

## **Cross-sectoral partnership in social policy: the control of school attendance in the Bolsa Família Program<sup>1</sup>**

Written by Cristina Almeida Cunha Filgueiras  
2013  
With Teaching Note

### **Summary:**

The case study examines the collaboration between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger in Brazil in order to monitor the commitment made by the beneficiary families in keeping their children in school at the minimum attendance rate required by Bolsa Família Program. It analyzes the cross-sectoral approach as a social policy strategy and the challenges involved in coordination among government agencies to ensure the integrality of this anti-poverty and social protection policy program. The main focus of the study is the relationship between the institutional representatives of the federal government, but it also addresses important elements of interaction with other levels of government so that the management of the education conditionality complies with its purposes.

# Summary

1. Introduction .....	5
2. A meeting at the Tiradentes School .....	6
3. The Program .....	7
3.1- Commitment of the families and conditions for receiving the benefit .....	9
3.2- Control and management of the conditionality .....	10
4. Institutional context .....	12
4.1- One program, one conditionality and two ministries .....	13
4.2-MDS, manager of Bolsa Família .....	14
4.3-Ministry of Education .....	18
4.4-Social Assistance .....	22
5. Coordination and cross-sectoral approach .....	25
5.1- Shared vision .....	25
5.2-In the absence of a central coordination .....	26
5.3- The instruments, the instances and the spaces of coordination .....	27
5.4- Networks, people and organizations .....	28
5.5- Personal skills and institutional requirements .....	29
5.6- Cross-sectoral coordination beyond Bolsa Família .....	30
5.7- “No cross-sectoral management happens without a lot of sweat and inspiration” .....	30
6. After the meeting at the Tiradentes School .....	31
Notes .....	33
Bibliographic references .....	34
Annexes .....	37
Glossary of Acronyms .....	43

## 1. Introduction

This case study addresses cross-sectoral approach as a strategy of social policy and the challenges involved in the processes of coordination among government agencies to ensure the integrality of the policies of social protection.

Bolsa Família is an important program stemming from the anti-poverty policy of the Brazilian government that benefits people living in extreme poverty<sup>2</sup> with a monthly money transfer that varies according to family composition. The initiative is based on the acknowledgement that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and requires both income and integrality of social policy, which implies coordination of projects, articulation of those involved and a cross-sectoral strategy of action.

A family entitled to the benefit must enroll and keep its children and teenagers in school, and monitor the health of children, teenagers, pregnant and lactating women. These requirements are related to the core objectives of the income transfer program, that is increasing the human capital of the poor and excluded populations and breaking the cycle of the intergenerational reproduction of poverty. The conditionalities also require greater attention from the government in the provision of education, health and social assistance services to the neediest sectors of the population.

There are three levels of government involved in the implementation of Bolsa Família (federal, state and municipal) and the areas of social assistance, education and health. Collaborative relationships among the responsible areas and agencies are essential to the functioning of the program and to obtain the expected poverty reduction results. In this context, the ministries of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS), which is the national manager of Bolsa Família, and the sectoral ministries of Education (MEC) and Health have a leading role.

This study focuses on the tasks of the MDS and MEC, the agreements and the interaction between them in monitoring the attendance of the students from families entitled to the income transfer. The work done by both ministries and local governments across the country makes it possible to collect and systematize information on school attendance of approximately 17.5 million children and adolescents from families benefiting from the program. The information is used to guide social work with families whose children are not attending school. It even allows in identifying situations of social vulnerability that require action by the government. It is also used to control the implementation of the program by local governments.

The structuring of the education conditionality management and monitoring of school attendance and its development in the social

support to families was a complex and long process. This case study focuses on the factors that led to the development of partnerships and collaborative dynamics between the two ministries involved and their work with local governments.

In order to examine the cross-sectoral coordination, this paper first presents the case of a meeting between agents of social and educational policies to address the situation of Pedro, beneficiary of Bolsa Família and student at the Tiradentes School. The program is described as follows: its origin, its objectives and institutional format. It also addresses the commitments made by beneficiary families and how the monitoring takes place. Next, the institutional context, the actors in the management of education conditionality and monitoring of families are examined, especially the MDS and MEC, in addition to tools, instances and spaces of cross-sectoral coordination. Finally, the narrative returns to the Tiradentes School, where representatives of the government - the director and social assistant - analyze the case of a student named Pedro. The annexes include additional information about the program and a Teaching Note.

## **2. A meeting at the Tiradentes School**

Execution of Bolsa Família occurs in the 5,565 Brazilian municipalities, where teams from local governments are responsible for it. All schools where children or adolescents from beneficiary families study are agents in the chain of program implementation, mainly because they take part in monitoring student attendance.

In a city located in the Northeast region of the country, Antônio, director of the Tiradentes School, awaits Teresa, a social assistant at the Reference Center for Social Assistance (CRAS), for a meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the situation of Pedro, a first-year high school student whose family receives Bolsa Família benefits. The payment was blocked because Pedro did not fulfill the minimum class attendance requirement.

When Teresa called to request the scheduling of the meeting, she mentioned that Pedro is one of the teenagers whose situation she monitors after receiving the list of local families who have school attendance problems from the city manager of the Bolsa Família program. She also stated that records from the ministry show that Pedro's mother went to school to justify the absence of her son, but the director did not accept her reasons. Then, when the social assistant visited the home of the family, she found that the mother has trouble controlling her son's absences from school because she is away from home from 6 AM to 8 PM every day due to work and no other adult lives in the house. Her son, who has already been arrested once for thefts, often prefers to stay on

the streets with other teens in the neighborhood. He has already failed more than once in different school's degree.

While the director waits for the social assistant, he talks to a teacher he invited to attend the meeting. The teacher's opinion is that:

"School works as a magnet for social problems. It reflects everything, especially in the case of a school like ours, which is in a poor and underprivileged area."

Antônio has a different opinion:

"I agree that as we are in daily contact with the students, their problems quickly show up in school. Now, at least we have someone talk to about the teenagers' problems and their families, which hinder learning and even lead them to drop out of school. We can contact the staff of the health unit or social work to talk about some of the more difficult cases, or forward them. Bolsa Família requires a lot of work from the school, but it has helped to reduce dropout and absence rates because the parents of the students are more concerned with what happens to their children."

And he continued:

"The secretariat of education of the city complained that many school principals did not inform the attendance rates of the students who are in the program to the local government. At this school, we do what we can, but we do not accept any reason for missing classes because we cannot investigate everything that happens in family life."

Situations such as those mentioned above can occur in any of the 160,000 Brazilian schools where children and adolescents benefit from Bolsa Família. The family, the school principal and the social assistant are responsible for dealing with dropout and attendance rates, but they are not the only ones. Before we address how the meeting at school progressed (which will be brought up again at the end of this report), we will explore how the management of education conditionality of Bolsa Família mobilizes several public agents and how the strategy adopted by the program requires cross-sectoral partnerships. Thus, we will be able to understand the relevance of the meeting between the director, Antônio, and the social worker, Teresa, to discuss and take actions regarding the situation of the student, Pedro.

### **3. The Program**

In October of 2003, the federal government created the Bolsa Família. The decree that regulated the program establishes that its

implementation must be “decentralized, through joint efforts among federal entities, considering the cross-sectoral approach, the participation of communities and social control.”<sup>3</sup>

The policy strategy adopted by the government in the fight against poverty that is developed in this program combines three dimensions: the immediate relief of poverty with a direct transfer of income to poor families; the break of the poverty cycle between generations through access to basic social services like health, education and social assistance; the availability of complementary actions and programs that qualify the provision of services and support the development of the families.

The program brought together four existing income transfer programs: Bolsa Escola (school), Bolsa Alimentação (nutrition), Cartão Alimentação (food card) and Auxílio-Gás (Cooking Gas Aid). Each was administered in a different ministry, which established its own eligibility criteria for beneficiaries.

