it.

Referring to Pressman and Wildavsky (1998), the problems that the vulnerabilities of the campaign could trigger such as *deviation* and *delay* are modeled here. The first problem was that the persuasive effort, which was the heart of the campaign, deviated from the focus, that is, from the purpose of convincing the counterparts (audience) that Colombia was satisfactorily complying with the values, policies, and standards of the OECD. Deviation was a foreseeable problem given the large number of actors and technical expertise required for the negotiations. The delay, for its part, appeared as a possible problem because of the articulation of two contextual factors (the duration of the term of the administration of President Santos and the periodicity of the meetings of the OECD committees) with a characteristic of the design of the process (the restriction that the OECD would only consider inviting the country to become a member when it has the approval of the 23 technical committees “as a package”). Table 5 shows the events that, by triggering the deviation or delay, would undermine (damage) the campaign progress towards its central purpose. The countermeasures adopted by the campaign managers that managed to prevent or confront the aforementioned problems have been extensively analyzed in the previous section.

⁴⁵ This perspective has been suggested repeatedly by Michael Barzelay in seminars, classes and conversations, and is closely linked to his proposal regarding the development of public management as a professional and knowledge field (BARZELAY, 2007, 2019).

What can we learn from all this? Replicating the characteristics of the campaign or the countermeasures that were put into effect, considering them “good practices” of public management, is not very fruitful for the reason already explained. It is therefore necessary to take a step back and focus attention on the ideas underlying these characteristics and measures, as is done in the last column of Table 5. All of them – which have been used in the previous section to analyze the campaign and its future – come from theoretical frameworks or proposals that can be considered part of the field of knowledge of public management (what BARZELAY, 2019, calls “propositional theories”). Its usefulness in revealing key characteristics of campaign design and management has been shown in the previous section. Taking these elements into consideration to carefully consider which of the characteristics of the Colombian campaign can be adapted (extrapolated) to other contexts and how to do it, is the best learning path that can be recommended. These elements can be organized into the following lines of reflection, useful for the design and management of public policy campaigns:

a) Consider the particular nature of the campaign, depending on the nature of its main purpose. Therefore, in the case under study, it was a persuasion campaign, and more specifically, coercive persuasion (JONES & SIMONS, 2017). Recognizing this particular type of campaign leads directly to paying attention in its design and management to the stage control process (HILGARTNER, 2000), which makes it possible for the production of arguments to be clearly oriented to the audience and to be convincing for it, which in turn requires making the most of the rhetorical, dramatic and evidence-building aspects that make up any argumentation effort (HOOD & JACKSON, 1997; MAJONE, 1997). Obviously, not all policy interventions are persuasive campaigns, but even in those cases, and as is well known, all public policy efforts necessarily involve argumentation to achieve authority and resources. Considering this dimension is therefore always recommended.

b) Organize the links between the political actors (elected or not elected) as well as between them and the civil servants (professional and technical bureaucrats) involved in the intervention, so that the political impulse (its strategic content) does not collapse and it is able to spread throughout the entire operational chain. For this, it is necessary to reflect on the desirable balances between the discretion (relative autonomy) and responsibility (enforceability by superiors) of the intervening actors, considering the different forms of possible articulation between them – of the “agency” or “fiduciary” type (HOOD & LODGE, 2006) – and their combinations. Becoming aware of these types of links, organizing them, and preventing them from being completely up to the spontaneity of the actors, is an important task. The case under study is a good example of the usefulness of resisting the tendency – usual among senior managers and political authorities – towards formally “adjusting” as much as possible the space for action and decision of bureaucrats (technicians), believing that this allows for the maintenance of momentum and orientation during long campaigns. The Colombian campaign towards the OECD suggests that, even in protracted processes in time and with a large number of actors, combining mutuality spaces with vertical supervision actions, even ex post (editorial control, for example), can be, in certain situations, a more effective path.

c) Establish organizational, monitoring and control systems that respond as much as possible to the previous point, that is, to the balance sought between the discretion for action and the enforceability of results. In terms of organization, it is advisable to consider the different forms of work coordination – supervision, normalization, lateral adaptation (MINTZBERG, 1993) – and their consequences in the establishment of organizational configurations that tend to a greater extent towards adaptive flexibility or, on the contrary, to hierarchical formality and even, as the case under study shows, to a combination of both. Regarding monitoring and control, the emphasis on the use of restrictive control systems (diagnostic control and limiting systems: SIMONS, 1995) – of which the case studied is a good

example – seems to facilitate the targeting of the actors in the immediate results sought (approval in each OECD committee, for example). Although it is never too much to consider the usefulness of positive impulse mechanisms (belief and learning systems: SIMONS, 1995), it is possible that, in the case of campaigns, that is, of public policy interventions that do not acquire a character since they do not tend to be perpetuated beyond the achievement of their final purpose (WEISS & TSCHIRHART, 1994; SHARP, 2011), these forms of control are less relevant. On the other hand, employing control mechanisms to discipline performance through blame management (HOOD, 2011), requires careful consideration of the areas of the operational chain in which it is indeed possible to assign specific responsibilities for failures, since that if applied in a uniform manner beyond this possibility, the control system loses credibility and influence among those involved.

