

Bolsa Família Program: Funding Families for Development

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1. Background and introduction

Brazil has a population of approximately 191 million, 84.3% of which is urban. Its gross domestic product of 1,573 trillion US dollars in 2009 (approximately 8,414 per capita) places the nation within the ranks of middle-income countries. Despite remarkable progress in recent the extremely high level of inequality means that absolute number of poor people are still very high. In 2009, the share income of the top 1% richest is 12.1%, comparable to the share income of the 50% poorest, which is 15.5% according to 2010 Ipea data².

Given the heterogeneity and large territorial dimensions of Brazil (with 8.5 million square kilometers, it is the fifth largest in the world, being equivalent in size to the continental United States), the country faces an important challenge to coordinate the actions and programs in the Federal Government, 26 States, one Federal District and 5,564 Municipal Governments.

Just to illustrate the administrative challenges, the municipalities have populations that range from 800 people to 11 million people and total yearly gross domestic products that range from 1,000 US dollars to 77 million US dollars. And yet, these very heterogeneous entities are subject to a large number of rules governing the implementation of public policies that are identical.

In this context, recent Brazilian governments have pursued simultaneous agendas of social inclusion, reduction of inequalities, strengthening of democracy, macroeconomic stability, and acceleration of sustainable growth.

This paper presents a case study of the implementation of *Bolsa Família*, a program of direct cash transfers to poor families conditioned

to compliance with specific requirements by the recipients (commonly known as conditional cash transfers). *Bolsa Família* benefits approximately 51 million people in Brazil, with an annual budget of 5.8 billion US dollars in 2011³.

2. Social policy in Brazil: a brief historical context

Colonial past has left behind an immense social debt in Brazil. During the formative years of the nation, millions of people were forced from their homelands in Africa to work in heavy labor in slavery in Brazil. Indigenous populations were decimated to a mere fraction of the original numbers. Furthermore, as the country turned independent in 1822, abolished slavery in 1888, and became a republic in 1889, no inclusion mechanisms were put into place for either the indigenous people or the slave descendents, perpetuating a cycle of poverty that has lasting negative effects to the present date.

As a republic, Brazil has had a history of political patronage and clientelism that characterized its social policies during the majority of the twentieth century. In the 1930's and 1940's, the first social rights were introduced in the form of pensions, maximum daily workloads, and paid vacation time. However, these rights were restricted to the few members of urban labor groups that had power of mobilization and could affect economic activities in a decisive manner. Such was the case of railroad, port and telegraph workers. It was not until the 1970's that the right to pensions was extended to workers of the rural sector, partly in order to alleviate potential social unrest in the countryside.

From the 1960's until the turn of the millennium, the main approach to poverty alleviation was based on a belief that growth is good for the poor. A *coup d'état* gave rise to a military dictatorship in 1964, and for the following ten years the economy expanded rapidly, with annual growth rates reaching peaks of 14%. But as the country grew, income concentration worsened. A common saying at the time was that the country was experiencing an "economic miracle", but very few actually benefited from it. Government officials insisted that a cake must rise before it can be shared.

The second half of the 1980's was marked by the end of the authoritarian period, and the drafting of a new Constitution was an important cornerstone of the democratization process. The 1988 Constitution at last introduced legal guarantees to a broad set of social rights, including rights to healthcare, education, social protection, pensions, and housing, amongst others. However, despite the legal mandate, policy implementation has had mixed progress.

In the 1990's – the first decade under the new constitution – public policy emphasized structural adjustment reforms focused on macroeconomic stabilization, fiscal austerity measures, and privatization of services. From 1993 to 1995, previously rampant inflation finally came into control, which made a good dent on poverty rates⁴. However, for eight years following 1995, average real incomes remained stagnant while poverty and inequality rates still remained at very high levels. Important social programs were introduced during this period, but those still had limited reach.