The National Secretariat for Citizenship Income (SENARC) is the agency responsible for the program in the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS). It is responsible for establishing rules for the implementation of Bolsa Família, setting benefit values, setting and monitoring the conditions required for the families, establishing goals, proposing the annual budget for the program, establishing dialogues and partnerships with the municipalities, states and other agencies of the federal government, monitoring the operation of the program and performing regular evaluations. It also includes establishing a relationship with Caixa Econômica Federal, a public bank and financial operator of the program that processes information about the families and transfers the monetary aid to the beneficiaries.

The secretariat establishes the criteria of who receives the benefit and how much they receive, as well as the criteria for the suspension and cutting of benefits. The value of the financial benefit varies according to the income and composition of the family. It can vary from R\$ 32.00 (\$14,14) to R\$ 306.00 (\$135,22), and the average value in April of 2013 was R\$ 150.00 (\$66.30). The beneficiary can receive the benefit in agencies and ATMs anywhere in the country with the use of an electronic card.

SENARC is also the manager of other income transfer benefits intended for the population with low income or in vulnerable situations. The Single Registry for Social Programs (CadÚnico) is also under its responsibility. It registers families in poverty or extreme poverty situation that require or receive benefits from the federal government. CadÚnico stores the information about families that is collected by teams from municipal governments. It is considered an essential instrument for the planning, implementation and control of the actions of the program.

Bolsa Família has become a landmark in Brazilian social policy in terms of territorial scope, invested resources and target audience. Since its inception, it has received a great amount of visibility, garnering national and international attention. Within Brazil, the program is controlled and audited by control agencies from the public administration. They receive inquiries and put pressure to substantiate the establishment of its goals and procedures, as well as the results obtained from its implementation.

The income transfer program started in 2003 with 3.6 million beneficiary families. In 2013, 13.5 million families were benefited<sup>4</sup>. The expansion of its coverage was based on the expansion of the operational capacity and structuring of the “decentralized management”, that is, the institutional arrangements that ensure that the program is implemented with the work of several levels of government and articulated with other sectoral policies.

### ***3.1- Commitment of the families and conditions for receiving the benefit***

The income transfer comes with a conditional character. By becoming a beneficiary of the program, the family agrees to comply with commitments in the areas of education and health. The conditions related to education are: school enrollment and minimum attendance of 85% for children and adolescents between 6 and 15 years old, and 75% for teenagers aged 16 to 17. In terms of health, the family must monitor the vaccination schedule as well as the growth and development of children up to 7 years old, from prenatal and postpartum. There is also the monitoring of attendance of children included in the Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI) and services that foster coexistence and strengthen ties.

As regards to the conditionality of education, which is the specific object of this narrative, the agents of educational policy (school principals and education secretariats) are the ones responsible for informing MEC about it. MEC consolidates the school attendance information, which is then submitted to the database of MDS. If the student does not attend school or does not meet the attendance rate required, the family may have its financial benefit suspended or canceled by MDS.

The managers of Bolsa Família affirm that the purpose of the education conditionality is increasing the human capital of beneficiaries, considered one of the conditions that are crucial for the process of overcoming poverty. In this context, it becomes important to encourage school attendance and development by analyzing the reasons for the low attendance rate of the student individually. The intention is not to punish, but to prevent dropouts. And if the children or adolescents are not enrolled, the purpose is that they enroll and attend school. The

program seeks to encourage families to value education as a means to overcome poverty.

The proper monitoring of the conditions is strategic, because it enables the identification of situations of vulnerability within the family context that interfere with access to basic services to which the family is entitled, demanding actions from the public authorities related to the provision of services and policies for education, health and social assistance.

However, this set of purposes needs to make sense for all stakeholders involved in the program. The actors in the field of education are required to incorporate new processes to their work dynamics, to operate information systems or to perform policy and technical actions so that the subject make progress within the context of public policy. It's also expected that they use the information generated by monitoring the attendance of the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família to promote the improvement of educational initiatives. However, such actors, from school to the ministry, often see that certain actions and responsibilities, such as the control of the beneficiaries, are not their job, because they understand that the program is an action of "education".

### **3.2- Control and management of the conditionality**

The institutional arrangements and procedures for the control of school attendance have been established from the beginning of Bolsa Família until the institutionalization of the complex current routine, which consists of a series of procedures.

This routine involves:

- The Attendance System - a computerized system to be filled out online - created and managed by MEC. It receives information from a network of operators in municipalities that are monitored by the ministry;

- The articulation between MDS and MEC to set the annual schedule for the collection of information and train the agents involved in the process;

- Generating and disseminating information to the agents of social policy at local level on the children and adolescents who have not met the attendance rate, aiming to establish strategies for monitoring and support.

José Eduardo<sup>5</sup>, a technical advisor from MDS active in the process points out the requirements associated with this routine:


"(...) it requires negotiation and commitment. The operating schedule for the monitoring of the conditionalities is annually agreed in a meeting between ministries. The deadline is very



tight and everything needs to be synchronized. Thousands of professionals are involved; everyone needs to do their part to meet the deadlines and the quality of information.”

The management cycle of education conditionality is repeated every two months, with the exception of vacation periods.

**Figure 1 - Cycle of conditionality in “school attendance”**



As a result of the work done, school attendance showed a steady increase in coverage<sup>6</sup>. In the first two months of 2013, 15.1 million out of a total of 17.4 million children and adolescents between 6 and 17 years old were monitored. 97.3% of the total of monitored students presented a school attendance rate above the minimum percentage required and 2.7% of the students had low attendance rates.

**Table 1- School attendance results. First two months of 2013.**

Total of students from 6 to 17 years old beneficiaries of Bolsa Família	17.4 million
Beneficiary students who had monitored attendance	15.1 million (86.7% of the total)
Beneficiary students who did not have monitored attendance	2.3 million (13.3% of the total)
Percentage of monitored students who have met the minimum attendance rate	97.3%
Percentage of monitored students who have not met the minimum attendance rate	2.7%

Source: MDS/SENARC. Boletim Bolsa Família Informa nº 366. May 29, 2013.

Based on the information collected and systematized by MEC, MDS generates monitoring reports of commitment to education. In addition to allowing public agents to work on the reality to improve the

performance of the program, the information has also permitted analyses on the impacts of Bolsa Família.

The data from the Elementary Education School Census of 2011 shows that, in high school, the acceptance rate of the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família is 79.9%. The dropout rate among program beneficiaries, on the other hand, is 7.1%, lower than the national average of 10.8%. In elementary school, the acceptance rate of Bolsa Família beneficiaries has grown steadily, from 80.5% in 2008 to 83.9% in 2011. The dropout rate in 2011 was of 2.9% for the beneficiaries of the program in elementary school. There are also positive effects on the indicators of age-grade distortion both in elementary school and in high school<sup>7</sup>.

Since 2006, teams from municipalities may register cases of non-compliance with conditionalities in the conditionalities management system (SICON), as well as referrals made by personnel from social work<sup>8</sup>. Data from May of 2011 indicates that 26,418 beneficiary families of Bolsa Família Program were included in the family monitoring.

#### **4. Institutional context**

The management of conditions of the program requires the mobilization of several actors in three levels of government and in distinct sectors of public policy, as well as strategies for vertical and horizontal coordination<sup>9</sup>.

MDS is responsible for the management of all conditionalities of Bolsa Família in the federal government. In the ministry, the responsibility lies with SENARC, through the Conditions Management Department (DECON). The agents of the educational policy (school principals, state and municipal education secretariats and MEC) are responsible for informing and consolidating information on school attendance. The overall management of this assignment is with SECADI, from MEC.

Therefore, DECON/MDS and SECADI/MEC are key organizational actors that monitor the compliance with the conditionalities of education, even though MDS responds for the program before the government and society.


There are tensions caused by the institutional format of the program and its cross-sectoral character, which model the work of monitoring the conditions. Despite the legal provisions that assign the role of articulating the actions of the federal agencies to this ministry, MDS does not have a hierarchical position with the authority to require some behavior from another ministry and from the public agents associated with it.

A similar situation occurs in the relationship of the federal government with other federal entities (states and municipalities, and

city halls, education secretariats and schools) that monitor the compliance of the families with the commitment of education. The Brazilian Constitution establishes that each of the entities of the federation is autonomous. There is no legal determination of hierarchical obedience among them, which drives different elements of adherence, encouragement and reciprocal involvement in the development of national public policies.