d) Have at hand alternative decision and action mechanisms to those initially planned, in case these are overwhelmed due to unforeseen actions of those involved or due to the unexpected effect of contextual factors. In the case of the Colombian campaign, the possibility of accessing political channels (*political bargaining*: ALLISON & ZELIKOW, 1999) and diplomats, to face interactions that exceeded the eminently technical channel, foreseen in the design of the campaign. The abovementioned is not intended to be a list of “lessons” or “good practices” of equal utility in very different contexts and opportunities, and its purpose is to invite the reader to carefully consider the conceptual (propositional) elements shown in Table 5. This implies taking the Colombian campaign for access to the OECD, in the first place, as a precedent (BARZELAY, 2019) for the design and management of other public interventions (a precedent whose operation is understandable considering the conceptual frameworks) and, secondly, as a stimulus to think creatively about the challenges that public managers face, in very diverse situations, to successfully direct public policy interventions.

Table 5
Campaign vulnerabilities and countermeasures

Vulnerabilities	Problem	Countermeasures	Elements to consider in other public initiatives
OECD technical staff refusal to approve COL positions.	Delay	Focusing the argumentation on the requirements and interests of the audiences (23 committees).	Designing and managing the campaign as a coercive persuasion effort (JONES & SIMONS, 2017). Symmetry, evidence selection, and elimination of doubt in argument development (HOOD & JACKSON, 1997).
OECD countries' refusal to approve COL positions.	Delay	Exploration of OECD countries' positions in Paris and Brussels. Direct negotiation with political authorities of the countries, including (unforeseen) concessions at the level of political and legislative decisions. Recourse to the diplomatic relations channel. Efforts to maintain a univocal narrative with counterparts.	Olitical bargaining (ALLISON & ZELIKOW, 1999). Anticipation of alternative decision channels to the one initially envisaged. Scenario control (HILGARTNER, 2000).

<p>Weakening or extinction of presidential political momentum.</p>	<p>Delay</p>	<p>Operating system modeled as a "double loop" of articulation between public servants and political actors:</p> <p>Designation of High Counselors to direct the campaign from the presidential environment, enjoying wide discretion in exchange for final result.</p> <p>Granting of relative technical autonomy to the negotiating teams in exchange for the necessary approvals.</p> <p>Campaign monitoring scorecard applied at the level of the Council of Ministers, compensating for the difficulty of identifying responsibilities at the level of technical teams responsibilities at the level of technical teams.</p>	<p>Agency" and "delegation" type articulation between political actors (HOOD & LODGE, 2006).</p> <p>"Fiduciary" type articulation between technicians and political authorities (HOOD & LODGE, 2006).</p> <p>Blame management (HOOD, 2011).</p>
<p>Dispersion of the technical effort (dissent and loss of focus in the audience due to views, interests or conflicts of interest), interests or conflicts of jurisdiction, favored by teams of peers with little hierarchical formalization).</p>	<p>Deviation Delay</p>	<p>Operating system modeled as a "mirror" of the OECD's technical structure.</p> <p>Vertical supervision from the Presidency (direct supervision at meetings, follow-up means and editorial control).</p> <p>Designation of coordinators of the technical teams as liaison with the Presidency.</p>	<p>Professional and personal similarities to enhance persuasive effort (JONES & SIMONS, 2017).</p> <p>Elicitation of a univocal narrative through scenario control (HILGARTNER, 2000).</p> <p>Complementarity of diagnostic and limiting controls (SIMONS, 1995) as instruments of hierarchical supervision (HOOD et al., 2004; MINTZBERG, 1993).</p>

Resistance and opportunism (political, technical or bureaucratic), favored by relative autonomy of technicians and sectoral specialization of negotiations.	Deviation	Lateral matching between technical peers from different ministries: motivation through status expectations and international contacts. Vertical supervision from the Presidency (direct supervision in meetings and meetings and editorial control).	Peer-to-peer mutuality (mutual adjustment) to enable collaboration between specialized technical inputs (HOOD et al., 2004; MINTZBERG, 1993) Exercise of limiting control (SIMONS, 1995).
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