By 2001, over 58 million Brazilians (more than the populations of Canada and Australia combined) lived in poverty, earning approximately less than two US dollars a day per capita⁵. Of those, 25 million lived in extreme poverty, subsisting on less than one US dollar a day per capita⁶. These figures provide the overall initial scenario in which *Bolsa Família* program was designed and implemented.

3. Formative years: From local level initiatives to a national policy

The success stories commonly associated with *Bolsa Família* in the national and international public policy communities frequently overlook the importance of the process of learning and experimenting that took place with the basic income policies in Brazil.

The first Brazilian initiatives of direct money transfers to poor families conditioned to the compliance with specific requirements by the recipients (the conditional cash transfers), took place at the local level. In 1995 the local governments of the cities of Campinas and of Brasília started pioneering initiatives that made cash payments directly to the families as an incentive to make sure that their children attended school regularly. In both cities, the programs were called *Bolsa Escola* in Portuguese, an expression that could be translated as “School Fund”. From these early experiences, variations of conditional cash transfers or basic income programs started to appear at various city, state and federal administrations. By 1998, at least 24 subnational income transfer initiatives were already in progress with varying scopes and ranges.

At the federal level, conditional cash transfer programs took place in a highly fragmented fashion during the Cardoso administration (1995-2002) and in the first year of the Lula administration (2003), as it will become clear below. In 1996, the federal government started the *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (Child Labor Eradication Program), which made payments to poor families that had children at risk of engaging in labor activities, with the purpose of keeping them in school instead of working. In 2001, the Federal Ministry of Education launched a program that was also called *Bolsa Escola* (School Fund), giving

cash to poor families whose children attended school regularly. Also in 2001, the Federal Ministry of Health launched a program named *Bolsa Alimentação* (Feeding Fund), which provided cash to poor families that were at risk of undernourishment. In 2002, the federal government launched yet one more cash transfer to poor families under the name of *Auxílio Gás* (Cooking Gas Aid) that supplemented the incomes of those who were registered for other social programs with a minimum cash stipend to compensate for rising prices in cooking gas.

At the end of the Cardoso administration (December 2002), at least four different government agencies were transferring cash to poor families as a form of alleviating poverty. But each agency was using their own registries, payment mechanisms, administrative procedures, and, perhaps more interestingly, the same policy was being used to justify the pursuit of different organizational missions – education, health, child labor, and energy.

Around this time, president Lula was elected after having campaigned with a platform that was focused heavily on the reduction of poverty and inequalities. It was the first time that the Workers Party had managed to win presidential elections. In his inaugural speech, Lula announced *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) policy, stating that the human right to adequate food and the fight against poverty were the key priorities of his presidency.

In order to implement Zero Hunger policy, President Lula created a government agency that was named Extraordinary Ministry for Food Security and Fight against Hunger, known in Portuguese by the suggestive acronym *MESA*, which means “table”. A long time activist in the fight against hunger and a close ally of the president, Mr. José Graziano was appointed as the first minister to head the agency responsible for implementing the Zero Hunger policy. Its first relevant initiative in early 2003 was the creation of yet one more form of cash transfers to poor families, called *Cartão Alimentação* (Food card).

Here the issue of public results versus civic results comes into play. How can public policy be shaped to help empower the citizenry?

The Food Card did not make specific social behavioural requirements, i.e. conditions, from the families, but the funds received by the families had to be spent only on the purchase of food items. The proposed control mechanisms for the program implementation involved the creation of local committees of organized citizens, called *Comitês Gestores* (Managerial Committees) that were to oversee family expenditures. Behind this design was an idea that the organization of Managerial

Committees and the ensuing discussions would empower citizens, and strengthen social abilities of critical thought and self-awareness.

Very soon administrative and political problems started to arise with the Food Card program, especially on the control of the use of the funds transferred to the families. At the time, the Brazil had no system comparable to the United States Food Stamps program, which electronically restricts the disbursement of funds to pre-authorized items. Some proposals started to arise, suggesting that expenditures of poor families should be made available by public display of food purchasing receipts from supermarkets and grocery stores. A huge controversy followed. An interview given by the minister Graziano to the newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* vividly illustrates the public debate on the topics of the requirement to present receipts to prove that the funds were used for food purchases, and on the role of the Managerial Committees as an instrument of public oversight.