What happens in the relationship between MDS and MEC influences the relationship among the actors implementing the policies at local level to some extent, that is, it directly affects the interaction with beneficiaries. Agreements and joint actions from both ministries, by setting an example, providing guidance, encouragement, and, also, making joint requirements, would help to promote integration at local level.

**Figure 2 - Agencies involved in the education conditionality management of Bolsa Família and the monitoring of families**



In black: people responsible for monitoring school attendance  
 In blue: people responsible for managing Bolsa Família and for the overall management of conditions  
 In red: people responsible for monitoring families that are not in compliance with school attendance rate

**4.1- One program, one conditionality and two ministries**

*“From the inception of the conditions of the program to the details of the operation of the conditionality management and monitoring of the families, there has been a collective development, through regular meetings between all the federal*

*sectors involved in the areas of health, education, social assistance and the Bolsa Família Program” (National Secretariat for Citizenship Income 2010:66).”*

There was no regulation about how the monitoring of the conditionalities of the families and the collection of information would work. A presidential decree from September of 2004 determined that MDS should monitor the compliance with the conditionalities in conjunction with the Ministry of Education and the other federal entities. MEC is responsible for systematizing school attendance information and MDS has the overall responsibility for the implementation and management of Bolsa Família. Since MDS is in the same hierarchical position as MEC, it could not set a requirement, from top to bottom, to determine the necessary actions and obligations so that the education sector monitored the attendance.

In November of 2004, MDS and MEC established performance and collaboration protocols for the subject through a joint ministerial ordinance. Then, the implementation procedures for the normative provisions were defined. The efforts of the highest authorities of these ministries, with the support from the Presidency of the Republic, had an essential role in this process.

In addition to the political weight of the core of the federal government in the definitions of Bolsa Família, other factors contributed in boosting the search for agreements for joint work. Both ministries were constantly subject to criticism from the media and pressure from society, which initially focused on the absence of a mechanism to check the compliance with the requirements of school attendance and then turned their attention to possible failures in the mechanisms implemented. In 2004, within the scope of the inspection program of the Federal Court of Accounts, MDS was required to adopt measures for the fulfillment of the conditionalities and was given a deadline of six months for the implementation of the control system.

#### **4.2-MDS, manager of Bolsa Família**

MDS was created in January of 2004, shortly after the creation of PBF. At the beginning, the main challenges were structuring the portfolio and implementing a government initiative with the complexity and size of Bolsa Família. The ministry had another great challenge: structuring a Social Assistance policy, whose institutional framework was to be defined and implemented.

Bolsa Família is not the only responsibility of the ministry. However, the program is complex, achieving a prominent position in the government strategy, reaching gigantic proportions as to the population

and territorial coverage, and occupying a central position in the MDS. Moreover, the image of the ministry is closely linked to the program by society. All this caused SENARC, the national manager of the income transfer policy, to play a leading role in the ministry, in the relationship with other instances of the federal administration, and with state and local governments.

Since the implementation of the program is decentralized, the municipalities have a key role. It was necessary to gain the acceptance of the municipalities in order to structure the municipal coordination of management. Many mayors resisted taking over the responsibilities of the program because they believed that the local governments had the onus of implementation, while the federal government was seen by the beneficiary population as the “owner” of the program and as the primary responsible for improving the life of the families. Meanwhile, the interest of the federal manager is that the implementation be carried out with an active participation of local governments, but without interference in the most important decisions, in the rules related to the provision of the benefit or in the implementation schedule. In a certain way, the format of the program relegates the local government to the role of executor, who is totally involved with operational aspects.

Since the inception of the program, there has been political and administrative conflicts with the decentralized implementation, leading the federal manager to seek ways to encourage and also compel the municipal managers to improve their performance. This generated a shared management model between states and municipalities, where the responsibilities of each government level are defined in the implementation of the program<sup>10</sup>. The establishment of a Term of Commitment between the the mayor of each city and MDS formalizes the roles and responsibilities of the local implementation of the program and establishes a minimum operation standard for the program at local level. Signing this commitment is a prerequisite for the municipal administration to receive the financial incentives of the program. (Lindert et al. 2007).

Another area of conflict is related to state governments, since they did not have a well-defined role in the institutional design of Bolsa Família, that is, they did not have their own agenda for the program (Mesquita, 2007; Licio, 2004). The local and federal governments have a direct relationship in the operation of the program. The state governments are focused on supporting local governments in the registration of families and the training of local teams.

The program’s conditionalities demanded the expansion of the federal coordination with the creation of cross-sectoral network for monitoring. It would take some years to reach the current format.

The attention to education and health conditions did not immediately become a major concern at SENARC, perhaps because they were focused on other several work fronts for the implementation of Bolsa Família. However, the carrying out of the school attendance control had to occur. There were experts in the agency that were in charge of working and keeping in contact with MEC, but the subject was not significant inside SENARC when compared to other elements of the program.

The issue gained relevance and institutional acknowledgement within the ministry with the creation of a unit with greater emphasis on the structure of the secretariat that would be in charge of the “management of conditions”. MEC experienced a similar process in 2006, when it was involved in designing a system to collect and consolidate school attendance information, which contributed to the strengthening of the cooperative relationship between SENARC and the department responsible for monitoring education at MEC.

With the purpose of inducing local governments to participate in the implementation of Bolsa Família and to financially support the management activities of the program, MDS started to allocate financial resources to municipal governments. It was determined that the amount to be transferred to each local government would be calculated using the Decentralized Management Index (IGD). The index considers the performance of the local government in several aspects, with emphasis on the monitoring of school attendance through the system established by MEC and the management of CadÚnico. The resources transferred by the federal government helped to improve the relationship with local governments, since they can be used to purchase equipment and train teams, to purchase vehicles for the transport of technicians, to perform collective actions for the issuance of civil documents, to create educational campaigns directed to the beneficiaries, to implement complementary programs for the increase of the schooling rate and for the productive inclusion of the beneficiaries, to create actions of community and territorial development, to support social control instances of the program, among many other options (Currello et al. 2010: 161).

SENARC made significant efforts in the creation of the information tool for the management of the conditionalities of Bolsa Família. The webpage Sistema de Condicionalidades do Programa Bolsa Família allows the managers and experts responsible for monitoring the conditionalities in the states and municipalities to query families data that did not comply with their commitment and perform actions related to effects on the receipt of the benefit. It allows you to enter information about the monitoring of the families performed by the social work teams, for example.

In 2007, the entry into operation of the Attendance System, developed by MEC, streamlined the data collection and the systematization of school attendance data. SENARC started to have more responsibilities, as for the generation of reports, analysis of monitoring results and submission of feedback on the subject to state and municipal managers.

During this period, the conditionalities were managed by the Management Department of SENARC, under the responsibility of the General Coordination of the Management of Conditionalities, composed of a team of seven people. At the end of 2009, when MDS was restructured, these units were reformulated and the Department of Conditionalities was created.

In 2011, José Eduardo, who had been in charge of the monitoring of school attendance at MEC since 2008 was invited to direct the Department of Conditionalities (DECON) at MDS. Other technicians with experience working at MEC were also called to the same department. Their knowledge on the area of education and their personal relationships within MEC have contributed to create a systematic analysis on the conditionality of education and guidance to the cross-sectoral work at MDS.


In 2012, there was a reformulation at DECON with the purpose to enhance the cross-sectoral management of Bolsa Família. It created a “coordination to support integrated actions” in the department, with the goal of changing the profile of the cross-sectoral work that was being done. What was previously regarded as articulation was dispersed among a variety of themes such as education, health, micro-credit, environment, culture and others. According to the director, this dispersion resulted in little interaction with the programs of other areas, since the relationship was practically limited to the exchange of bases of studies. It did not generate much advancement for the purposes of the policy against poverty and for the expanding of opportunities for families in vulnerable situations. The new coordination focused the articulation work on education, health and social care.

A subdivision of DECON started to be responsible for organizing the use of a set of information from different national databases (such as Educa Censo, CadÚnico, the Attendance System and others) and, from these databases, it subsidized the production of studies and analyzes that, in addition to qualifying the debates on the subject, supported the decision making of public managers. For this purpose, the new coordination created the “Dashboard of Conditionality Indicators”, which includes indicators in five areas: social vulnerabilities, access to services, health management, education management, management of Bolsa Família. According to Fernando, one of the people in charge of the initiative, the following took place:



“First, SENARC worked internally on the subject, then, it involved the technicians of the National Secretariat for Social Assistance, MEC and the Ministry of Health. There was a lot of debate on the definition of conditions. We had a round of discussion with MEC, gathered their suggestions and brought their point of view on the subject. We had a second round of discussion with the Ministry of Health. We managed to create Working Groups to discuss the Dashboard of Indicators, with representatives from the fields of education, health and social care, and also with representatives from all the coordination of DECON. We conducted seminars in several regions of the country to present the Dashboard of Indicators and the potential use of its information by public managers in states and municipalities”. (Interview)

**Figure 3 - The management of conditionalities at MDS**



Therefore, since the creation of Bolsa Família, there have been constant changes in the organization of the topic “management of conditionalities” within SENARC so that it reached the current institutional format shown in Figure 3.

#### **4.3-Ministry of Education**

With the creation of Bolsa Família, the actors of education policy at all levels of government were mobilized to comply with the commitment of periodically monitoring and controlling school attendance of students from families that receive income transfers.

The role of MEC regarding PBF consists of:

- monitoring the school attendance of students in the program;
- managing the information system: receiving the records of school attendance and the justifications for low attendance rates;



- consolidating the data obtained from the records and making it available to MDS to subsidize the management of the program.

In order to achieve the development of the elements mentioned, MEC worked internally and externally, with agents in the education system throughout the country, and with the national manager of Bolsa Família. Its main responsibility, that is, registering, consolidating and submitting information on school attendance, takes up most of this journey. With the structuring of components to comply with such responsibility, the teams in charge of the subject in the ministry could also dedicate their time to the analysis of reasons for the low attendance rates or non-attendance, aiming to provide ways to prevent/reduce dropouts and encourage school attendance and the educational progress of students found in a situation of social vulnerability.

The fact that Bolsa Família is not a program of the Ministry of Education hindered its inclusion in the portfolio agenda and the establishment of a dialogue with other ministerial programs, especially those related to basic education. Since MEC is not directly responsible for income transfers, the PBF does not have the same visibility as other programmatic lines and does not constantly appear in the interventions of the authorities in the area because it is not a central issue within the agency.

When Bolsa Família was created, MEC did not have - and today still lacks - a mechanism to monitor the low attendance rates of all students in the school system. Many agents who work with educational policies do not agree that only the students benefited by PBF should have their attendance monitored.

Having a technological system that enables the registration and consolidation of information from each of the schools was essential to structure the monitoring of school attendance. In 2004, as an emergency, MEC began to use an operating system provided by Caixa Econômica Federal, the public bank that pays the benefit to the families. The municipal government entered the information. However, this system had many operational problems and did not offer much functionality. One of its major limitations was that it did not allow its online use by the operators.

Although limited, this first system allowed MEC to structure the procedures and begin to address the challenges involved in the monitoring of school attendance. One of the main challenges was to obtain the collaboration and commitment of municipal governments.

One of the first measures taken by the ministry was to request the municipalities to sign a term of commitment of the education department related to Bolsa Família. It also adopted the practice of sending official letters to the mayors and municipal secretaries of education across the

country at the beginning of each collection period, reinforcing the importance of the school attendance records and the submission of information to the ministry. In the middle of each attendance registration period, telegrams were sent to the local governments that had not submitted the data or had submitted incomplete data.

The actual requirement made by the manager of Bolsa Família started having practical effects in 2007, when the new registration system developed by MEC, the Attendance System, started to be fully used, which allowed a rapid increase in the monitoring rate of the educational commitments. The ministry provided to the cities and states a system that is easy to operate and was created in web platform, eliminating the use of application forms. It made it possible to decentralize the registration of information to schools and transferred the responsibility of filling in information to schools. Moreover, the role of “local operator of the Attendance System” was created. The local operator is formally appointed by the mayor and constantly interacts with the ministry.

Many obstacles were faced and overcome in order to achieve this level of development. The operational and technical difficulties must be highlighted. Access to the internet is not homogeneous across the country and, in most cities, the people from the local government had little familiarity with information technologies. There are places in the country where there was not even a phone from which MEC staff could communicate with the local manager. The turnover rate in the municipalities is a constant issue and requires a structured routine to train new people to be integrated in the network.

The Attendance System allowed a faster data generation and streamlined the preparation of reports and analyses. MEC and MDS started to receive periodic information on the status of school attendance of children and adolescents benefited from the income transfer program against poverty.

The staff of MEC has worked for several years in institutionalizing the control of school attendance, with all processes involved in the agreements with state and local governments, in addition to the direct contact with educational establishments. As a result of this effort, a network with approximately 36,000 professionals was formed in 2013, mainly with operators of the school attendance system, state and local secretariats for education. In each region of the country, there are annual presencial courses with state and local operators on the functioning of the monitoring system of school attendance, as well as on the logic and development of the monitoring job.

In 2009, the Attendance System began to allow the entry of information about the identification of the reason for the low attendance


rate of students. The information is based on the observation of a table of noncompliance with school attendance defined by MEC, increasing the knowledge about the causes<sup>11</sup>.

The routine of monitoring this process is an operation of great proportion that is repeated five times a year. In 2013, the families of approximately 17 million children and adolescents were benefited from PBF. This year, it has been recorded information on school attendance of about 15 million of these beneficiaries.

Since the beginning of the actions of MEC on this subject, the team in charge of the control of school attendance has worked in the Secretariat for Continuing Education, Literacy and Diversity (SECAD), which later incorporated the term “Inclusion” and changed its name to SECADI<sup>12</sup>.

“SECADI, in conjunction with the school systems, implements educational policies in the areas of literacy and education for teenagers and adults, environmental education, human rights education, special education, field education, indigenous school, quilombola education and education for ethnic and racial relations. Its purpose is to contribute to the inclusive development of education systems, focused on valuing differences and diversity, promoting inclusive education, human rights and social and environmental sustainability, in order to implement transversal and cross-sectoral public policies” ([http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=816\(15/8/2013\)](http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=816(15/8/2013))).

**Figure 4 - The management of the conditionality of education at MEC**



SECADI covers a lot of subjects, with a greater weight on the diversity issue. In this context, those responsible for managing the conditions of Bolsa Família find it difficult to encourage the ministry to use information on school attendance as a reference to be considered when proposing educational policy initiatives aimed at favoring the public benefited from the program.

The coordination of the monitoring of attendance develops an ongoing work so that the subject has space and visibility in the policy agenda of the Ministry of Education. In the words of Manuela, General Coordinator of the Monitoring of School Inclusion:

“Just as the teenagers in most vulnerable situations are invisible in schools, the teams that work with these populations are also invisible. In the Ministry, we also (...). Continually work opening doors, bringing the topic to the agendas for discussion, mentioning it in meetings, presenting the numbers and, finally, putting into perspective the subject of school attendance. (...) There is resistance from some sectors to consider that Bolsa Família is also a program of education.”

She continues:

“The cross-sectoral approach appears in the question: what has been done with the information? We have the data, which is an improvement, but so what?” (...). We want to think about the education policy, access and school attendance. We do not want only to register school attendance.”(Interview)

#### **4.4-Social Assistance**

Recognizing the attendance problem is only part of the procedure in the Bolsa Família. It can affect the granting of the monetary benefit to families. And it can also be a sign of social risks that need to be addressed.


The management of conditionalities is a strategy to identify families that require closer monitoring by other policies and act on the determinant dimensions of the vulnerabilities that go beyond the income deficit.

For the proper monitoring of each municipality, there must be a connection between the identification that a child or adolescent is absent from school or does not have the minimum attendance rate, and the social assistance work, which will analyze the situations experienced by the family and lead this family to specific social interventions with the teams of the Social Assistance policy.