Folha de São Paulo – One of the criticisms to the requirement of presenting receipts is that it would not only create a market of counterfeit sales receipts but it would also generate excessive red tape.

Graziano – I repeat that we have no fiscal objective. On the discretion of the local committees, the proof of [food] purchases could be made with a formal sales receipt, handwritten notes from the owner of the grocery store, or even the testimony of the salesperson.

Folha de São Paulo – Did the government have access to the survey that indicates that in basic income programs, families already spend 70% of the money on food purchases?

Graziano – There are several studies showing that the families spend 70% or even 80% of their funds on food. This data suggests that the discussion has been focused on details only. In our view, it doesn't matter how the expenditure was made. The important issue is the people's organization that results from the actions promoted by the [Food Card] program.

The difference between the [Food Card] and the [School Fund] is not the link with the type of expenditure. The difference resides in the fact that one program promotes schooling while the other one creates the embryo of local organization: the citizen oversight committees. And, with the [Food Card], which associates income with food purchases, the beneficiaries will have more money to invest on their own citizenship.⁷

In late 2003, the federal government already had at least five cash transfer programs, including the policies initiated by the previous administration and the new Food Card program. Once more, such programs had differences in requirements, amount of funds transferred, administrative structures, governance structures, and oversight mechanisms. But all of them had one key overlapping characteristic: they were poverty alleviation programs focused largely on the same target population, namely people living below the poverty line.

The programs were managed by five different ministries, each own trying to use similar tools (cash transfers) to achieve different public policy results: social work, health, education, food security, energy, and child labor. As the controversy over different programs, agencies, and requirements grew into a public debate, without a clearly visible causal link to the reduction of poverty, President Lula decided to launch a task force to unify all of the cash transfer programs and its databases into one single program.

According to a comment made by one of the president's Lula top aides at the time, Ms. Miriam Belchior, the role of presidential leadership was crucial to this decision to unify the programs and also to the success in achieving it.

The second point is the issue of leadership. An issue that does not value a matrix framework will not succeed in making the administration achieve goals of such magnitude. Then, what role did the President play? The President of the Republic arrived at the [Interministerial] Social Policy Commission⁸ and said: the income transfer programs must be unified. "Wait, but..." No, there is no "wait, but...". These programs must be unified, but they must be unified in a way that takes into account the views of all of the Ministries that are involved with the issue. There must be an open dialogue. And a process in which everyone may express their views and contribute to the overall construction.⁹

The result of the presidential determinations was the creation of *Bolsa Família* in October 2003, merging the previously existing *Bolsa Escola* (School Fund), *Bolsa Alimentação* (Food Fund), *Cartão Alimentação* (Food Card), and *Auxílio Gás* (Cooking Gas Aid)¹⁰. In the new program, recipient families would have no constraints on how they use the funds, but they would be preferentially paid to the women in the household. Furthermore, families would have to comply with a set of conditionalities regarding the use of health and education services.

And instead of assigning the infant *Bolsa Family* to one of the ministries that was responsible for its parent programs, the President of the Republic decided to create an Executive Secretariat directly under his office to manage the new program.

In response to problems of compliance, the design of the program was made **more** flexible, rather than having stricter controls.

But the underlying divergences over the overall approach to poverty alleviation and to the implementation of *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) – the strategy that later became an international trademark of President Lula’s Administration – did not end with the integration of programs. An important debate over what role civil society should have for the oversight of the program persisted, even after all of the cash transfer programs were merged to form the *Bolsa Família*.