In 1988, Social Assistance was recognized as a public policy in Brazil. However, only in the middle of the following decade was the structuring of the key elements of the sector effectively initiated, with standards, programs, administrative procedures, action methodologies, formation of work teams and the implementation of reference units<sup>13</sup>.

SNAS, the National Secretariat for Social Assistance, which belongs to MDS, is responsible for the national management of Social Assistance. This Secretariat defines the main guidelines for social work in national programs and also for the performance of the sector with the PBF.

**Figure 5 - Responsibility for the monitoring of families in the structure of MDS**



Until 2008, the benefit of PBF could be canceled after noncompliance for four times in a row within a total period of 18 months. In other words, the student would need to be out of school for over a whole year for the cancellation of the income transfer.

From September 2008, the period was reduced to six months. According to Ordinance No. 321, which regulates the management of conditionalities, the family may receive from a warning notification to a notification of cancellation of the benefit, according to the number of times the noncompliance was registered in the records of a student. The application of gradual effects on the financial benefit allows the identification of the reasons for the noncompliance with school attendance and direct the family to specific social actions that can help reverse the situation and address the conditions of vulnerability. The aim is to ensure the income of a family in a situation of vulnerability and social risk when the area of social assistance aids it.

In the first two months of 2013, approximately 400,000 students, of the 15 million students monitored by Bolsa Família, did not comply with the school attendance rate required by the program. A portion of this total could have its benefit suspended or canceled.

The reduction of the deadline for the impact on the receipt of monetary benefit if the family does not comply with the commitment required by the program meant bigger demands for the staff of Social Assistance. They are called to search for families to visit, analyze the reasons that lead to school absence and structure, in conjunction with other actors of the public policies, the support to students and their families.

Given the expectations on the role of social assistance, technicians and managers in the area have expressed some concern. It is what Laura, a technician at SNAS of MDS, points out:

“Social assistance is not the answer to all problems. Situations of vulnerability are often complex. It’s no use transferring the problem from education to social assistance teams.”

“The discussion on family monitoring has been started at SNAS. There is work in progress regarding the articulation

between the actions of basic social protection and income transfers.” (Interview)

Despite the proximity between the teams of Bolsa Família and Social Assistance - as they are in the same area of the cross-sectoral policy and their actions are aimed at the same audience - there is no immediate connection between them in any level of government. In most of the country, social assistance teams at CRAS register the families in the CadÚnico. However, it is common that the social assistance and Bolsa Família programs be locally managed in separate administrative structures and without adequate cooperation between them.

On the other hand, on several occasions, both national secretariats - SENARC and SUAS - work together and issue guidelines for the implementation of Bolsa Família (joint operating instructions).

In addition to entering information in the systems developed by SENARC at each referral center of the municipality, CRAS and CREAS technicians enter information in their own system of Social Assistance, the Monthly Attendance Record (RMA), which began to operate in 2012 and follows the process of the units.

This is the concern of one of Fernando, one of the MDS technicians:

“RMA and SICON are parallel systems. CRAS staff has to register the same thing twice. Even at a distance, they notice the lack of some common understanding among us here in the ministry.”(Interview)

MDS prepared the Protocol for the Integrated Management of Services, Benefits and Income Transfers in 2009, with the goal of integration between services, benefits and income transfer programs of the Federal Government, all components of the National Social Assistance Policy. The protocol describes procedures for the monitoring of beneficiary families by the local government through CRAS and CREAS units.

In the federal government, technical working groups on specific subjects are a way to promote the dialogue between areas. Several sectors participate in these groups, according to the purpose of each one. As explained by Laura a technician at SNAS of MDS:

“A working group is one of the practical ways of creating a closer relationship between sectors, thinking about the subject together, establishing joint agendas and knowing the other sectors. It is not easy to know the role of another policy and we learn to think about the subjects and issues by adopting the perspective of another person. Understanding requires receptiveness. There is also learning and tasks between the components of each team.” (Interview)

A concrete example of such collaboration is the technical group with the Integral Education program, created in 2013, with the initiative of DECON. José Eduardo, the director of the department explains the importance of this group:

“Since education itself does not solve its own problems, it is essential to create cross-sectoral arrangements. There are 3.5 million children and teenagers out of school. Education needs Social Assistance and Health. And vice-versa. The integration between sectors is required. However, it does not happen proactively. It is not automatic just because there are standards, decrees, ordinances and mutual protocols. Integration is created with method, planning, strategy, technical quality and ability to know organizational cultures (...). It is important to open up to each other, listen, negotiate, know that you are dealing with another organizational culture. Even if it is the ministry that is here, in the next building, there are differences. It is necessary to make a move in order to understand” (Interview).

## **5. Coordination and cross-sectoral approach**

### **5.1- Shared vision**

Since we already know the main elements of the program, the conditions and institutional context that include two ministries and three distinct organizational levels, we can now turn our attention more directly to some aspects of coordination and cross-sectoral approach.

Joint regulations and institutional mechanisms for collaboration were established in the development of the articulation between sectors of public policy with regard to the management of the commitment of families receiving Bolsa Família. Beyond that, there was the definition of operating procedures and adoption of incentives, such as IGD, which was developed at a macro management level, directing the coordinated work expected to exist at a local level of implementation in each municipality.

The relevance of the education conditionality for overcoming poverty and the equality of opportunities was developed and disseminated through contributions of the actors participating in the program. According to José Eduardo:

“It is always necessary to work with a strategic and political perspective within each of the organizations/ministries, so that the education conditionality management is not restricted to the collection of information. It is also necessary to work with

the information in order to “insert the topic ‘educational inequality’ on the agenda of MEC and MDS. We seek to create a platform for education and inequality, and draw attention to the importance of the work between sectors in order to address these inequalities.” (Interview)

The work to generate common strategic vision at a macro-institutional level also makes sense if there is convergence among the actors involved in the implementation of policies at a local level and if the differences in the way the agents in the areas of Education and Social Assistance see low school attendance are set aside. In the history of PBF, there have been differences in the reasons accepted by each area to justify the noncompliance with school attendance. Furthermore, before a situation of low attendance rate, it is common that each area considers that the problem should be solved by another area.

### **5.2-In the absence of a central coordination**

Despite the closer relationships of cooperative nature between SENARC/MDS and the areas responsible for monitoring the education, the professionals more directly involved in the management of conditions observed that, with regard to this specific issue, there was “a lack, from the institutional point of view, of a central coordination, designed to promote articulation and greater integration of the social areas at the federal level” (Currello et al. 2010: 160).

With the same perspective, the director of DECON at SENARC observed in 2013:

“It would be necessary for a higher level department, such as the Civil Office, and the Ministry of Planning as an agency for cross-sectoral coordination, to make the ministries communicate to each other and create a system within the government (related to the subject of the conditionalities and the cross-sectoral articulation). Since such thing does not exist, we develop our initiatives with our own motivation and vision.” (Interview)

In the absence of induction of cooperation or lack of systematic monitoring of part of the core of the federal government, the director points out that a bilateral relationship between MDS and MEC was created in the management of conditionalities:

“As the coordination that is established does not exist within a general strategy led or driven by a government agency that would be above MDS and MEC, our development depends a lot on our ability to negotiate well with the several areas of the other ministry. Not only the monitoring of conditionalities



should be involved, but the development of a policy and programs for these audiences” (Interview).

### **5.3- The instruments, the instances and the spaces for coordination**

From a normative point of view, there are laws and decrees that established the key milestones of Bolsa Família. Agreements and protocols were signed and ministerial and inter-ministerial decrees were issued, establishing the duties and powers of each of the ministries, from states and municipalities, in the program.

The Integrated System for the Monitoring of Conditionalities, formed by several information systems of MEC and MDS, was developed due to numerous initiatives from each ministry and discussions between the teams in order to constantly model and optimize the registration of information on school attendance and the analysis of data.

Normative and operational components of the program are the subject of training activities of the teams that work in each of the levels of government. In all Brazilian states, there are workshops and training courses that count with the participation of representatives of those responsible for conditions at MDS and MEC. There are also cross-sectoral regional seminars, jointly promoted by both ministries, as spaces for dialogue. In addition, representatives of a ministry regularly present seminars organized by the partner ministry.