Part of the presidential advisors insisted that the management of the cash transfers to poor families, including the selection of beneficiaries, and audit and control functions should be mainly conducted by citizens organized in Managerial Committees. They argued that such a design would not only help to alleviate poverty through cash transfers, but also increase social mobilization and empower the citizens. But a second group of presidential advisors defended the idea that the management of *Bolsa Família* should strengthen the federative pact, rather than civil society. They proposed that states and municipalities should be responsible for managing the program and verifying legal compliance.

This dispute was made clear in a letter sent in December 2003 from Mr. Carlos Alberto Libânio Christo, known as Friar Betto and one of the top presidential advisors, to Mr. José Dirceu, who was then Chief of Staff of the President’s Office:

Bolsa Família: in my view, the duplicity over Bolsa Família and [Zero Hunger] has not been properly resolved. It seems as if they are different programs, and that the one which was announced later replaces the other one. I hope that the [impending] ministerial reform settles this issue. It is important to maintain the Managerial Committees in each municipality, composed by a majority of the civil society. It is important to stress that these committees should not lose their

powers related to the selection of registered beneficiaries. My proposal is that the current criterion should be kept (...): two thirds of the committee member should be representatives from the organized civil society and one third should come from government.

(...)

I believe in the role that states and municipalities have for the development of the program, but it is essential to maintain balance, especially in all of the municipalities in Brazil, and the Managerial Committee favors such balance.¹¹

In fact, the managerial reform anticipated by Friar Betto took place soon after. In January 2004, a new ministry was created, integrating functions of social assistance, food and nutrition security, and income transfers, absorbing the responsibilities over the *Bolsa Família*. This new agency was named Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger. Mr. Patrus Ananias, who had been a mayor of the city of Belo Horizonte and was a Federal Congressman, was invited by President Lula to be the Minister.

Also in January 2004, the Provisional Measure that had created the *Bolsa Família* was converted into the Federal Law number 10836. The law established that the previously existing cash transfer programs were unified. The cash benefit was to be paid directly to the families by means of an ATM card issued by Caixa Econômica Federal, a public bank owned by the federal government. Beneficiaries should preferably be female¹², and in order to receive the benefits, families should be below the poverty line and comply with a set of requirements, called conditionalities. The law also stated that the design of the mechanisms of social control and participation in the program was to be a responsibility of the governments of the municipalities. Therefore, it meant the end of the proposed Managerial Committees with a majority of representatives from civil society. Instead, the mayors were the main authority responsible for managing the program at the local level.

4. From early stages to a permanent national policy

When *Bolsa Família* was created in last quarter of 2003, its “parent programs” benefited 3.6 million families with cash transfers. But the program was far from being a unanimous initiative. During 2004, the first year of its existence, *Bolsa Família* was submitted to intensive scrutiny from the press.

In October 2004, when *Bolsa Familia* was having its first anniversary, televised media prepare a series of investigative reports showing the so-called inclusion and exclusion errors, i.e, some relatively wealthy families that should not be receiving the cash transfers were benefited by the program while some extremely poor families were still excluded from it. The contrasting images of rich and poor people created a strong impact in public opinion against *Bolsa Familia*, and the report was mentioned by President Lula in a public speech:

I thought that the news report that came out on TV one of these days was important to us. Some people thought that the report was a criticism. I think that we have to learn to accept things as they are. It is true that all of us, politicians, would like that, every day, the headlines in the news were favorable, but we are not like that even in our private lives. So why should we ask the others to do so? What we have is just the consciousness and the certainty that we are doing our best and that we are sensitive enough to correct the mistakes as we find them, understand that they are mistakes, and correct our path.

Every now and then people say: "But the registry of beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia does this, does not do that". Well, if even a large chain of supermarkets such as Pão de Açúcar accepts the possibility of 1% of losses to shoplifting, imagine what can happen to a program that works with five million ATM cards. There could be some frauds. There could be.¹³

In his speech, the President made a reference to potential problems in the registry of beneficiaries. From the beginning, the program has relied on a registry called *Cadastro Único* (Single Registry), a massive database that gathers data on all families in the country that are at risk of poverty, defined as an income threshold of approximately 872 USD per month, or three times the value of national minimum salary.