The technical working groups on specific issues, already mentioned, are opportunities for exchange and pacts between MEC and MDS, as well as with other areas of public policy that do not have a direct responsibility in the PBF.

In 2006, on the initiative of teams involved in the management of Bolsa Família, an intergovernmental and cross-sectoral forum on the conditions of the program was created. It was originally something informal, a space for negotiation and creation of consensus on the most relevant and emerging themes related to the management of health and education conditions and the monitoring of the families. In 2009, the Forum was institutionalized through Inter-Ministerial Ordinance MDS-ECM-MS, which defined the heads of several agencies and entities as participants<sup>14</sup>.

One of the federal government employees who participated in the Forum more than once informs about its frequency and functioning:

“The Forum is a work meeting. People from the ministries are brought together to discuss and analyze topics related to the issues of the conditions. It happens once or twice a year. (...) The effective working relationships between MDS and MEC, the two federal agencies that must respond for the monitoring of school attendance of the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família, are

based on the demands. There are meetings to address and respond to the components of the management conditions, as well as to deal with and refer them. These meetings address the operation, the procedures and referrals, which is normal for a public policy, the daily routine and monitoring of results. (Interview)

At local level, the creation of cross-sectoral management committees of Bolsa Família in the municipalities was stimulated, which would allow periodic meetings among the areas, the joint planning of actions such as household visits and training activities for networks of public policies related to the program. However, there is no systematic record of the existence of committees in the municipalities in a way that would tell how many they are and how they work. The reality in many municipalities is of little progress in the cross-sectoral approach and difficulties to break the compartmentalization of administrative structures and the organizational logics of each sector.

#### **5.4- Networks, people and organizations**

In addition to the formal instances, there are informal spaces for dialogue between ministerial teams where interpersonal relationships are very important, as well as the very fact that there are technicians and coordinators with personal trajectory of activity at MEC and MDS. Fernando believes that the personal characteristics of the interlocutors and the individual and professional histories influence the development and maintenance of the procedures of cross-sectoral coordination:

“Bilateral relationships are very dependent on people. They work because there are professionals who wander through this network. There is commitment among them”. (Interview)

The characteristics of the actors may represent opportunities, as indicated by the interviewees, and also risks to the cross-sectoral coordination. The risk of relying on personal relationships is not creating working abilities in the organizations and action styles that are less associated with the profile of who holds the position at each moment. The turnover rate of technicians in the teams, which is common at MEC, SENARC and SNAS, represents a threat to the consolidation of what was developed by MDS. Turnover occurs due to changes in the governments and also due to the hiring instability of part of the professionals, as well as the hiring of advisors to cover the reduced size of the teams.

Let’s see what the managers, Manuela and José Eduardo, responsible for the monitoring of conditions at MEC and MDS say:

“The institutionalization of processes is something difficult. The (staff) turnover is big in the ministry. If there are no career

servants, there are lots of advisors. Although they help a lot, when they leave, part of the process is lost, leaving no record". (Interview)

"For the consolidation of what has been achieved, the career of the federal manager is vital, because it creates longevity in the public management. It is a nucleus of people who will not leave with the changes in the governments. It keeps the memory, the records. The legacy can be deepened, in order to build upon what already existed. With turnover, work can be lost." (Interview)

### **5.5- Personal skills and institutional requirements**

As regards to the skills to work in a coordinated manner in the management of education conditionality of Bolsa Família, which depends on the active participation of the actors in the educational system that are not under its control, the director of DECON points out some requirements:

"The department of conditionalities is essentially relational. It does not exist *per se*. Management is an operation of sensitive nature. It is having leadership without bypassing the others. It is always analyzing the actors. We don't want to set the tone that we are commanding. There is a tension and a search for balance between being proactive and not imposing, avoiding a vertical relationship". (Interview)

According to the director José Eduardo, the management of conditionalities requires, in addition to technical capacity, relational skills of negotiation and motivation:

"MDS is in a delicate position next to the ministries of Education and Health. It is a bilateral relationship, but almost vertical in a certain way, because MDS is the manager of Bolsa Família, and needs to make it happen and get results (...). Working in a coordinated manner requires sensibility from the manager. He must know how to negotiate and when to 'give space to another ministry'. He must also be proactive, but be very careful to bring a partner, and he cannot be authoritarian or arrogant. He will be the leader and, at the same time, he will bring MEC, so that the ministry can follow us and be a partner indeed, without feeling left out." (Interview)

The sector responsible for the management of conditions has the intention to influence by placing the topic of school attendance as a strategy for confronting the educational inequalities. However, MEC is

responsible for the decision and leadership of the educational policy, and it has its own dynamics for prioritizing policy components.

There are political constraints on the relationship between ministries and between levels of government that need to be taken into account. The “delicate nature” of management, mentioned in the interview with the professional, is also related to the fact that the program is considered politically strategic for the government and, since its inception, it has constant exposure in society and in the media.

### **5.6- Cross-sectoral coordination beyond Bolsa Família**

Almost ten years after the creation of the program, the coordinated work on the monitoring of school attendance of the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família and the management of conditionalities advance to another step with the development of integration initiatives for the public of PBF in education programs. José Eduardo points out that:

“Now we have a relationship with MEC on several work fronts. Our presence is very strong there. It’s not just with the sector that monitors the conditionalities of school attendance. We are seeking to innovate, with the development of policy and programs for the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família. (Interview)

The most remarkable partnership is with Programa Mais Educação (More Education Program), a full-time education program, which aims to extend school time and improve the quality of the school day of children and adolescents enrolled in public schools<sup>15</sup>.

DECON/MDS and the Secretariat for Basic Education/MEC worked together to ensure that, within this integral education program, priority was given to public schools where more than 50% of the students come from families that receive the conditional income transfer. In 2012, from the 77,000 schools where most students are beneficiaries of Bolsa Família, 32,000 were prioritized in MEC program. They are schools that concentrate a large number of students in situations of social vulnerability<sup>16</sup>.

### **5.7-“No cross-sectoral management happens without a lot of sweat and inspiration”**

The experience of coordinated work between MDS and MEC in the monitoring of school attendance of beneficiaries of Bolsa Família brought lessons and learnings for both ministries.

What has been learned is that regulations and standards are necessary, but not enough to assure coordination. It takes sweat and inspiration to get them off the drawing board, in the words of the director of conditionalities of MDS. According to José Eduardo, partnership and

coordination are developed with method, planning, strategies and technical capacity. In his opinion, these were the factors that contributed to the growth of bilateral relationships between the ministries:

“On the technical aspect of managing conditions: setting the focus of our work; working with data, systems, monitoring, exchange of information, training; studies and analyses, reports, a number of things and procedures to consolidate the conditionalities.(...) On the political aspect: strategies that provide partnerships with policies and programs for the public of income transfer. It is necessary to learn the culture of another organization and other areas of policy in order to create a political relationship with them. Education and Health, for example, have their own institutional characteristics, their own way of working, a sectoral logic, just like any area. There is also the logic of each organization. We asked ourselves: ‘ what is this culture?’ We had to learn; it took a while. (...) From the political perspective, it is also necessary to identify the scenario in order to know whether or not to proceed. Sometimes it is also necessary to take a step back. Or wait”. (Interview)

## **6. After the meeting at the Tiradentes School**

After learning about Bolsa Família Program, and about the federal and cross-sectoral relationships necessary for its implementation, it’s time to see how the meeting between the director Antônio and social worker Teresa went at The Tiradentes School.

When the social assistant returned to CRAS, she reported to the team how the meeting went, the perceptions and referrals for the case of the student Pedro:

“It was agreed that the cancellation of Bolsa Família benefit should be temporarily suspended. For the monitoring, we will call the family to participate in the PAIF (Integral Family Care Program) and invite Pedro to participate in the activities of basic protection so that he has the opportunity to change his behavior. The school will keep our staff informed about the situation of the student’s attendance.”

The social assistant reported that there was a teacher in the meeting who had contact with other technicians at CRAS during a training workshop promoted by the managers of the program at the City Hall. This kind of meeting is for people who work with children, teenagers and families benefited from the program to meet, share experiences, be informed about the standards to be applied and the government

guidelines. The director had already participated in a workshop held at the state secretariat for education, in which there were coordinators and technicians of MEC and MDS.

Teresa continued:

“The meeting was very good because we also addressed the topic of the guidelines of Bolsa Família that the teams of education and social assistance receive from the ministries and secretariats of the state and local government. As you know, they are constantly informing us of ordinances and official publications regarding school attendance and the need to monitor the families. We talked about it and Antônio, the school principal, was able to understand the justifiable reasons for school absences. He agreed to accept the justification presented by Pedro’s mother.”

After finishing the report to CRAS team and filling out the records about the case, Teresa finished her workday. She felt pleased that she was able to dialogue and make the director understand the situation, and that the case was well received by her coworkers. After all, she thought, despite the requirements of Bolsa Família give so much work and often cause tensions and conflicts, they have helped to keep poor children and adolescents in school. In so many years working as a social worker in the city, she met many children who were “candidates” to drop out of school that are now teenagers attending high school and making plans for the future. She also met families with adolescents like Pedro, with behavioral problems at school and even involvement in thefts, who needed support from the school and other agents of public policies to try to reverse the situation.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup>This case study was written by Cristina Almeida Cunha Filgueiras to the Brazilian National School of Public Management in partnership with the Eurosocioal (Program for Social Cohesion in Latin America). The author thanks the collaboration of many people who have contributed to this case study whether for the concession of interviews or by adding comments on the case study: Bruna D'Avila Andrade, Carla Bronzo, Daniel Ximenes, Elisabete Ferrarezi, Florentino Chaves Neto, Luís Henrique D'Andrea, Marizaura Camões, Pedro Palotti, Simone Medeiros, Soraya Brandão and Valéria Porto.
- <sup>2</sup>The program considers as extremely poor the family with a monthly per capita income of less than R\$ 70.00 (\$30.00).
- <sup>3</sup>Law No. 10,836 of January 9, 2004 and Decree No. 5,209 of September 17, 2004.
- <sup>4</sup>According to the Population Census of 2000, Brazil had 170 million inhabitants, of which 22.9 million were considered extremely poor (13.5%). The population census of 2010 identified that the country had reached 190.7 million inhabitants, of which 16.2 million were extremely poor, which represented 8.5% of the Brazilian population.
- <sup>5</sup> All the names mentioned in this case study are fictitious.
- <sup>6</sup>Annex 2 contains a chart with data on the evolution of the monitoring of school attendance.
- <sup>7</sup>Technical note No. 34. SENARC/MDS and SECADI/MEC. Brasília, January 31, 2013.
- <sup>8</sup>The figure in Annex 3 shows the steps of the monitoring of the conditions process.
- <sup>9</sup>The terms "coordination", "articulation" and "partnership" are used interchangeably herein, referring to the joint work conducted by MEC and MDS in the Bolsa Família. We opted for not favoring one of the terms because in the queried material, obtained from these public agencies, these words seem to be used interchangeably.
- <sup>10</sup>The duties of municipal and state governments in the Bolsa Família are listed in Annex 1.
- <sup>11</sup>The Table of Justifications of 2013 for the registration of low attendance rates distinguishes justifiable reasons, which do not generate the risk of loss of the benefit for the family, and non-justifiable reasons, that can lead to the loss of the benefit for the family. Examples of justifiable reasons: treatment of disease and student health care (confirmed by the school); facts that restrain the displacement/access of the student to school (e.g. flooding); family illness/death in the family/student's death. Examples of non-justifiable reasons: pregnancy; need to take care of younger siblings; negligence of parents or guardians, child labor, exploitation / sexual abuse, domestic violence.
- <sup>12</sup> The SECADI, in articulation with the educational systems, implements educational policy in different areas such as literacy, environmental education, human rights education, special education (towards to disabled population), rural education, native born education, quilombola and education to ethnic-racial relationships. Its purpose is to contribute to the inclusive development in the educational systems, concerned with diversity, to the promotion of inclusive education, to human rights and to social and environmental sustainability, aiming the effectiveness of transversal and cross-sectoral public policies ([http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=816&msg=1](http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=290&Itemid=816&msg=1)). Last access: 15/08/2013
- <sup>13</sup>In 2005, the Unified Social Assistance System, SUAS, was created. It is now present in most Brazilian municipalities via two main types of units. The first is the Reference Center for Social Assistance (CRAS),

where it is developed the Integral Family Care Program (PAIF), whose actions are intended to strengthen the protection of families, preventing the rupture of ties, promoting the access and use of rights, and contributing to the improvement of the quality of life, life projects and transforming family and community relationships. The second type is the Specialized Reference Center for Social Assistance (CREAS), where you can find the Protective Services and Specialized Assistance to Individuals and Families (PAEFI). The public network of social protection equipment reached the total of 7,475 units of CRAS and 2,109 units of CREAS in 2011.

<sup>14</sup>Agencies and entities of the Cross-sectoral and Intergovernmental Forum: SENARC/MDS; SNAS/MDS; SECAD/MEC; Secretariat for Health Care/Ministry of Health; Council of State Secretaries of Education; National Council of State Secretaries of Health; National Forum of State Secretaries of Social Assistance; National Collegiate of Municipal Secretariats of Social Assistance; National Union of Municipal Directors of Education and National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries.

<sup>15</sup>In the extended school day, it is considered the basic disciplines and pedagogical support allied to music, sports, culture, arts, media, applied sciences, human rights, among others.

<sup>16</sup>Joint Technical Note No. 184. DECON/SENARC/MDS and DICEI/SEB/MEC.

<sup>17</sup> In the preparation of this case study information were also gathered by interviews with civil servants and managers of the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger. All the interviews took place in August, 2013.

### Bibliographic references<sup>17</sup>

BRASIL. Ministério da Educação. Secretaria de Educação Continuada, Alfabetização, Diversidade e Inclusão. Portal <http://portal.mec.gov.br> (acesso em 15/8/2013)

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania. **Guia para o Acompanhamento das Condicionalidades do Programa Bolsa Família**. 2008.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. **Resolução CIT, nº 07 de 10 de setembro de 2009**. Cria o Protocolo de Gestão Integrada de Serviços, Benefícios e Transferência de Renda no âmbito do Sistema Único de Assistência Social (SUAS).

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação; Secretaria Nacional de Assistência Social. **Censo SUAS 2011: CRAS, CREAs, Centros Pop, Gestão Municipal, Gestão Estadual, Conselhos Municipais, Conselhos Estaduais e Rede Privada**. Brasília, DF: MDS. 2013.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. SENARC. **Relatório de Condicionalidades do Programa Bolsa Família**. 1º semestre de 2010. Brasília, 2010.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. **Manual de gestão de benefícios**. Volume 1. Brasília, novembro de 2010.



\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. SENARC. **Caderno do IGD-M**. Informativo sobre o Índice de Gestão Descentralizada Municipal do Programa Bolsa Família. Brasília, DF, 2011.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. SENARC. Resultados da frequência escolar. Primeiro bimestre de 2013. **Bolsa Família Informa** n.366, 29 de maio de 2013.

\_\_\_\_\_. DECON/SENARC/MDS e DICEI/SEB/MEC. **Nota Técnica Conjunta n. 184**. Apresenta informações sobre o Programa Bolsa Família e Programa Mais Educação referentes ao resultado das adesões das escolas em 2013. Brasília, 15 de julho de 2013.

\_\_\_\_\_. SENARC/MDS e SECADI/MEC. **Nota Técnica** n.34. Brasília, 31 de janeiro de 2013. Assunto: O Programa Bolsa Família e a condicionalidade de educação. Resultados de rendimento e movimento escolar.

CURRALERO, Cláudia B. et al. As condicionalidades do Programa Bolsa Família. In: CASTRO, Jorge Abrahão de e MODESTO, Lúcia (orgs.). **Bolsa Família 2003-2010: avanços e desafios**. Brasília: Ipea, 2010. Volume 1.