This Single Registry is maintained by the Federal Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger, but municipal governments are responsible for collecting data of poor families and entering them into the registry. This was one of the sensitive points that led to the creation of *Bolsa Familia* – as mentioned earlier, part of the government wished to assign the responsibility of selecting the beneficiaries and entering them into the registry to civil society, while the remaining officials wanted to have the municipal governments performing this task. The latter idea prevailed.

After being entered into the Single Registry, families are selected to receive the benefit by the Federal government. The funds are then directly paid to the families with the use of an ATM card issued by a federal bank. With the cards, the benefit may be withdrawn in banks, post offices, lottery shops and other forms of banking correspondents. Families may use the benefits freely and are not mandated to report their expenses. In approximately 95% of the cases, the ATM cards are registered under a female in the household. The average value of the benefit is 65 US dollars, but it may reach up to 137 US dollars, depending on the characteristics of the family.

In order to receive the benefits, families must comply with conditionalities that are designed at building human capital. The education conditionalities require minimum 85% school attendance for children aged 6 to 15 years and of 75% for teenagers 16 or 17 years old. The health conditionalities require that children aged 0 to 6 years are immunized and receive growth monitoring, and also that pregnant women attend sessions of pre and postnatal care. Finally, social assistance conditionalities require that children at risk of labor participate in after school activities. The health, education and social assistance services related with the conditionalities are universal and provided free of charge.

Despite the complex program design including conditionalities, in the early implementation stages, much of the attention of the press was focused on the errors of inclusion and exclusion, as well on the roles of school quality and attendance. Dr. Kathy Lindert, a Social Protection Specialist working at the World Bank commented on the press coverage based on an extensive analysis of media coverage of the program.

From the point of view of the PBF's [Programa Bolsa Família] objectives and expected roles, however, it can be said that the press coverage sometimes is out of focus, as in the case of reporting on inclusion vs. exclusion errors or on its roles in promoting school attendance (via conditionalities) vs. school quality (out of the realm of the PBF). Similarly, from a technical point of view, there are important differences between administrative errors and intentional fraud (both of which are present to some degree in all programs), but these concepts are sometimes blurred in reporting on the program. The analysis should be useful to help the press itself identify new hooks for its reporting and to better understand the program's broad nature and role, as well as key implementation aspects.¹⁴

Having survived the difficult first year of intense media scrutiny, the biggest test of the program came with the presidential election of 2006 – the first national election since the creation of Bolsa Família. At the time of the elections (October 2006), the program had already reached its target coverage of 11.1 million families who were estimated to live under the poverty line in the country.

Electoral results made clear that a large fraction of civil society took over the program as an asset that they wanted to keep.

Every candidate running for the presidential election publicly mentioned that they supported the program. For President Lula, it meant one big success story reduction of poverty and inequality that translated into electoral support in his campaign for reelection. For his main opponent, Mr. Geraldo Alckmin, the votes of 11.1 million families could not be ignored, and he disputed the “paternity” of the program, since it had originated from initiatives of previous administration at federal and subnational levels. Rather than attacking the program, the opposition parties mentioned that they would expand and improve it.

As of January 2011, *Bolsa Família* reached 12.85 million families in every Brazilian municipality and the federal district, with a budget for the year of approximately 5.7 billion US dollars. The program costs nearly 0.4% of Brazilian Gross Domestic Product each year. Another round of presidential elections was held in October 2010, and once more, all major candidates publicly declared their support for the program. Current president Dilma Rousseff publicly renewed her commitment with the program, approving an average raise of 19.8% in the monetary amount of the cash benefit in March 2011.

5. Documented impacts

Bolsa Família program is considered one of the largest of its kind in the world¹⁵, benefiting approximately 50 million people in the entire country. Its stated rationales are: fighting deprivation and hunger and as a means of short-term alleviation of the most urgent effects of poverty; breaking the intergeneration poverty cycle through health, education and social assistance conditionalities; promoting access to public services, also by the means of conditionalities; and finally, integrating and rationalizing the social safety net.

Several studies have documented the impacts of the Programa *Bolsa Família* for reductions of poverty and inequality reduction¹⁶,

improvement of local economies, reduction of child nutrition and others food security impacts¹⁷.

Perhaps the most important public policy impacts have been the reduction of poverty and inequality, two problems that are persistent and interrelated throughout the entire history of Brazil. In the years between 2001 and 2008, the average annual growth rate of per capita family income was a little under 3% for the entire population, which is not remarkable when compared to the fastest growing countries in the world¹⁸. However, when the data for family income is categorized by deciles of distribution, one important distinction is revealed: while the income of the 10% richest grew at an average of nearly 8% per year, the income of the 10% poorest grew at an average of nearly 1.5% per year.

The continuation of this trend has produced an important reduction in income inequality levels in Brazil, which has reached the lowest levels, measured by the Gini coefficient, since the beginning of the available time series that begins in 1976¹⁹.

Despite the great importance of the reduction of income inequality, partially attributable to *Bolsa Família* and other social policies, evaluations of the conditional cash transfer program in Brazil also points to evidence of positive impacts in other domains, such as food and nutrition security. A cross-sectional study done at the time of the expansion of the program in 2005 documents that the prevalence of undernutrition among children from 6 months to 1 year of age, in families that were not beneficiaries of the program was 2.65 higher than the prevalence of undernutrition of those in beneficiary families²⁰.

In some occasions looser controls may led to a reconciliation of performance and controls.

Representative surveys of beneficiaries show that their top expenditures of Bolsa Família Funds are on food (indicated by 87% of the families), school supplies (mentioned by 46% of the families), and clothing (37% of the families). This is significant, given the early debates about how to make sure that the families spent their money on food purchases. Given that in 95% of the cases the cash benefit is paid directly to a female in the household, this reinforces existing evidence that women are better spenders than men. Another important consequence captured in the surveys was that 40% of the women reported increase in decision power in their household after receiving the program.

In the case of Brazil, the global economic crises of 2008-2009 provided an appropriate testing for the claim the social policies may act counter-cyclically and mitigate the effects of external shocks through incentives to internal markets and consumption of the families²¹.

6. Final notes: Broadening the expanded public space

Perhaps more important than traditional impact evaluations is the possibility that *Bolsa Familia* may promote an integration of public and civic results. Above and beyond the stated rationales and public policy results of the conditional cash transfer, once program implementation began it became clear that the success of the program depended on a broader set of changes both in the public and civic spheres. The strong leadership behind pushing for implementation of the program created momentum for other advancing other items in the social policy agenda. Therefore, the results spawned by the program contributed to generate an expanded public space in several domains.

First, a considerable share of the poorest Brazilians still did not have any form of identification or official documents and therefore, they were denied and form of access to public services. In an interview given in 2005, then Minister of Social Development and Fight against Hunger, Mr. Patrus Ananias, lays out the difficulties and the civic achievements that have been experienced.

It is a matter of citizenship to make sure that people obtain their official registration. We are making partnerships with social organizations to help people get their identification papers. Several families that strictly comply with the program rules still do not receive the money because they do not exist from a civic perspective. Those are people that have never had a birth certificate, a marriage certificate, or anything comparable. I do not see a political or electoral interest in this. We have partnerships with every single local government in the country.²²

Second, the new spending power of poorer families has made an important influence on the economical dynamics of the country. Large food corporations have made new investments on factories in the poorer Northeastern region of the country, in order to serve these new markets. Even the food products themselves have changed, with packages being made in smaller portions and simpler wrapping materials to make them more affordable to people with low incomes.²³

Third, the main mechanism of payment used by the *Bolsa Familia* program, namely ATM cards, paved the way for several other public initiatives. The federal bank that is responsible for issuing the cards, named CAIXA, is converting the cash cards into simplified banking accounts. Within this program, families are starting to have access to a

new set of financial products, such as small loans, savings accounts, and other services which help the beneficiaries to be included in the formal banking system.²⁴

Fourth, the discussion about accountability and control over the payment of benefits created strong incentives for greater transparency. Anyone with internet access may check whether any given person is a recipient of Bolsa Família (and other government programs as well) at the website <http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br>.