KEAST, Robyn; BROWN, Kerry e MANDELL, Myrna. Encontrando a combinação certa: decifrando significados e estratégias de integração. **Revista do Serviço Público**. Brasília 63 (3): 311-341, jul./set 2012.

LICHA, Isabel e MOLINA, Carlos Gerardo. Coordinación de la política social: criterios para avanzar. **Serie Documentos de Trabajo** I-58. Washington DC: Instituto Interamericano para el Desarrollo Social. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. 2006.

LÍCIO, Elaine Cristina. A trajetória dos programas de transferência de renda no Brasil: o impacto da variável federativa. **Revista do Serviço Público**. Brasília, 55 (3), 37-59, jul./set. 2004.

LINDERT, Kathy, Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière. The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil's Bolsa Familia Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context. **World Bank Social Protection Working Paper** n.. 0709. 2007.

MESQUITA, Camille Sahb. Contradições do processo de implementação de políticas públicas: uma análise do Programa Bolsa Família 2003-2006. **Revista do Serviço Público**. Brasília 57 (4): 465-487 out./dez 2006.

PETERS, Guy. Managing Horizontal Government. The Politics of Coordination. **Research paper** n. 21. Ottawa. Canadian Centre of Management Development. 1998.

SECRETARIA NACIONAL DE RENDA DA CIDADANIA. Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. Gestão de Condicionalidades e Acompanhamento das Famílias do Programa Bolsa Família In: ENAP. **Ações premiadas no 15º. Concurso Inovação na Gestão Pública Federal**. Brasília: ENAP, 2010, p. 59-80.

SOARES, Sergei e SÁTYRO, Natália. O Programa Bolsa Família: desenho institucional e possibilidades futuras. In: Castro, Jorge Abrahão de e Modesto, Lúcia (orgs.). **Bolsa Família 2003-2010: avanços e desafios**. Volume 1. Brasília: Ipea, 2010.

XIMENES, Daniel de Aquino e AGATTE, Juliana Picoli. A gestão das condicionalidades do Programa Bolsa Família: uma experiência intersectorial e federativa. **Inclusão Social**, Brasília, v. 5 n. 1, p.11-19, jul./dez. 2011.

### Legislation

**Decree No. 5,209 of September 17, 2004.** It regulates Bolsa Família program.

**Law No. 10,836 of January 9, 2004.** It institutes Bolsa Família Program, among other provisions.

**Interministerial Ordinance MEC/MDS No. 3,789 of November 17, 2004.** It adopts provisions concerning the duties and standards for the provision and monitoring of education actions related to the conditions of beneficiary families of Bolsa Família Program and the remaining programs.

**Interministerial Ordinance MEC/MDS No. 3,789 of November 17, 2004.** It adopts provisions concerning the duties and standards for the provision and monitoring of education actions related to the conditions of beneficiary families of Bolsa Família Program.

**Ordinance GM/MDS No. 246 of May 20, 2005.** It regulates the commitment of the municipalities to Bolsa Família Program, approves the instruments necessary for the formalization of the commitment of the municipalities to the program, for the designation of municipal managers of the program and for information about its local instance of social control, and sets the procedure for the commitment of local entities to the referred program.

**Ordinance GM No. 321 of September 27, 2008.** It regulates the Management of Conditions of Bolsa Família Program.

**Ordinance No. 321 of September 29, 2008.** It regulates the management of conditions of Bolsa Família Program, revokes Ordinance GM/MDS No. 552 of November 9, 2005, among other provisions.

**Interministerial Ordinance No. 2 of September 16, 2009.** It institutes the Inter-governmental and Cross-Sectoral Forum for the Management of Conditions of Bolsa Família Program.

## Annex 1

### **Powers and responsibilities of the state government, municipal government and municipal manager of Bolsa Família Program**

#### *State government*

- Instituting the State Coordination of PBF, with corresponding information about its composition to SENARC;
- Development of training activities to subsidize the work of the municipalities in the process of registration and update of information of the database of CadÚnico, in compliance with the provisions of Ordinance GM /MDS No. 369 of 2005, and any normative acts issued by the Ministry related to the subject.
- Development of activities of technical and logistical support to the municipalities, according to the demand and their technical and management skills;
- When necessary, it must provide logistics infrastructure to the municipalities for the entry of information and transmission of data to CadÚnico;
- Implementation of a strategy to support the access of its population in circumstances of poverty or extreme poverty to identification documents.
- Development of a strategy to support the inclusion of traditional and specific populations, especially indigenous communities and remaining quilombos, in the CadÚnico; use of CadÚnico database exclusively to carry out activities foreseen in the Term of Commitment for queries and studies related to income transfer programs.

#### *Municipal government*

- Identification and registration of families in poverty and extreme poverty conditions in the CadÚnico;
- Update of information in the CadÚnico, which is verified through the percentage of valid registrations and the percentage of households updated in the last two years;
- Management of the benefits of PBF and Remaining Programs;

- Ensuring the access of the beneficiaries of PBF to education and health services, in conjunction with Federal and State Governments;
- Monitoring the compliance with the conditions;
- Monitoring of the beneficiary families, acting especially in cases of bigger social vulnerability;
- Establishment of partnerships with local, state and federal agencies and institutions, governmental and non-governmental, for the provision of supplementary programs for the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família Program;
- Verification and/or referral of complaints to the appropriate authorities.

#### *Municipal Manager of the program*


The Municipal Manager is responsible for coordinating the activities of CadÚnico and for the management of Bolsa Família Program (PBF). The Municipal Manager shall be formally appointed by the mayor. The responsibilities are:

- Mediating between the local government, MDS and the state for the implementation of Bolsa Família and CadÚnico. This is why the Manager must have the power to make decisions, to mobilize other institutions and to articulate among the areas involved in the operation of the Program;
- Coordinating the relationship between the secretariats for social assistance, education and health for the monitoring of the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família and the verification of the conditions;
- Coordinating the implementation of the resources transferred by the Federal Government to PBF in the municipalities. These resources have been transferred from the National Fund for Social Assistance to the municipal assistance funds. Thus, the Municipal Manager of Bolsa Família will be responsible for the application of the financial resources of the program - deciding if the resource will be invested in hiring personnel, in training of staff, in the purchase of materials to assist in the work of maintenance of the data of local beneficiaries, among others;
- Mediating the dialogue, on behalf of the municipality, with members of the Instance of Social Control of the municipality, ensuring them the monitoring and inspection of the actions of the program in the community;
- Coordinating the dialogue with other secretariats and agencies related to the municipal, state and federal government, as well as with non-governmental entities, with the purpose to facilitate the implementation of supplementary programs for families beneficiaries of Bolsa Família.

Source: <http://www.mds.gov.br/falemds/perguntas-frequentes/bolsa-familia/bolsa-familia/gestor/bolsa-familia-institucional>

## Annex 2


Evolution of the Monitoring of School Attendance (6 to 17 years). 2008 to 2012. Brazil.



Source: Ximenes and Agatte, 2011: 17

## Annex 3

### Monitoring process of the conditions of Bolsa Família



Extracted from: SENARC. *A importância da gestão das condicionalidades para o Programa Bolsa Família*. <http://www.assistenciasocial.al.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/arquivos/apresentacoes/programacao-do-iii-seminario-estadua-da-frequecia-cscolar-dos-beneficiarios-do-programa-bolsa-familia-1/Apresenta-o%20Macei-%20maio%20de%202011.pdf> (last access: 15/08/2013)

## Glossary of Acronyms

CadÚnico - Single Registry for Social Programs

CRAS - Reference Center for Social Assistance

CREAS - Specialized Reference Center for Social Assistance

DECON - Department of Conditionalities

IGD - Decentralized Management Index

MDS - Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger

MEC- Ministry of Education

PBF - Bolsa Família Program

RMA - Monthly Attendance Record

SECAD - Secretariat for Continuing Education, Literacy and Diversity

SECADI - Secretariat for Continuing Education, Literacy, Diversity and Inclusion

SENARC - National Secretariat for Citizenship Income

SICON - System of Conditionalities

SNAS - National Secretariat for Social Assistance

SUAS - Unified Social Assistance System