Finally, the main electronic database used for managing the program, the Single Registry of Beneficiaries, is an enabling technology with enormous potential for the design, implementation, and evaluation of other social policies. Once the database was built, new initiatives can be planned using geospatial analysis techniques to identify needs and to monitor delivery of public services to the population. So far, these possibilities have not been explored to their full potential, which indicates that future impacts may also be very important.

Within the New Synthesis expanded public space, *Bolsa Família* may suggest interesting possibilities of a policy that was initiated by local governments, made its way up to a national policy, then was incorporated as an asset of civil society. From perspective of the axis of social and civil results, the program has promoted an integration of policies with impacts that largely surpassed its original intended policy purposes, showing that funding families at the micro level may be a way to achieve widescale developmental impacts.

Footnotes

- ¹ Frederico Guanais is Health Senior Specialist at the Social Protection and Health Division of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC. At the time when the earlier versions of this paper were written, he was Head of the International Cooperation office at the Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (ENAP) in Brasília, Brazil. The findings, interpretations and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the view of the Brazilian government or the Inter-American Development Bank.
- ² Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (2010). IPEADATA. Brasília, Distrito Federal, Brazil. Available at: <http://www.ipeadata.gov.br>.
- ³ Rounded value for an exchange rate of USD 1.00 = BRL 1.76 (April 2010). All figures in US dollars in this paper follow this rate.⁴ Inflation rate in consumer prices for the year of 1993 was 2,489% (two thousand four hundred and eighty nine percent).
- ⁵ Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (2010).
- ⁶ Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (2010).
- ⁷ Salomon M (2003). Graziano indica que Vale-Gás e Bolsa-Renda podem acabar [Graziano indicates that Cooking Gas Subsidy and Income Fund may end] (Interview of Mr. José Graziano to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, published on February 2nd, 2003).
- ⁸ The Interministerial Social Policy Commission is a working group coordinated by the President's Office with the purpose of integrating the different areas of social policies.
- ⁹ Belchior, M (2009) Speech at the Brazil-France Forum "Professionalization and consolidation of public service in the context of public policy reform". National School of Public Administration, Brasília, Brazil, September 15th 2009.
- ¹⁰ The Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil remained existing a separate until 2005, when it was also merged to Bolsa Família.
- ¹¹ Betto, Frei (2009). Calendário do Poder. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco.
- ¹² Existing research indicates that women are much better spenders.
- ¹³ President Lula. Speech at the 5th Meeting of the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security. October 26th, 2004. Available at: <http://www.info.planalto.gov.br/download/discursos/pr583.doc>
- ¹⁴ Lindert K, Vincensini V. (2010) "Bolsa Família in the Headlines: An Analysis of the Media's Treatment of Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil". Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/Resources/Lindert-CCT_Media_Study-Dec2010.pdf.
- ¹⁵ Similar experiences have been implemented in most Latin American countries and elsewhere. Similarly to *Bolsa Família*, Mexico has a wide-scale and largely successful conditional cash transfer program called *Oportunidades*.
- ¹⁶ Rocha S. (2008) Transferências de renda federais: focalização e impactos sobre pobreza e desigualdade. [Federal income transfers: focalization and impacts on poverty and inequality.] Rev. econ. Contemp., vol.12, n.1, pp. 67-96; Soares, S (2008). O Ritmo de Queda na

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- ¹⁷ Santos L, Paes-Sousa R, Silva JB, Victora CG (2008). National Immunization Day: a strategy to monitor health and nutrition indicators. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, v. 86, p. 474-479.
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